International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi has said the planned nuclear agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia does not require Riyadh to sign the Additional Protocol or accept the so-called “gold standard”, which would give the agency broader inspection powers. However, arrangements resembling parts of those safeguards are being prepared.
What Stands Out?
Saudi Arabia has rejected the principle of the “gold standard”, which prevents domestic uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of nuclear material, unlike a previous US agreement with the United Arab Emirates.
Grossi, however, says Riyadh is preparing to accept obligations beyond the basic requirements in its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement governing its relationship with the IAEA.
Has the IAEA Been Involved in the Agreement?
Yes, according to Grossi.
“The important thing is that, during the consultations and the preparation process, we were able to include some provisions in the bilateral agreement that would give the agency additional verification and monitoring powers,” he told a press conference.
He said those powers would relate to activities including uranium enrichment, the preceding stage known as uranium conversion, and reprocessing, which allows plutonium to be separated from spent reactor fuel.
“As we all know, these are sensitive activities. Therefore, about them, we will have powers and capabilities very similar to those provided for under the Additional Protocol,” Grossi said, without providing further details.
According to Reuters, Grossi said the bilateral arrangement between the IAEA and Saudi Arabia would be submitted to the agency’s 35-member Board of Governors once the details were finalised.
Recent Developments
The United States and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement in July on cooperation in civilian nuclear energy that would allow Riyadh to enrich uranium and build nuclear reactors using American technology.
In August, the administration of US President Donald Trump submitted a “123 Agreement” for the transfer of nuclear energy technology to Congress, signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.
What Is the “Gold Standard”?
The “gold standard” is a strict legal and regulatory model under which a country voluntarily and permanently renounces domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in exchange for access to civilian nuclear technology and equipment from advanced nuclear states.
In practical terms, Saudi Arabia would not be bound by the IAEA Additional Protocol, which gives the agency broader powers to monitor a country’s nuclear activities and conduct wider inspections within the country, rather than limiting access to declared nuclear energy facilities.
Why Is It Called a “123 Agreement”?
The agreement takes its name from Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
It provides the legally required framework for major peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and its partners before significant exports of US-origin nuclear material, such as reactor fuel, or equipment, including nuclear reactors and major components, can be authorised.
What Does the Agreement Require?
Beyond facilitating nuclear cooperation, a 123 Agreement is designed to advance shared nuclear non-proliferation and security objectives between the United States and its partners. It establishes nine nuclear non-proliferation criteria.
According to the US State Department, these include legal commitments by US partners to maintain strong standards concerning IAEA safeguards and the physical security of transferred nuclear material.
The United States also retains approval rights over the retransfer, enrichment or processing of US-obligated nuclear material supplied to another partner. Transferred material or equipment must not be used in a nuclear explosive device or for any other military purpose.
What Are the Details of the Saudi Agreement?
The agreement is set to run for 30 years and is valued at billions of dollars.
It gives US companies a central role in building Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme while excluding foreign competitors.
The agreement includes the construction of nuclear reactors using technology from the US company Westinghouse, including its AP1000 reactor, which produces approximately 1,100 megawatts of electricity.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the agreement also provides for a two-year joint US-Saudi study to assess the commercial feasibility of enriching uranium inside the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia would also commit not to turn to another partner for 10 years if the United States objects.
The Nuclear Energy Case
Among the proposed reactors, the AP1000 produces around 1,100 megawatts of electricity, enough to supply approximately 800,000 to one million homes.
In practical terms, that could provide electricity to a large city or several smaller cities, depending on electricity consumption levels in the country concerned.
What Does Saudi Arabia Gain?
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme is linked to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 agenda, which seeks to diversify the Kingdom’s energy sources, support the development of atomic energy and use nuclear energy and radiation applications for peaceful purposes in pursuit of sustainable national development.
Saudi Arabia is also seeking to diversify its energy mix, utilise its domestic uranium reserves and free up larger quantities of oil for export.
Does Saudi Arabia Want a Nuclear Bomb?
The answer, based on Mohammed bin Salman’s previous public statements, is both yes and no.
The crown prince has repeatedly said in media interviews that Saudi Arabia is not seeking to build a nuclear weapon. However, he has also stated that the Kingdom would pursue one if neighbouring Iran developed a nuclear bomb.
What Happens Next?
Once the agreement is formally submitted to Congress, it enters a review period of approximately 90 days of continuous congressional session, during which lawmakers can seek to block it.
If an objection does not succeed, the agreement can enter into force.
To prevent the agreement from proceeding, Congress would need to pass a joint resolution with a two-thirds majority sufficient to override any presidential veto.
