A report by Izvestia examines Iran’s ability to sustain its missile programme despite sustained strikes and sanctions, pointing to a deeply embedded infrastructure and a strategy built on attrition and adaptability.
The report challenges claims from Washington that Iran’s missile arsenal is nearing depletion, arguing such assessments are premature. Despite repeated strikes, significant portions of Iran’s production capacity remain operational, largely due to facilities located underground and shielded from direct surveillance and targeting.
Tehran retains a broad margin for manoeuvre, allowing it to choose between rapid escalation or a prolonged attritional strategy. This decision is expected to shape the trajectory of the current phase and determine the scale and direction of escalation across the region.
Iran’s War Strategy: Escalation or Endurance
According to military analyst Dmitry Kornev, two primary scenarios define Iran’s operational approach.
The first is a high-risk escalation model, described as a “maximum commitment” strategy. This would involve sharply increasing the volume of missile launches, potentially doubling or tripling attack rates compared to March levels. The objective is to overwhelm enemy air defence systems, exploiting potential shortages in interceptor munitions. While this approach increases the likelihood of breaching defensive systems and inflicting substantial damage, it carries a critical drawback: rapid depletion of missile stockpiles.
The second scenario is a long-war strategy, which statistical indicators suggest Iran attempted to follow during April. This approach relies on strict rationing of missile usage, extending operational timelines from one month up to six months. It prioritises sustainability over immediate impact, but remains fragile, requiring Iran to withstand continuous and intense aerial pressure.
There remains a possibility that Tehran could abandon this controlled approach in favour of immediate escalation, particularly if it calculates that its remaining capabilities can still deliver high-impact strikes in the short term.
US Assessment: Reduced Arsenal and Weakened Capabilities
The report notes that Washington estimates Iran retains approximately 50 percent of its pre-war missile stockpile.
In remarks to Fox News, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Iran is seeking a deal as its arsenal declines and its broader military capabilities weaken. He claimed that Tehran has lost significant portions of its naval and air power, alongside mounting economic pressure driven by inflation, drought conditions, and sanctions.
Rubio asserted that Iran now holds only half of its ammunition, lacks functional industrial capacity, and has suffered major infrastructure damage, leaving it in a significantly weakened position.
Open-source estimates further suggest that by late April, Iran faced shortages not only in munitions but also in launch systems. Assessments attributed to the occupation indicate that up to 60 percent of launch platforms have been destroyed, creating a clear imbalance in operational capacity.
Even with roughly half of its missile stockpile intact, Iran’s ability to conduct large-scale, concentrated strikes has declined to around 40 percent of its previous capability.
Missile Usage Patterns and Inventory Breakdown
Kornev’s analysis of munitions usage between late February and late April reveals significant variation across missile types.
Short-range systems such as Fateh, Zolfaghar, and Qiam formed the backbone of operations, particularly in strikes targeting Gulf states. These systems have reportedly been depleted by around 50 percent.
In contrast, medium- and long-range missiles, including Emad and Khorramshahr, have been deployed more selectively, preserving a larger share of their reserves, estimated to remain between 55 percent and 70 percent.
Strategic systems and space-related programmes have largely remained outside intensive operational use, maintaining their status as reserve capabilities.
Underground Infrastructure: The Hidden Backbone
Military expert Yuri Lyamin highlights a critical flaw in many external assessments: the failure to account for Iran’s extensive underground infrastructure strategy.
Unlike conventional industrial facilities, Iran’s missile production network has been developed over decades and is embedded deep within mountainous terrain, making it highly resistant to detection and direct strikes.
Satellite imagery, often relied upon in external analysis, reveals only surface-level installations. Core facilities, including assembly lines and solid fuel production systems, are protected within hardened geological layers.
Lyamin points to the experience of the occupation in Syria as evidence, where years of repeated airstrikes failed to decisively disable underground production sites. Targeting tunnel entrances does not equate to destroying entire facilities, and Iran has demonstrated the ability to clear debris and restore supply lines to underground bases within hours.
Production Resilience Despite Sanctions
Conflict data from 2024 to 2025 reinforces the resilience of this system. Intelligence projections that Iran would require years to rebuild solid fuel production capacity proved inaccurate, as Tehran resumed large-scale output within months.
According to Lyamin, Iran’s industry has consistently rebounded after each escalation cycle, producing hundreds of ballistic missiles monthly. This suggests not only intact underground facilities but also stockpiled equipment that enables rapid repair of damaged surface installations.
The maritime blockade has constrained oil exports but has not critically disrupted the supply of essential components. Land routes, cooperation across the Caspian Sea, and indirect supply chains through third countries continue to sustain production cycles.
While the missile industry has likely suffered significant damage, it has not reached operational paralysis. The current situation reflects a temporary slowdown rather than structural collapse, one that Iran is positioned to overcome in a relatively short timeframe.
Strategic Miscalculation Risk
The report concludes with a warning from Lyamin that relying on estimates suggesting Iran’s capabilities have been halved may underestimate the structural depth and layered design of its military-industrial system. This architecture was built specifically to sustain prolonged wars of attrition, not short-term engagements.
