Turkish-Israeli relations have endured a chronic state of tension over the past 15 years, where hard military power intersects with geopolitical and economic calculations. This has produced indirect confrontation lines shaped by minority files across the region and by each side’s relationships with Western states.
Although both countries possess substantial, hard military capabilities, experts interviewed by Al Jazeera Net stress that this strength functions primarily as deterrence, not as a sign of readiness to use force. Each side understands the costs and risks of direct escalation.
With Israel repeatedly signalling dreams of regional expansion and projecting military power across multiple fronts—in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen—Ankara’s concern has grown over movements spanning large stretches of its near-abroad, viewing them as threats to Turkey’s national security.
Turkey’s recent announcement to cut commercial relations with Israel and close all ports to Israeli goods fits this context: a sharp escalation responding to Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza. Ankara thus re-affirmed that a clash with Tel Aviv is no longer unthinkable, even as both prefer to keep competition within indirect bounds.
This report surveys, through several experts, the core strengths of each party, the scope of potential confrontations, and the levers of pressure—minority cards, economic and geopolitical files, and the use of overlapping relationships with Western states, especially the United States.
The Role of Military Power
While attention often goes first to the sheer weight of Turkish and Israeli military power as a cornerstone of the rivalry, Liqaa Makki, Senior Researcher at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, argues it is less decisive than other vectors of influence.
Makki explains that military power chiefly provides deterrence and helps prevent direct clashes. “I do not think the two sides are currently prepared to use military force in a direct confrontation,” he says, “but it remains a pressure card linked to displaying power more than actual use.”
Assessing how this power translates, Omar Ozkizilcik, Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, notes that both Turkey and Israel can project influence beyond their borders. Yet their modes of influence differ:
- Turkey enjoys continuity and integration in the arenas where it operates, thanks to superior soft power and regional acceptance.
- Israel, despite airpower and cyber advantages, struggles to sustain durable influence outside its borders.
Security and military expert Osama Khaled provides a comparative snapshot of capabilities:
Turkey’s Military Endowments
- Air defence, interception, and early-warning systems.
- Intelligence capabilities with reach into external theatres.
- Political decision-making strength and execution via multiple institutions.
- Airpower with a particular edge in unmanned aviation.
- Missile and naval capabilities notable by regional standards.
- Vast geography relative to Israel.
- Large, resilient demography—a deep manpower reservoir for protracted war.
Israel’s Military Strengths
- Formidable cyber capabilities—the region’s largest.
- Human intelligence penetration, recruitment, and access to adversaries’ inner circles.
- Air defence and long-reach airpower, stealth progress, and layered air-defence systems among the world’s most advanced.
- Extensive missile forces able to reach most surrounding targets.
- Elite units capable of operating behind enemy lines with high professionalism.
- Political decisiveness that seizes opportunities without hesitation.
In recent weeks, Turkey has taken three practical steps in anticipation of a possible confrontation with Israel: bolstering air-defence systems, strengthening the home front, and building advanced shelters against nuclear-related threats. Additionally, the Turkish military received a locally built “Steel Dome” system, and Ankara moved to acquire Eurofighter jets to reinforce airpower—signalling that Turkey is exploiting deterrence gaps in the region and preparing for any sudden shift in the balance of power.
Political and Economic Pressure Cards
The ability of both Ankara and Tel Aviv to reshape regional geopolitics is central to their competition. Makki notes that Israel can irritate Turkey via relations with actors such as Kurds in northern Syria, and through supporting minorities elsewhere; in turn, Turkey wields broad influence in vital files such as ties with Azerbaijan and Armenia and alliances with notable regional powers.
On the economic side, Makki points out that cutting trade affects both: Turkey had exported agricultural and other products to Israel, and after the cutoff found third-party routes for exports; meanwhile, Turkey’s tourism sector has felt the loss of Israeli visitors. The result is reciprocal pressure that does not reach a decisive level for either side.
He adds that the former Israel–Egypt–Greece–Cyprus alignment on East Mediterranean gas once posed major leverage against Turkey, but Ankara’s improved ties with Cairo and the Gulf have weakened that card and closed some avenues for Tel Aviv.
From Ozkizilcik’s perspective, Turkish diplomacy has made Ankara a welcomed actor across the region, while Israel—due to its policies—faces relative isolation among neighbours, despite attempts to forge political and economic alignments, including moves toward normalisation.
The Minority Card in the Region
Over the last 15 years, Turkish-Israeli relations have settled into intermittent, indirect confrontations, where geopolitical leverage matters more than raw military force.
Within this context, the Kurdish and Druze files in Syria intersect with Ankara–Tel Aviv competition. Makki notes Israel’s ties with Kurdish actors are murky: there are signals of contacts with the PKK, while support for the SDF appears clearer—though the SDF also receives backing from multiple parties, including Washington and Tehran. The ledger remains complex and indirect.
Regarding the Druze (in southern Syria), Israel’s support functions as a persistent attempt to rattle Turkey’s national security via the Syrian theatre. This lever resurfaces whenever the struggle over influence in Syria intensifies.
Ozkizilcik stresses this is not a “minority struggle” per se, but a clash of visions:
- Turkey prefers strong, stable neighbouring states.
- Israel sees its security in weaker or fragmented neighbours.
Thus, Israel does not pursue humanitarian alliances with Druze or Kurds; it uses them as geopolitical instruments.
Osama Khaled adds that Israeli support for the SDF and Druze in Suwayda heightens Ankara’s fears of erosion of influence and demographic/security shifts in its Syrian sphere. Turkey’s response is to fortify the home front and address chronic challenges like the PKK, leaving the minority card as a temporary pressure tool rather than a decisive game-changer.
Demographically, Kurds are concentrated in northeast Syria (al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and parts of Aleppo), while Druze are in Suwayda (south Syria). Both zones sit on contact lines of influence: Kurds along Turkey’s southern border, Druze on Syria’s southern flank near the occupied Golan and Israeli zones of influence.
Relations with the West
Western positions clearly shape Turkish-Israeli dynamics. It is best not to lump Western states together: Europe often diverges from U.S. positions, especially under the shadow of the Russia–Ukraine war and President Donald Trump’s approach to it and to NATO—where Turkey is the alliance’s second-largest military.
According to Osama Khaled, Europe pursues a pragmatic regional role to back stability and protect interests. As a key NATO member and a major defence power in Europe, Turkey is not a partner European capitals wish to lose to Israel, regardless of tensions. Still, an open confrontation could split Europe—some states leaning toward Israel, others pushing mediation and de-escalation.
The U.S. stance is more complex: Washington seeks to guard its interests with both, yet remains clearly tilted toward Israel if forced to choose, due to Israeli influence in U.S. corridors and the strategic partnership. Even so, Turkey’s geography, societal scale, and strategic location grant Ankara leverage, and the U.S. is keen not to lose Turkey as a vital counterweight to Russia.
Broadly, the West prefers no direct clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Europe and America tend toward mediation and tension-reduction, particularly since Turkey’s state-building vision is closer to Western preferences, while Israel often prefers a fragmented environment it deems safer.
Since the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010—when Israeli forces killed Turkish activists attempting to break the Gaza naval blockade—relations have sharply deteriorated, cycling between limited rapprochement and recurring disputes. Tensions have spiked at each major regional juncture, especially following Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza since October 2023 and Turkey’s recent trade cutoff and port closures.
Outlook
The Middle East remains ripe for further shifts amid Ankara–Tel Aviv competition. Both sides recognise that a military clash is the worst-case scenario, yet the equation stays open to new regional surprises as local and international conflicts intensify.
