Less than two months remain before the Israeli elections, and the outlook for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is far from promising.
Opinion polls show support for his Likud party stagnating and, at times, declining, while the main opposition party continues to gain ground. The fear-based tactics Netanyahu has used successfully against his rivals in the past are also failing to produce the same effect this time. Meanwhile, a group of new right-wing parties threatens to fragment his electoral bloc and take votes away from Likud.
The question is what Netanyahu might do to save himself from the very real prospect of being removed from power through the ballot box.
Political analysts and commentators have warned that Netanyahu could seek to disrupt the elections by encouraging violence, if not orchestrating it, using the police against the opposition, or attempting to delegitimise the Central Elections Committee that oversees the vote.
If all of those options fail, he could resort, after the polls close, to claims similar to those made by US President Donald Trump about a “stolen election”.
None of these threats has materialised so far. However, the election campaign will not formally begin until 7 September, when parties submit their final electoral lists.
There is, however, one electoral tactic Netanyahu may already have begun to activate: manufacturing one or more security crises.
The objective would be to repair his damaged image as “Mr Security” and give more moderate voters who have drifted away from Likud a reason to reconsider handing the country to his main rival, Gadi Eisenkot, who has never previously held the position of prime minister.
Netanyahu would not necessarily have to launch a full-scale war. He could instead ignite a military confrontation and allow it to escalate to the point where he could plausibly argue that there was no alternative but to go to war.
Was the Abu al-Duhur Strike an Early Signal?
Possible signs of such a strategy emerged on 18 August, when Israeli fighter jets bombed Abu al-Duhur airbase in Syria.
Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz said the attack was intended as a warning to Türkiye against deepening its military presence in Syria. According to reports, a Turkish military delegation had already visited the base with the intention of deploying drones and air defence systems there.
Israel has legitimate concerns regarding Türkiye’s ambitions in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. Yet many observers, including Tom Barrack, US President Donald Trump’s envoy to Türkiye and Syria, expressed doubts about the security rationale behind the attack.
“One theory is that they were simply baiting Türkiye, which is a very aggressive electoral idea, but perhaps one that will be well received,” Barrack speculated.
On other fronts, Trump has restricted Netanyahu’s ability to generate instability.
Iran, which remains the greatest security concern among the Israeli public, has effectively been placed outside Netanyahu’s immediate options after Trump made clear that he does not want the war to resume, at least until the US midterm elections are over in November.
In Gaza and Lebanon, where Trump imposed ceasefires, Netanyahu also has limited room for manoeuvre.
The Turkish Front Carries Its Own Risks
Aggressive action on the Syrian-Turkish front also carries substantial risks.
Washington supports Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s efforts to stabilise the country and align it with the West, and sees Turkish military assistance as a useful component of that process.
The United States, which has chaired security talks between Syria and Israel, does not want Israel to undermine al-Sharaa’s efforts.
Striking Syria and triggering a crisis with Türkiye, or something even more serious, could therefore be too great a gamble for Netanyahu, particularly given his already strained relationship with Trump.
Even so, the Israeli prime minister has spent recent weeks portraying Türkiye as a threat, as though preparing the public for a possible confrontation.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has responded with inflammatory rhetoric towards Israel.
Given Trump’s short attention span and his historical tolerance of Israeli violations of ceasefire agreements in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu may yet receive the green light he needs to attack Türkiye.
The Greater Danger May Be in the West Bank
The more immediate danger, however, lies in the West Bank.
Violence by extremist settlers, which intensified shortly after the Hamas attacks in 2023, has escalated further in recent weeks and become increasingly brazen.
The extremists are no longer attacking only Palestinians and their property. They have also targeted foreign media, pro-Palestinian activists and even Israeli soldiers when they attempt to intervene, which itself remains a rare occurrence.
Israeli military Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir has warned that the situation is getting out of control and ordered the deployment of additional forces.
Netanyahu and his government, however, have ignored those warnings.
With the far-right religious government increasingly concerned that it may soon lose power, it appears to view violence and settlement expansion as a final opportunity to impose irreversible facts on the ground, including land seizures and the displacement of Palestinians from their homes.
In the government’s preferred scenario, the attacks could ignite the kind of miniature “apocalypse” its most extreme members have long hoped for: Palestinians eventually respond with armed resistance, allowing the army and settlers to answer with an overwhelming assault that results in the mass expulsion of the Palestinian population.
Netanyahu does not share the far right’s messianic fantasies.
But his refusal to publicly condemn the violence, together with his failure to take serious action against it, reflects a cynical willingness to exploit the crisis for his own political benefit.
Faced with a wave of Palestinian retaliatory attacks and memories of the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, the average Israeli voter may not ask who started the escalation, but rather who is best equipped to deal with it.
Netanyahu is betting that the public will still view him as the safer and more capable choice.
Washington Has Applied Less Pressure in the West Bank
The Trump administration has directed far less criticism towards Israeli provocations in the West Bank than it has towards Israeli conduct on other fronts.
US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has criticised the violence, but Trump himself has said nothing publicly on the issue.
The risk of entering into an open confrontation with the US president therefore appears relatively low, especially compared with Netanyahu’s other options.
If the situation in the West Bank escalates, or if a security crisis elsewhere leads to the resumption of war, Netanyahu could attempt to use the emergency to postpone the elections altogether.
Such a scenario remains unlikely.
Israeli election law gives the Knesset the power to take such a step, although it would require an overwhelming majority that Netanyahu would find difficult to secure.
Even so, some of his fiercest critics do not completely rule out such a manoeuvre.
Like Trump, Netanyahu has repeatedly tested democratic norms, and he would almost certainly receive the support of his coalition partners.
Would Israelis Reward Another War?
It may appear illogical for Israeli voters to reward a leader seeking to drag the country into further confrontations after nearly three years of continuous war.
Public opinion, however, is more complicated.
There is a degree of “war fatigue”, but that sentiment is outweighed by an even stronger belief that the wars have failed to make Israel safer.
A July poll by the Institute for National Security Studies found that 37% of Israelis regarded Israel’s security situation as bad or very bad, compared with 26% who viewed it as good or very good.
More strikingly, 49% of respondents who support Netanyahu’s government described the security situation as bad or very bad.
A significant segment of the Israeli public therefore appears to regard the country’s wars as unfinished business rather than a chapter that should simply be closed.
Yet there is no guarantee Netanyahu would benefit electorally from inflaming another war.
Polls show that most Israelis believe Netanyahu makes military decisions based on electoral calculations. Netanyahu and his government also generally command less public trust than the military and the broader security establishment, including among coalition voters.
For Netanyahu, Losing May Not Be an Option
Netanyahu nevertheless has a long record of using political tactics that other politicians might hesitate to employ to remain in power.
There is little reason to believe this election will be different.
For Netanyahu, defeat is not a realistic option.
It would almost certainly end his political career and severely damage his legacy by opening the way for a full and impartial government inquiry into the Hamas attacks.
It would also make it more difficult for him to continue delaying his criminal trial or reach a plea agreement that would end the case on favourable terms.
Taken together, these pressures mean Netanyahu may simply decide to fight until the very end, regardless of the risks.
