Somewhere inside the White House or within a Pentagon war room, large screens display satellite and radar images of Iran’s rugged terrain. Digital lines are drawn across geographical maps as United States President Donald Trump and his generals weigh their options for war with Iran. What was initially expected to be a focused aerial campaign now appears to have slipped beyond its original limits, forcing American decision makers to consider additional options, none of which appear easy to implement.
Military commanders understand well the limits of air campaigns. Air strikes alone rarely topple governments or replace them, and their impact on political engineering is often limited. Even at the purely military level, certain objectives cannot be achieved without a presence on the ground. Aircraft may be able to strike a fortified nuclear site, but the results of such a strike cannot be fully assessed from the air. If the strike proves insufficient, ground forces become necessary to achieve larger objectives such as destroying nuclear facilities or seizing stockpiles of enriched uranium.
The Cost of Ground Deployment
The challenge is that any ground presence carries an entirely different calculation in terms of political, economic, and military costs. Iran’s geography alone presents major obstacles. The country is at least one and a half times larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined and has a population approaching 88 million people.
For decades, American strategic circles have believed that Washington would need to deploy no fewer than 500,000 troops if it intended to change the Iranian government by force. Under current political conditions, such an option would be extremely difficult and would involve serious complications.
What American planners are currently considering is a limited ground operation with clearly defined objectives that could deliver a measurable form of victory. A report by the American outlet Semafor indicated that the administration is studying the possibility of a special forces raid on major nuclear facilities such as Isfahan, Fordow, and Natanz. The aim would be to destroy the sites or seize materials linked to the nuclear programme from within, particularly enriched uranium stockpiles.
Signals of Military Readiness
In the same context, the United States military recently cancelled a major training exercise for a command unit within its elite airborne divisions while keeping the unit on standby at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. This move may indicate preparation for a rapid ground intervention scenario in the region.
The nuclear facility in Isfahan is considered one of the most sensitive potential targets. Earlier this year, the Institute for Science and International Security reported that Iran had buried the entrances to tunnel complexes at the site with earth. Reuters later reported that the facility may contain a significant stockpile of enriched uranium.
Potential targets are not limited to nuclear facilities. Kharg Island, located in the north eastern waters of the Gulf off the coast of Bushehr, is also considered a likely objective. Nearly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports pass through the island, which hosts central oil installations. Gaining control of it would represent a strategic step toward crippling Iran’s economy, according to The Washington Post.
The Role of the 82nd Airborne Division
Regardless of which sites might be targeted, a central question remains: how would the United States carry out such a high risk operation?
The 82nd Airborne Division stands out as the most prominent rapid intervention force in the US military. It is closely tied to the doctrine of rapid forced entry and the seizure of vital targets within a short period of time.
According to the division’s official website, it can deploy within eighteen hours. Its missions include parachute assaults and securing key objectives in preparation for the arrival of follow up forces.
However, the division would not operate alone in any complex operation inside Iran. While it can establish a rapid foothold and secure an initial objective, highly sensitive operations inside nuclear facilities or in complex environments are typically assigned to special operations forces.
Delta Force and Special Operations
Special operations units specialise in short and rapid missions aimed at destroying, capturing, or recovering specific targets, in addition to reconnaissance in sensitive environments. The most prominent of these units is Delta Force, which has reportedly spent years preparing for missions sometimes described in operational circles as “nuclear operations”. These involve entering sites containing fissile materials, centrifuges, or components linked to nuclear weapons, locating them, securing them, and either extracting or destroying them.
Delta Force gained global attention during the United States operation involving Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January of this year. However, operations inside Iran would be significantly more complex.
Military engineering units would also be an essential component of such missions. Joint assault doctrine indicates that success depends on the ability to establish, secure, and sustain a foothold. This task involves not only combat units but also engineers responsible for clearing obstacles, building access routes, preparing landing zones, and opening runways or entry points.
Historical Use of Rapid Intervention Forces
The 82nd Airborne Division has long been associated with rapid intervention operations and airborne assaults.
In October 1983, the division played a major role when the United States launched Operation Urgent Fury against the Caribbean island of Grenada following a political crisis that resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.
The division also appeared in Panama in 1989 during Operation Just Cause, where it was used as part of a rapid intervention strategy that led to the removal of Manuel Noriega.
More recently, elements of the division were deployed in 2020 to secure the US embassy in Baghdad before the assassination of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. The division also participated in the large scale evacuation from Afghanistan in 2021 and in the deployment of American forces to Eastern Europe in 2022 before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
These precedents do not necessarily mean that an airborne operation in Iran would resemble those earlier missions. However, they illustrate how Washington views the 82nd Airborne Division as an elite rapid response force.
A Possible Airborne Assault Plan
No military publicly announces the details of its airborne assault plans, yet such operations generally follow certain principles.
Any ground insertion plan relies first on achieving complete air superiority and disabling the opponent’s defensive capabilities during the initial hours of the operation. The first stage would likely involve a dense wave of surprise missile and air strikes targeting Iranian air defence systems, early warning facilities, and major radar installations, particularly around the intended landing zone.
This was already one of the primary objectives of the initial operation carried out on 28 February, which targeted command and control headquarters, launch platforms for ballistic and hypersonic missiles, drone infrastructure, and Iran’s air defence network.
Additional strikes would likely focus on destroying surface to air missile batteries and air defence command centres in the opening minutes of the operation, using cruise missiles and precision guided bombs launched from stealth aircraft and long range bombers.
At the same time, electronic warfare and cyber operations would play a crucial role in disrupting communications and confusing command responses. A similar tactic reportedly occurred during the strike that targeted Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, when extensive cyber operations targeted government and military networks in order to disrupt Iranian coordination.
The objective of these measures would be to isolate the battlefield from the broader Iranian military system, including the Revolutionary Guard and other combat units, clearing the way for a safe airborne insertion.
American doctrine for airborne assaults indicates that forces could be inserted using fixed wing aircraft or stealth helicopters such as the MH 60 Black Hawk and MH 47G Chinook.
According to a report by the RAND Corporation, assaulting a heavily protected facility such as a nuclear installation may require landing forces at some distance from the target and manoeuvring toward it rather than dropping directly into the most heavily defended area.
If such an operation were carried out, the goal would most likely be temporary control rather than occupation. American airborne doctrine generally revolves around three objectives: seizing the target, engaging hostile forces, or extraction.
The Iranian Response
In Iran’s case, rapid extraction appears the most logical objective due to the country’s vast geography and complex military environment. The attacking force would enter, breach the site or part of it, destroy what must be destroyed, secure what must be secured, and withdraw before tactical success becomes a liability.
At the moment of assault, the greatest danger facing the attacking force would be close combat with Revolutionary Guard units, facility protection forces, and rapid reinforcement units that would rush toward the target once the strike begins.
If the landing occurs near a nuclear or mountainous facility, combat would likely unfold in an environment favourable to Iranian defenders, featuring tunnels, narrow entrances, reinforced concrete fortifications, and concealed firing positions.
According to a report by the Defence Intelligence Agency, Iran possesses the largest underground facilities programme in the Middle East. Its defensive philosophy relies heavily on dispersion, fortification, and concealment.
This means Iranian defenders would not fight only from surface positions but from a defensive infrastructure designed to reduce the effectiveness of air strikes and buy time for defensive units to reorganise and respond.
The confrontation would not remain purely ground based. Even if the attacking force reached the target, it would likely face multiple layers of Iranian response, including suicide drones, short range rockets or missiles targeting landing zones, attacks on air bases used by the assault aircraft, and possibly the opening of other fronts intended to distract command and control structures.
Once the assault force reaches the target, the second phase begins, focusing on rapid control of entrances, exits, and strongpoints that could be used against the attackers. Such battles are usually brief but intense. The attacking side aims to resolve the fight within minutes or hours before reinforcements arrive, while the defenders attempt to slow the advance long enough to bring in additional forces.
In Iran’s case, this challenge becomes even greater. Iranian defence planning is designed not only for conventional surface combat but also for delaying attackers inside narrow and complex environments. If the engagement lasts too long, Iranian forces could attempt to encircle the attacking unit and trap it inside what military doctrine describes as a fire pocket using direct and indirect fire, drones, and closed movement routes.
The withdrawal phase then follows, often the most dangerous stage of the entire operation. Once the element of surprise disappears, the attacking force becomes easier to detect and target. If Iran’s defensive system remains capable of responding after bombardment, the withdrawing force could face more organised fire than it encountered during entry.
Could This Lead to a Full Ground Invasion?
Most likely, the operation being considered would involve a limited and rapid ground insertion with a specific objective. The prospects for a wider ground invasion would depend largely on the success of initial operations and the political appetite to absorb the enormous costs of a larger campaign.
However, certain indicators surrounding the American military buildup near Iran have drawn attention. One of the most notable is the appearance of A 10 aircraft in air movements connected to forward bases near the theatre of operations, along with the positioning of large US naval units in Souda Bay on the island of Crete.
The A 10 is not merely a multi role attack aircraft. It was designed specifically to provide close air support for ground forces, accompanying troops during combat and targeting tanks, armoured vehicles, and hostile ground movements in close proximity to the battlefield.
Unlike aircraft that release munitions from a safe distance, the A 10 can remain over the battlefield for extended periods, observe developments on the ground, and intervene with precision according to the evolving situation.
For this reason, the appearance of such aircraft in any military buildup is not simply a numerical addition to air power but often an indication of increased attention to the ground dimension of the conflict.
This does not necessarily mean that a decision has been made to launch a large scale ground operation. However, it suggests that Washington is keeping that option within the range of possibilities.
Ultimately, invading a vast, mountainous, and densely populated country and attempting to control it would require far more than a few hundred or even several thousand troops. Iran’s territory exceeds one and a half million square kilometres, and much of its population lives around a plateau surrounded by mountain ranges.
Any ground advance would therefore be slower, supply lines longer, and defensive operations easier for forces fighting on their own terrain. Added to this is the challenge of controlling Iran’s major cities, which could turn any ground war into a prolonged and costly urban conflict.
In such a scenario, the human and military costs for Washington would be significant. Even discussions within the United States acknowledge that sending ground troops into Iran would require preparation for heavy losses.
Controlling a country with such complex characteristics could ultimately produce an outcome worse than the experience in Iraq. Iran would not necessarily need to defeat the United States militarily to turn the war into a strategic disaster. It would only need to endure for as long as possible.
