What does Benjamin Netanyahu need as he heads into his electoral battle? And is his political survival tied primarily to his wartime agenda?
There are reasons to believe so, particularly after unprecedented statements emerged inside Israel. Among the most notable were remarks by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who said Netanyahu could be prepared to “wreck everything” to avoid falling from power, including by delaying the elections themselves.
Such a scenario would normally require one of two conditions: either signs of a civil conflict arising from the elections, which remains unlikely, or the country entering a state of emergency because of an external war, a far more plausible possibility.
Israel has experienced such a scenario before. In 1973, Knesset elections had been scheduled for 30 October. Then the war of 6 October broke out and hundreds of thousands of reservists were called into service. The Knesset was forced to pass a special law postponing the elections for two months, and they were eventually held on 31 December that year.
Netanyahu’s position today appears increasingly difficult, with the prospect of another term far from guaranteed. Yet as he fights one of the broadest political battles of his career, he is also under pressure over the failure of the plan to bring down the Iranian regime.
Netanyahu, along with Israel’s security establishment, now faces the consequences of that failure, even if Israel prefers to describe it as a “setback”.
Against this backdrop, the new leadership of the security services, particularly Mossad, has begun implementing a new operational programme. Its first steps included removing officials responsible for the Iran file and excluding a number of specialists from assessment and planning teams.
The central objective, however, is to prepare an alternative plan capable of being activated as quickly as possible.
Several concrete indicators point towards the Israeli government’s current priorities.
The first is restoring the momentum of the achievements and victories Israel believes it has secured since 7 October, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria or even Iran. This creates an incentive to maintain a high level of escalation.
The second is responding to the severe criticism directed at Netanyahu, particularly from the United States, where he is being blamed for the failure. Israel’s intelligence image has also suffered internationally after its agencies had boasted about their capabilities during the initial rounds in Lebanon and Iran. Israel therefore sees itself as needing an achievement that can restore Western confidence, particularly American confidence, in its capabilities.
The third is revenge against the Iranian leadership, which endured the confrontation and disrupted Netanyahu’s project. This could involve extensive sabotage operations directed not only at the Iranian regime but also at state infrastructure, with the intention of forcing the Iranian population to bear the consequences of its support for its government and the cost of confrontation.
The fourth is Netanyahu’s need to re-establish himself as the “strong leader” whom Israel still requires to expand its position and influence.
How Could Netanyahu Achieve This?
Since the announcement of the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, Netanyahu has felt increasingly constrained.
The US administration narrowed his room for manoeuvre, forcing the Israeli military to obtain prior approval for any action that might be connected to the Iran file, including large-scale military operations in Lebanon.
Beyond the hollow debate surrounding Lebanon’s “framework agreement”, Netanyahu understands that the US-Iranian memorandum established new rules of engagement in Lebanon.
It restricted Israel’s ability to operate freely across Lebanese territory and against multiple categories of targets. At the same time, it did not completely prevent Israel from carrying out operations it considers necessary, provided Washington does not regard them as violations of the new rules.
After the fragile ceasefire, Israel’s efforts therefore concentrated on expanding destruction and bulldozing operations. Northern Command was assigned a security mission centred on the broadest possible intelligence-gathering effort to build a new target bank related to Hezbollah, its members and its cadres.
At the same time, another effort focused on deepening what Israel calls its “defensive line” through calculated and carefully planned operations.
Israel is activating new Mossad programmes inside Iran to repair its image before Trump and prepare the ground for another joint war.
The complex and prolonged operation at Ali al-Taher formed part of this approach.
Israel informed the Americans in advance that it intended to carry out the operation without igniting the entire front. The United States therefore did not oppose the Israeli security and military plan at Ali al-Taher, provided the operation did not create a provocation capable of pushing Iran towards another expansion of the war.
At the same time, Israel entered negotiations with Lebanon in an effort to satisfy the American side, particularly the current associated with Marco Rubio, which has pushed for separating the Lebanese track from the Iranian one.
In practice, few in Lebanon expected any serious Israeli concessions. Everything requested by President Joseph Aoun amounted to little more than cosmetic measures that could justify keeping the negotiations alive.
Israel, ultimately, wants one thing: a confrontation between the Lebanese army and the resistance.
It understands that the army has no intention of entering such a battle and is neither militarily nor operationally prepared for such a confrontation. Tel Aviv has therefore adopted a policy of continually raising its demands, benefiting from Washington’s unwillingness to impose serious pressure on Israel.
Inside the White House, there are those who say, explicitly or implicitly, “we will not be more royalist than the king”, referring to the conduct of Aoun and his negotiating team, which appears more concerned with uprooting the resistance than ending the occupation.
As the Iran Track Falters, Israel Sees an Opening
A strong view existed inside Israel that the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran was not in the interests of the United States.
The Israeli leadership, along with other parties, including Iran itself, developed a conviction that the memorandum would not survive for long.
Israel, however, does not want to undermine it simply to pave the way for another agreement. Rather, it seeks to derail the arrangement and reopen discussion about resuming a large-scale war aimed at overthrowing the Iranian regime.
That objective has failed to gain enthusiasm from other parties.
The US administration itself does not appear supportive. Arab Gulf states have meanwhile expressed concern that a broad escalation could open the gates of hell against all of their interests.
At the same time, another front has been taking shape among states opposed to unchecked Israeli expansion. Its members span from China in the east to Egypt in the west, passing through Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other countries.
These states maintain strong relations with the current US administration and have acted, and continue to act, as a brake on ideas that periodically surface inside the White House about launching a major military operation against Iran.
They have also benefited from the growing internal debate within the US administration and increasing criticism of Israel to limit momentum towards another confrontation.
As difficulties began to emerge in the US-Iranian understanding, however, Israel returned to examining how it could regain access to the decision-making table, driven by its desire to become a partner in any new war against Iran.
Israel considers itself better prepared today than it was previously. It says it has corrected mistakes made during the previous phase, while Israeli military and security circles are once again promoting the idea that an opportunity has emerged to deliver a decisive blow against Iran.
Iran, meanwhile, regardless of how Washington manages the current tension, has pursued a path designed to keep Israel outside the present confrontation.
Tehran is concentrating on direct confrontation with the Americans, seeking to pressure Washington to return to the memorandum of understanding while simultaneously reducing the level of US military presence in the region.
Netanyahu is attempting to reverse that equation.
His objective would be to drag Iran into a direct confrontation with Israel while tensions with the United States are already high, creating the conditions for a new campaign jointly led by Washington and Tel Aviv against Iran.
Under such a scenario, Israel would require at least partial American assistance with air defences and clear US support in opening stores of heavy munitions required for a large-scale war.
On intelligence, Israel claims it does not need American support. US intelligence circles reject that assertion, arguing that successful Israeli operations would not have been possible without American intelligence assistance.
Netanyahu currently lacks a justification for launching a direct military attack against Iran.
That does not mean he has abandoned the idea of drawing Tehran into another confrontation. Instead, he may simply be searching for another route towards the same objective.
He may believe he has found it in Lebanon.
Escalation against the resistance in Lebanon, combined with a return to open bombing across different parts of the country, could be designed to provoke a response from the resistance.
Israel could then broaden its strikes and escalation, eventually placing Iran under pressure to enter the war. At that point, Netanyahu would have achieved what he sought.
Or Is the Objective to Restore Freedom of Action?
The debate raises another fundamental question about the nature of what is currently happening in southern Lebanon.
Netanyahu received instructions from Trump not to launch a large-scale military operation aimed at occupying Ali al-Taher or other positions, and has so far operated within those limits.
When the Americans attempted to persuade Hezbollah to hand these positions over to the Lebanese army, Hezbollah had no intention of agreeing.
More importantly, President Joseph Aoun, who had previously told the Americans that the army would not enter into confrontation with Hezbollah, also reportedly told them, in effect: “Why are you pressuring us? Let Israel complete the task, and afterwards we will deal with what comes next.”
The front opposing Netanyahu sees removing him from power as a central objective of its political and military strategy.
Understanding the Israeli operations in the south therefore requires examining whether Israel is initiating strikes and assassinations beyond the security zone, or whether it is carrying them out in response to actions by the resistance.
For the Israeli government and military, the US-Iranian memorandum removed an advantage that had previously given Israel broad room for manoeuvre: “freedom of action”.
Under the new rules, Israel became restricted from targeting security, political or military sites in areas far beyond the occupied zone, while continuing to insist on what it considers its “right to respond to existing threats”.
One interpretation emerging from this debate is that Netanyahu may not currently be capable of launching an operation large enough to derail the elections.
Instead, the “permanent gain” and “open-ended right” he may be seeking is Israel’s ability to act freely against anything it classifies as a threat to its security.
Netanyahu is no political novice. He understands the American position, while Israel’s military and security agencies possess enough intelligence to assess what Iran and Hezbollah currently want.
Therefore, if Netanyahu cannot persuade the United States to support another large-scale war against Iran, one objective of Israel’s current operations may be to impose a new reality built around a claimed “right to remove threats”.
Following what happened at Ali al-Taher and the widening destruction inside the occupied area, the Israeli objective may therefore be to restore the freedom of action it enjoyed before 2 March.
Iran and the Resistance: Strategic Ambiguity
There is little dispute that none of the actors confronting Israel wants Netanyahu to remain in power.
The parties involved in the confrontation, from Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen, the Iraqi resistance and Iran, see no interest in Netanyahu’s continued rule, regardless of who might eventually replace him.
Yet the issue also revolves around Netanyahu himself.
He represents a political vision distinct from many others inside Israel, one shaped since his youth and explained repeatedly in his speeches and books.
Any change in Israel’s leadership would therefore affect numerous calculations. One of the most important is a question Israel has still not been prepared to answer: should it halt the current wave of attacks against its enemies, or continue the war regardless of its domestic and external cost?
Some may assume that the clarity of this equation automatically means the opposing side will refuse to be drawn into it.
If Israel wants to provoke Iran, the argument goes, then Iran and Hezbollah should absorb the new escalation and refrain from responding, thereby denying Netanyahu the outcome he seeks.
But the calculations are not that simple.
Iran’s calculations after the failure of the memorandum of understanding with the United States are no longer identical to those that existed before it. Nor is its assessment of Israel’s role in what occurred still governed by the rules of the previous phase.
Everything connected to the doctrine of “strategic patience” has changed.
That approach has ended, and it is not coming back.
What Iran and the resistance are capable of doing under these new conditions is another question altogether.
