Questions are growing across the region over whether Turkey could become “Israel’s” next strategic target after the war on Iran. The question is no longer limited to political commentary or social media speculation. It has entered the language of analysts, former officials and regional observers who see Turkish-Israeli relations moving from diplomatic tension into open strategic rivalry.
Yet the more serious assessment is this: a direct military confrontation between Turkey and “Israel” remains unlikely, but the rivalry between them is already unfolding across Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, regional trade corridors, defence industries and the wider struggle over the future of West Asia.
This is not a passing diplomatic dispute. It is a deeper contest over influence, borders, security, alliances and the shape of the region after decades of American dominance.
For Sunna Files readers, the issue must be understood with clarity. The matter is not simply whether two states will go to war. The real question is whether the Muslim region is entering a new phase in which the balance of power is being rewritten, and whether Turkey now stands as one of the main actors challenging the regional order “Israel” seeks to impose.
From Diplomatic Tension to Strategic Rivalry
For years, Turkey and “Israel” maintained a relationship marked by caution, crisis and occasional cooperation. There were diplomatic ruptures, public confrontations and periods of limited normalisation. But the current phase appears different.
Geopolitical analyst Mahmoud Allouch argues that the relationship has moved beyond a temporary diplomatic crisis into what he describes as an intense strategic rivalry.
This rivalry now spans several theatres. In Syria, Turkey seeks influence over the country’s future political and security direction, while “Israel” continues to act through military pressure and security calculations. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara views Israeli cooperation with Greece and Southern Cyprus as part of a wider attempt to contain Turkish influence. In regional economics, new trade corridor proposals are challenging “Israel’s” ambition to position itself as a key commercial bridge between Asia and Europe.
What was once a relationship shaped by cautious management has become a contest over regional architecture.
Three Drivers Behind the Rivalry
There are three main drivers behind the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry.
The first is mutual threat perception. Turkey’s expanding regional influence, especially since the political upheavals that began in 2011, is increasingly viewed by “Israel” as a strategic challenge. Ankara’s links to Syria, its influence among Sunni populations, its military presence in several theatres and its growing defence industry all contribute to Israeli concern.
The second driver is the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey believes “Israel” is building a regional alignment with Greece and Southern Cyprus to limit Turkish power and consolidate Israeli influence over energy routes, maritime zones and regional security partnerships. For Ankara, this is not a side issue. The Eastern Mediterranean is tied to national security, energy, Cyprus and Turkey’s wider strategic identity.
The third driver is the changing role of the United States. Washington remains the most important external actor capable of preventing escalation between Turkey and “Israel”. However, American leverage is no longer what it once was. Both Ankara and Tel Aviv have grown more willing to act independently, and both have tested the limits of US influence in different ways.
This does not mean the United States is irrelevant. It still has decisive influence. But it no longer controls the relationship with the same discipline it once did.
Is Direct War Likely?
Despite the rising tension, direct war between Turkey and “Israel” remains unlikely in the foreseeable future.
The reasons are structural and strategic.
Turkey possesses one of NATO’s largest militaries, controls one of the world’s most important geographic positions, and remains central to Western security architecture. A direct conflict involving Turkey would not resemble previous Israeli military operations against weaker or isolated regional actors. It would carry far greater international consequences.
Turkey is also not a state that can be attacked without triggering a wider strategic crisis. Its position between Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean gives it a level of importance that complicates any military scenario.
For “Israel”, opening a front against a military power such as Turkey would be extraordinarily risky. For Turkey, direct war with “Israel” would also carry major diplomatic, military and economic consequences. Neither side has a clear interest in pushing the rivalry into open confrontation.
This is why the more likely scenario is not conventional war, but intensified confrontation through proxy arenas, regional positioning, military deterrence, intelligence activity, diplomatic pressure and economic corridors.
“Turkey Is the New Iran”
The phrase that captured recent attention came from former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who reportedly described Turkey as “the new Iran” during a conference of major American Jewish organisations in February 2026.
The statement caused anger in Turkey because it suggested that once Iran was weakened or contained, Ankara could become the next major strategic concern for “Israel”.
Other voices close to Israeli and American strategic circles have advanced similar arguments. Some have called for the United States and “Israel” to contain Turkey, accusing Ankara of opposing US foreign policy, disturbing Western allies and seeking a larger regional role after the war on Iran.
Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official, went even further in an article arguing that “Israel” could launch a preemptive strike on Turkey. Such claims are not official policy, but they are useful indicators of a mood within certain circles that increasingly view Turkey as a long-term strategic obstacle.
Turkey has clearly noticed this shift.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly described Israeli actions in Syria, Lebanon and the wider region as threats that also affect Turkey’s security. His language should not be dismissed as mere political theatre. It reflects a broader strategic concern within Ankara that “Israel’s” military behaviour is no longer limited to Palestine, Lebanon or Syria, but is part of a wider attempt to reshape the region through force.
When Erdogan says Turkey’s security begins in Beirut and Damascus, he is sending a deterrent message. Ankara is warning that Israeli escalation in Syria or Lebanon is not seen as distant from Turkish national security.
Syria Is the Central Arena
If there is one place where Turkish-Israeli rivalry is already visible, it is Syria.
Syria is no longer simply another regional file. It has become the central arena where competing visions for the future of West Asia are colliding.
Turkey has historical, religious, cultural and geographic ties to Syria. It also has direct security interests, border concerns, refugee pressures and military influence on the ground. For Ankara, Syria’s future is not external policy. It is a core national security matter.
“Israel”, by contrast, approaches Syria largely through a security lens. Its priority is to prevent the emergence of any military or political arrangement that could threaten its northern front, challenge its occupation of the Golan Heights or allow hostile forces to consolidate near its borders.
This creates fundamentally conflicting strategic interests.
Turkey wants influence over Syria’s future political order. “Israel” wants to limit threats and prevent the rise of any regional axis that could restrict its freedom of military action. These are not easily reconcilable positions.
Trade Corridors and the Battle for Regional Connectivity
The rivalry is not only military. It is also economic and infrastructural.
Following political changes in Syria and growing Turkish-Saudi cooperation, proposals have emerged for new regional trade corridors linking Turkey with the Gulf through Syria and Jordan. Such routes could strengthen Turkey’s position as a bridge between Europe, West Asia and the Gulf.
This directly challenges the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, a project in which “Israel” hoped to become a central commercial gateway between Asia and Europe.
Trade corridors are not merely roads, railways or ports. They are instruments of power. They determine which states become indispensable, which territories become connected, and which political projects gain long-term influence.
For this reason, Syria is not just about security. It is about the future map of regional trade, influence and dependency.
Turkey’s Defence Industry Changes the Equation
Any discussion about whether Turkey could become “Israel’s” next target must include Turkey’s defence industry.
Turkey’s defence sector has transformed dramatically over the past several decades. Once heavily dependent on Western military aid and imported weapons, Ankara has built a growing domestic defence ecosystem that now plays a central role in its strategic autonomy.
This transformation has deep roots. During the Cold War, Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and became deeply tied to Western military systems. For years, its armed forces relied heavily on US equipment, support and financing.
The Cyprus crises of the 1960s and 1970s changed Turkish thinking. When Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo in 1975. The embargo disrupted Turkey’s military readiness and exposed the dangers of dependency on foreign suppliers.
That experience became a strategic lesson. Turkey began investing more seriously in domestic defence institutions, including ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, and later expanded into drones, missiles, naval systems, electronics, air defence and military exports.
By the 2020s, Turkey had become a major defence exporter. Its drones, armoured vehicles, missiles and electronic systems have been used or purchased across several regions. This growth has strengthened Ankara’s regional influence and reduced its reliance on external suppliers.
This is one reason “Israel” and its allies watch Turkey closely. A Turkey with a stronger defence sector is harder to pressure, harder to isolate and harder to treat as a subordinate actor.
Shared Concerns, Different Objectives
Despite their rivalry, Turkey and “Israel” still have one overlapping concern: neither wants Syria to collapse completely into long-term state failure.
A fully collapsed Syria would create security threats for both. It could produce uncontrolled armed groups, refugee flows, smuggling networks and unpredictable cross-border instability.
But beyond that narrow overlap, their objectives diverge.
Turkey wants a Syria where its influence is strong, its borders are secure, Kurdish separatist threats are contained, refugees can eventually return, and regional trade routes can be rebuilt. “Israel” wants a Syria that does not develop into a strong military threat and does not become part of any regional structure that limits Israeli freedom of action.
These two visions cannot easily coexist.
The Muslim World and the Question of Power
For Muslims, the Turkey-Israel rivalry must be read as part of a larger picture.
The modern Muslim world has suffered for decades from fragmentation, occupation, foreign dependency, weak leadership and externally imposed security orders. Palestine has remained the clearest wound in this reality. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and other lands have also paid the price of collapsed sovereignty and foreign intervention.
Turkey’s rise as an independent regional actor is therefore watched with hope by some and suspicion by others. It is not because Turkey is perfect, nor because any state should be treated as beyond criticism. Rather, it is because any shift away from total Western and Israeli dominance creates new calculations in the region.
Islam teaches that strength must be tied to justice. Power without justice becomes oppression. But weakness without strategy also leaves communities exposed.
The Qur’an commands Muslims to prepare strength as a means of deterrence, not aggression. Deterrence matters because unchecked aggression only grows when it believes there will be no consequence.
This is why Turkey’s defence rise, its regional diplomacy and its posture toward Syria and Palestine matter beyond Turkish domestic politics. They are part of a wider question: will the region remain shaped by external force, or will Muslim-majority states regain the ability to influence their own future?
What Happens Next?
The next chapter of Turkish-Israeli relations is unlikely to be written through direct war. It is more likely to unfold through Syria, Lebanon, trade corridors, defence projects, diplomatic alignments and the struggle over influence in West Asia.
The rivalry will likely intensify. The rhetoric will remain sharp. “Israel” will continue to view Turkey’s expanding role with concern. Turkey will continue to view Israeli military behaviour as destabilising and threatening to the regional balance.
But direct military confrontation remains improbable because the cost would be too high for both sides, and because the United States still has strong incentives to prevent such a war.
The real battlefield is therefore not only physical. It is strategic.
It is the future of Syria.
It is the shape of regional trade.
It is the strength of defence industries.
It is the alignment of Muslim states.
It is the ability to deter aggression without falling into reckless war.
Turkey may not be “Israel’s” next military target in the direct sense. But it has clearly become one of the main strategic obstacles to the regional order “Israel” wants to build.
That is why the question matters.
Not because war is inevitable, but because the regional balance is changing.
