Long before Israel was established in 1948, Zionist leaders developed a strategic vision for the Middle East that relied on military force, cooperation with colonial powers and opposition to movements seeking Arab and Islamic independence.
The establishment of Israel, following the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns and the mass displacement of Palestinians during the Nakba, provided the foundation for this strategy.
From its beginnings, the Zionist project sought not merely to secure its existence through military superiority, but also to position itself as a strategic, security and political partner to the colonial powers supporting its establishment.
An essential component of this approach was obstructing efforts towards Arab and Islamic independence, particularly projects aimed at developing industrial, defensive and institutional capabilities that could enable regional populations to overcome political fragmentation and dependence on Western and other foreign powers.
During its war on Gaza, which has been accompanied by accusations of genocide against the Palestinian people, the Israeli government sought to exploit the wider military confrontation to pursue a far more ambitious strategic objective: reshaping the Middle East into a regional order dominated by Israel.
Under this envisioned arrangement, regional governments and political forces would be compelled to accept Israeli supremacy following the weakening or destruction of movements, organisations and states unwilling to submit to Israeli and American military pressure.
This ambition has increasingly influenced operational and strategic discussions within the Israeli military, intelligence services, security establishment and political leadership.
Israeli military strategists and decision-makers have been developing doctrines intended to translate the advantages gained through military campaigns, supported by successive American policies and particularly the current US administration, into a lasting regional structure in which Israel determines the rules of engagement and the boundaries of acceptable political behaviour.
Beyond Gaza: A Strategy of Regional Domination
Israel’s extensive military campaigns across Gaza, the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as its attacks on Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and its bombing of Qatar, are presented in this analysis as components of a broader strategic design rather than improvised responses to developments on individual battlefields.
The argument is that these operations form part of plans developed over time, subsequently modified and adapted to changing circumstances, while retaining a consistent central objective: establishing Israeli predominance across the region.
One illustration is the operation involving exploding pagers and other communications devices in Lebanon, which caused widespread casualties. Investigations and reports have indicated that preparations for the operation extended over several years.
Another example is Israel’s military confrontation with Iran, which followed strategic planning undertaken across multiple Israeli governments.
These examples suggest that the objectives pursued during the current regional confrontation were not necessarily formulated in response to the war in Gaza. Instead, the war created opportunities to accelerate plans that had long existed within Israeli strategic thinking.
American support for Israeli military operations has further emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
The Israeli leadership has presented itself as capable of bringing about political change in Iran, while demonstrating its willingness to strike Doha, the capital of Qatar, and expand its military presence inside Syria.
Israeli forces have occupied substantial areas of Syrian territory, while the Israeli defence minister and other senior officials have publicly opposed withdrawing from those positions.
Israeli officials have also issued statements directed against the Syrian state, attempted to impose conditions on its leadership and threatened Türkiye.
At the same time, Israel has pursued an aggressive expansion of settlements in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, continued its military campaign in Gaza in changing forms while refusing to implement the agreement, and sought to establish a security zone at the expense of Lebanese villages along the southern border.
Taken together, these developments are interpreted as expressions of a longstanding ambition that has gained renewed momentum during the Gaza war.
The strategic objective is to establish Israel as the dominant power in the Middle East, capable of determining the region’s political arrangements, dismantling governments and movements opposed to its policies, and compelling Arab and Islamic societies to normalise economic, political and security relations on terms favourable to Israeli interests.
‘Queen of the Jungle?’ Inside an Israeli Military Vision
A research paper published by the Dado Centre for military operational research offers insight into how this ambition is being discussed within Israel’s military establishment.
Written by two Israeli military officers, Dr Eyal Fekt and Dr Eyal Kheiminis, the paper is titled “Queen of the Jungle? On the Role of Israel’s Military Power in Shaping a New Regional Order in the Middle East.”
The study presents a strategic framework in which Israel moves beyond its traditional military posture and assumes a central role in determining the structure of the regional order across the Arab and Islamic world.
Its significance lies not merely in the military proposals advanced by its authors, but in the broader direction of strategic thinking that it reflects within sections of Israel’s defence, intelligence and political establishments.
Drawing on the writings of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a major figure in the development of American foreign and national security policy, the two officers argue that Israel requires new strategic and operational doctrines capable of enabling it to shape and manage the regional balance of power.
From Local Military Power to Regional Enforcer
The authors introduce their central argument by proposing a fundamental transformation in Israel’s military role.
They describe this as a transition from:
“A local defensive power focused on the first circle, which brings war back into the heart of national life in Israel.”
Towards:
“A regional defensive power capable of conducting continuous and extended operations throughout the Middle East.”
Although the authors employ the language of defence, that terminology is contested by the historical record of Israeli military interventions.
Since its establishment, Israel has initiated wars and military operations against Palestinians, neighbouring Arab states and other regional actors.
Consequently, characterising its expanding military activity as purely defensive obscures the interventionist nature of the strategy being discussed.
More importantly, the proposed transformation involves the Israeli military regarding itself as an institution with the authority and capability to influence the political structure of the wider Middle East.
The two officers argue that this expanded role requires the military to adopt a “new strategy that recognises the necessity of change”.
Such a strategy would provide Israel with “freedom of action”, the “ability to sustain operations” and the operational advantages necessary to fight across several theatres simultaneously.
The purpose of developing these capabilities is not simply to respond to immediate military threats.
Rather, the authors envision a military establishment capable of imposing “regional arrangements” that correspond with “Israel’s objectives”.
In this formulation, military superiority becomes a mechanism for determining the rules and structures governing neighbouring states and the region as a whole.
Henry Kissinger and the Theory of ‘Revolutionary Actors’
The Dado Centre paper draws heavily on Henry Kissinger’s theoretical approach to international order, particularly his concept of “revolutionary actors”.
Kissinger developed his analysis of international relations during the Cold War, a period marked by competition between the United States, the Soviet Union and political movements seeking to challenge existing systems of power.
Many of these movements were associated with the Soviet bloc or sought to transform political systems within their own countries.
Others challenged aspects of the international order dominated by major powers.
Within this framework, revolutionary actors were understood as forces that did not merely compete for influence within an established system, but sought to change its fundamental rules.
The Israeli officers identify similarities between the historical circumstances discussed in Kissinger’s writings and the current strategic environment in the Middle East.
Using this comparison, they raise a series of questions concerning the relationship between Israel and regional powers.
They ask:
“What do regional powers such as Iran and Türkiye, as well as Palestinian national aspirations, represent for the Israeli military and the State of Israel? How should action be taken to prevent these actors from becoming an existential threat? And what is the role of the Israeli military in establishing a sustainable regional order and maintaining it over the long term?”
The inclusion of Palestinian national aspirations alongside Iran and Türkiye is particularly revealing.
It places the Palestinian national question within a wider framework of regional forces that Israeli strategists must assess and potentially contain.
Rather than treating Palestinian aspirations exclusively as a matter of national rights or territorial sovereignty, the questions frame them as part of a strategic challenge to the regional order Israel seeks to establish.
Why the Authors Question Diplomacy
The two officers argue that although Kissinger was deeply involved in diplomacy as a means of advancing American interests during the Cold War, he remained sceptical about its effectiveness when confronting actors determined to fundamentally transform the international system.
They quote Kissinger’s observation:
“Diplomats may continue to meet, but they will cease to be effective, because they do not speak the same language … Conferences or meetings will become banal and predictable events, in which each side repeats its positions and accuses the other of its conduct.”
The significance of this argument lies in the distinction between disputes that can be resolved through negotiation and conflicts in which opposing parties reject the legitimacy of the underlying political order.
The Israeli officers apply Kissinger’s concept of revolutionary actors to Iran and other resistance forces across the Middle East.
They ask how Israel should act under conditions of what they describe as a continuing existential struggle against actors possessing revolutionary and hegemonic ambitions.
Their central question is:
“How should Israel act under conditions of a continuing existential conflict against a group of actors with hegemonic and revolutionary ambitions who seek to destroy Israel? And how can the trends of normalisation and economic and political integration in the Middle East be preserved at the same time?”
The question reveals two interconnected priorities.
The first is containing or weakening the regional forces that Israeli strategists regard as fundamentally hostile.
The second is protecting the diplomatic and economic normalisation process through which Israel seeks to integrate itself into the wider Middle East.
Within this framework, military pressure and regional normalisation are not treated as contradictory policies.
Instead, they operate as complementary elements of a strategy intended to establish and preserve an Israeli-centred regional order.
An Offensive Doctrine Against Iran and Its Allies
The conclusions drawn by the Israeli officers move beyond theoretical discussion towards direct recommendations for military strategy.
They argue that the Israeli military should:
“Adopt an offensive and proactive approach against Iran and its allies over the coming years.”
This recommendation places sustained military initiative at the centre of Israel’s regional posture.
Rather than relying on reactive operations or waiting for specific threats to materialise, the proposed doctrine would allow Israel to maintain continuous pressure on Iran and the forces aligned with it.
The officers also distinguish between changing Iran’s political behaviour and preventing it from challenging the regional order Israel seeks to establish.
Following their interpretation of Kissinger’s approach to revolutionary actors, they argue:
“The use of force against Iran should not be aimed at changing its policies unless a fundamental change occurs in the identity of the Iranian regime, but rather at preventing it from undermining the emerging regional order, and in a manner that serves Israeli objectives.”
This distinction is central to their proposed strategy.
Military operations would not necessarily be intended to persuade Tehran to adopt a particular policy or negotiate specific concessions.
Instead, the use of force would be directed towards limiting Iran’s ability to disrupt a regional structure in which Israel enjoys a dominant position.
The objective would therefore be the preservation of an emerging balance of power favourable to Israeli interests, regardless of whether the Iranian government accepted its legitimacy.
Iran and the Problem of ‘Absolute Security’
The officers argue that Iran is incapable of offering an adequate response to the regional transformation Israel seeks.
They attribute this to Tehran’s unwillingness to accept a Middle Eastern order in which Israel becomes, in their words, a “strong, prosperous and legitimate partner”.
They also suggest that the United States and Western powers face considerable difficulty in offering Iran measures capable of alleviating what the authors describe as its existential fears.
To explain this impasse, they invoke another concept associated with Kissinger: “absolute security”.
Under this conception, a state seeking continually to maximise its own security can create a situation in which other states experience persistent and unacceptable insecurity.
The pursuit of absolute security by one actor can therefore produce a lasting cycle of confrontation, because measures intended to strengthen that actor’s position are perceived by others as threats to their own existence.
Applied to the Middle East, the concept raises a fundamental contradiction within the proposed Israeli strategy.
Israel seeks a regional environment in which its security requirements determine the limits of other states’ military and political capabilities.
Yet efforts to secure such a position can deepen the insecurity of neighbouring powers, especially those that regard Israeli military predominance as a threat to their sovereignty.
For the two officers, however, the principal strategic requirement remains ensuring that the Israeli military possesses the capabilities necessary to preserve a regional order compatible with Israel’s interests.
Their analysis consequently places military readiness, operational freedom and the ability to intervene across multiple theatres at the centre of the proposed regional architecture.
Diplomacy as a Means of Buying Time
Despite their emphasis on military initiative, the authors do not dismiss diplomacy entirely.
They advocate maintaining diplomatic engagement and communication with regional governments, but assign these efforts a specific strategic function.
Diplomacy should help extend the intervals between military confrontations, allowing the Israeli army and security establishment sufficient time to rebuild and strengthen their capabilities.
It would also contribute to postponing, for as long as possible, what the authors describe as the inevitable collapse of the regional order.
This approach differs from a diplomatic strategy primarily focused on resolving the underlying causes of confrontation.
Instead, diplomatic engagement becomes a means of managing the timing and intensity of conflict while preserving Israel’s ability to resume military operations.
Periods of reduced confrontation would enable the military establishment to replenish resources, improve readiness and develop the capabilities required for future campaigns.
The officers thereby propose a combination of sustained military preparedness, periodic offensive operations and diplomatic engagement designed to manage the regional environment in Israel’s favour.
A Debate Within Israel’s Security Establishment
The authors acknowledge that their paper forms part of a wider debate within Israel’s military and security institutions over the strategic direction required following the current war.
At the centre of this discussion are two different approaches to the future role of the Israeli military.
One approach calls for developing the military capabilities necessary to maintain a continuous and influential Israeli presence throughout the region.
Under this model, Israel would remain actively involved in shaping the regional order, with the army possessing the ability to operate repeatedly and simultaneously across multiple theatres.
The alternative approach involves returning to what the officers describe as the “foundations of the traditional security doctrine”.
This model would focus on conducting operations aimed at removing what Israeli strategists define as threats.
In practical terms, that would include attacking attempts by resistance movements to develop their military capabilities or prepare operations against Israel.
The difference between the two approaches is therefore not necessarily whether Israel should use military force beyond its borders.
Both accept the legitimacy of military intervention within their respective strategic frameworks.
The disagreement concerns the scale, frequency and ultimate purpose of those interventions.
Should Israel concentrate on eliminating specific perceived threats, or should it develop the capacity to function as an enduring military power capable of determining the structure of the regional system itself?
The Dado Centre paper advances the second approach.
A New Regional Reality: Israel’s Ambitions Beyond Its Borders
The paper offers a window into the strategic discussions taking place within sections of Israel’s military establishment and wider decision-making environment.
Its importance lies in the increasingly explicit articulation of ambitions extending beyond conventional national security objectives.
The proposed role involves establishing Israel as a central authority in the regional balance of power, using military capabilities to influence the conduct of governments, determine security arrangements and preserve political conditions favourable to Israeli interests.
These ambitions are unfolding alongside public statements by Israeli ministers and political leaders invoking biblical visions of territorial expansion, including references to a state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.
Such rhetoric adds a religious and ideological dimension to strategic discussions already focused on reshaping the region through military power.
It also reinforces concerns that Israel’s regional ambitions cannot be understood solely through the language of immediate military threats or conventional defence planning.
The repeated use of force across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and other parts of the Middle East is interpreted within this broader context as an attempt to establish a new regional hierarchy.
The central feature of that hierarchy would be Israel’s capacity to determine which political forces, military capabilities and regional relationships are considered acceptable.
States and movements unwilling to operate within those limits would remain exposed to military pressure.
The Challenge Facing Arab and Islamic States
The emerging strategic environment presents Arab and Islamic governments, political movements and societies with a fundamental challenge.
If Israel is seeking to establish a regional system organised around its own security, economic and military priorities, the response cannot be confined to isolated disputes or reactions to individual military operations.
From the perspective advanced here, the Israeli approach requires regional actors to confront their internal divisions and develop a coordinated political and strategic response.
Such a response would involve overcoming longstanding disagreements, strengthening collective resistance to external domination and building the capabilities necessary to protect societies from military coercion.
It would also require investment in shared industrial and commercial infrastructure, the development of stronger economic relationships between regional states and the protection of people’s rights.
The underlying argument is that political independence cannot be maintained without corresponding economic, industrial and defensive capabilities.
A fragmented region dependent on foreign powers for essential resources and security remains vulnerable to coercion by states possessing superior military and technological capacities.
By contrast, greater cooperation among Arab and Islamic societies could provide a foundation for reducing that vulnerability and strengthening regional autonomy.
Normalisation Under Military Pressure
Israel’s proposed regional order also assigns an important role to normalisation with Arab and Islamic governments and societies.
However, the form of normalisation envisioned in this analysis differs from relationships established between politically equal states.
Israel seeks economic, political and security relations from a position of what its strategists describe as strength.
Under this arrangement, Israeli interests would be advanced through diplomatic and commercial relationships established in an environment shaped by overwhelming military power.
The threat of force would remain an essential instrument for influencing the decisions of neighbouring governments and societies.
American military and political support would provide the external backing necessary to sustain that position.
The resulting system would combine the economic benefits of regional integration with a security structure designed to preserve Israeli military superiority.
For critics of this approach, the danger is that normalisation becomes less an expression of mutual recognition and shared interests than a mechanism through which regional societies are pressured into accepting an unequal distribution of power.
The central ambition identified in the Dado Centre paper is therefore not simply the expansion of Israel’s military reach.
It is the transformation of that military reach into a durable regional order in which Israel possesses the capacity to shape political arrangements, enforce its security preferences and secure economic relationships on terms determined by its own strategic priorities.
