The mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is reshaping parts of the Middle East’s security landscape, strengthening Ankara’s influence, bringing Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities into the equation and highlighting Riyadh’s growing openness to alternative security arrangements.
The development could also complicate Israel’s efforts to integrate itself into emerging regional power structures.
Israeli newspaper Maariv said the agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is creating the outlines of a new regional reality that could make Israel’s integration into the Middle East more difficult.
According to the newspaper, the agreement strengthens Türkiye’s regional standing, gives Pakistan a distinctive role as the only nuclear-armed state among the three parties, and reflects Saudi Arabia’s search for security alternatives beyond complete reliance on Washington.
In an article by Zalman Shoval, Israel’s former ambassador to the United States, Maariv said the defence agreement was signed last week largely at Saudi initiative, with the stated objective of confronting the Iranian threat and its allies.
The newspaper added that Ankara, at least from its perspective, views the arrangement as a means of balancing Israel’s power and influence.
It said the agreement “does not bode well for Israel” because it entrenches a new reality in the Middle East that could obstruct Israel’s path towards deeper regional integration.
The agreement can also be viewed, the newspaper argued, as a framework of understanding among Sunni states in opposition to Shia Islam.
It pointed to the decision to sign the agreement in Mecca, Islam’s holiest city, rather than Riyadh, the Saudi capital, as reinforcing that symbolism.
The three states also share a range of strategic interests, including maintaining freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is particularly important for Saudi Arabia as it seeks to ensure the uninterrupted flow of its oil exports to global markets.
Pakistan, meanwhile, occupies a special position within the arrangement. Despite facing severe economic difficulties, it is the only one of the three countries to possess nuclear weapons.
Türkiye Seen as the Biggest Beneficiary
Maariv argued that Türkiye appears to be the principal beneficiary of the agreement, particularly at the political level.
It said Ankara views the framework as a means of strengthening its position within the Sunni world, describing Türkiye as one of the leading centres of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The status Türkiye has gained through the “Peace Council” in Gaza, chaired by US President Donald Trump, together with the new defence agreement, is helping Ankara expand its influence across the Middle East, including in its dealings with Israel, according to the newspaper.
Türkiye is also moving closer to signing wide-ranging agreements with Saudi Arabia in the military industries sector.
Israeli media outlets have described the agreement as a “Middle East NATO”, although Maariv said that comparison is exaggerated.
The agreement does contain a provision resembling Article 5 of the NATO treaty, under which member states are obliged to assist a member that comes under attack.
However, unlike NATO, the trilateral agreement does not include a unified military command or an agreed mechanism for implementing those mutual obligations.
Potential Conflicts of Interest
The newspaper also noted that Türkiye’s membership in NATO could create conflicts between its obligations to the alliance and those arising from the new agreement.
It added that the trilateral framework does not clearly identify a single common enemy.
Pakistan considers India a potential adversary, Türkiye views Greece as a potential adversary, while Saudi Arabia has its own calculations regarding the Houthis in Yemen.
NATO, by contrast, was historically structured around a single common enemy, the Soviet Union, Maariv said.
No equivalent unifying threat exists within the new agreement, while the question of the Houthis is already being tested following attacks on Saudi territory.
What About the United States?
One of the most important questions raised by the agreement concerns the position of the United States, which is an ally of all three states.
Maariv questioned whether Washington encouraged the agreement and sees it as complementary to existing or future arrangements aimed at stabilising the Middle East, or whether the signatories, particularly Saudi Arabia, are beginning to lose confidence in the United States as a guarantor of their security interests.
In this context, the newspaper referred to the nuclear agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States, which was conditioned on the normalisation of Saudi relations with Israel.
It said Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, appears to be weighing two competing options.
The first is continued reliance on the kingdom’s long-standing relationship with the United States despite the condition concerning Israel.
The second is to rely, at least temporarily, on its nuclear-armed ally Pakistan.
UAE, Egypt and Bahrain Left Outside the Agreement
Maariv noted that the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain were not included in the new arrangement despite being close allies of the United States.
It added that multiple sources indicate the UAE is also working to build a defence axis involving Israel and India.
The newspaper argued that the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement cannot be examined separately from its possible impact on broader geopolitical planning across the Middle East and on the region’s relations with other parts of the world.
In this context, it highlighted the importance of transport corridors linking India with Europe through Saudi Arabia, Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
That route, it said, competes with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The administration of former US President Joe Biden had viewed this issue, along with integrating Israel into the corridor, as one of its major strategic priorities.
Regional Plans That Could Bypass Israel
Maariv said the Trump administration has adopted a more limited approach to the issue, noting that even during negotiations with Iran, Washington focused on ensuring the free passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.
A previous plan had also been proposed to transport fuel in cooperation with Israel through the Ashkelon-Eilat pipeline, but it was blocked by Israel’s so-called change government and has not since been revived.
The newspaper concluded that such initiatives could form part of a broader and more comprehensive plan aimed at reinforcing the trends created by the Abraham Accords.
However, it warned that alternative plans are simultaneously emerging that could bypass Israel and instead give greater priority to Türkiye, Iraq and Syria.
The United States and Europe will also have a role in shaping the direction of these arrangements, Maariv said, adding that responding to these developments will be one of the most important tasks facing Israeli diplomacy in the near future.
