At a time when growing rapprochement among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye had raised the possibility of a four-way alliance among the four Sunni-majority states amid mounting regional tensions, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed the “Mecca” mutual defence agreement on Friday without Cairo.
The move has prompted questions among Egyptian analysts over whether Egypt chose to remain outside the emerging alliance or was excluded from it.
Amid the notable absence of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the mutual defence agreement in Mecca on Friday.
The agreement came after Riyadh announced on 30 July the formation of a 13-member maritime defence alliance that also did not include Egypt. Cairo had informally indicated that it was taking time to study whether to join and would seek parliament’s opinion.
The new agreement, described by The New Indian Express as a potential “Islamic NATO” capable of changing the balance of power in the Middle East and South Asia, is intended to “strengthen collective deterrence against any aggression”.
According to a statement by the Saudi Press Agency, the pact stipulates that “any armed attack on any of the three countries shall be considered an attack on all” and provides for expanded defence cooperation.
Egyptian analysts have questioned why Cairo is absent from an alliance concerned with protecting the southern entrance to the Red Sea, a strategic area facing repeated disruptions that directly affect navigation through the Suez Canal.
Their questions include whether Egypt has prioritised its relationship with the United Arab Emirates over Saudi Arabia, whether the development could signal renewed tensions between Cairo and Riyadh, whether Egypt wished to avoid antagonising Israel by joining a military bloc involving Türkiye, and what Egypt, which possesses one of the Arab world’s largest armies, stands to gain or lose by remaining outside the agreement.
Legitimate Questions, but Limited Information
Strategic affairs and crisis management expert Dr Murad Ali told Arabi21 that there was not enough information to determine what had happened behind closed doors.
“We do not have information that allows us to state conclusively what happened behind the scenes, but we do have questions without passing judgement,” he said.
Ali noted that Egypt had not previously been distant from this trajectory.
“On 21 June, what became known as the R4 framework, comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, met in Cairo and discussed issues of regional security and stability,” he said.
He argued that the subsequent decision by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan to move towards a more advanced level of defence cooperation without Egypt raised obvious questions.
“Was the idea that this four-party framework would develop into a broader security and defence arrangement before Egypt left it? Was Egypt excluded? Or did Cairo prefer not to move to this level of military commitment? I do not believe we currently have enough information to provide a definitive answer.”
Ali also questioned whether Egypt’s other regional alliances had influenced its position.
“Did Cairo prefer to preserve its close positioning with the UAE and avoid going too far into a path led by Saudi Arabia alongside Türkiye and Pakistan? Were there calculations connected to Cairo’s relationship with Tel Aviv, or its arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and Cyprus, that made it more cautious about entering a military alliance in which Türkiye is one of the main pillars?”
He said the development did not necessarily mean that a new crisis between Cairo and Riyadh was inevitable.
“The relationship between the two countries is larger and deeper than to be judged through a single step. They have economic, political and security interests between them. But with the formation of a security axis bringing together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, Egypt’s absence is not marginal. It raises questions about the direction of Egyptian-Saudi relations and Egypt’s position within the reshaping of regional balances.”
Strategic Importance and Growing Risks
Ali said the issue becomes more significant when viewed against the scale of the challenges facing Egypt, which sits at the heart of one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.
“The Suez Canal has come under pressure in recent years because of disruptions to navigation in the Red Sea,” he said.
He also referred to a recent incident in which a drone reached a facility inside one of Egypt’s major ports, saying questions remained over where it originated and how it reached such a strategic target.
“In this security environment, cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan could provide Egypt with significant strategic value in air defence, early warning, Red Sea security, military industries, drones, intelligence sharing and training,” Ali said.
He described the three countries as forming a particularly important combination.
Saudi Arabia brings considerable political and economic weight as well as a strategic position in the Gulf and Red Sea. Türkiye possesses a large military and an advanced defence industrial base, while Pakistan offers substantial military capabilities, strategic depth, extensive experience and nuclear weapons.
“Egypt’s departure from, or continued absence from, such a framework may deprive it of an important opportunity to participate in building a new regional security order rather than merely observing it from outside,” he said.
Ali acknowledged that the Egyptian government may have different calculations.
“It may believe that its broad network of relationships with Israel, India, Greece and Cyprus requires greater flexibility and that it should not bind itself to a single military axis. But the question is whether the possible tactical gains are worth the strategic loss if the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani partnership becomes the genuine nucleus of a new regional security system.”
He stressed that Egypt was not a minor state on the margins of the region.
“Its demographic, military, geographical and historical weight means its natural place is at the centre of any major Arab and Islamic security equation,” he said.
Ali expressed hope that Egypt would not drift further from its Arab and Islamic environment and that its commitments or calculations with the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek axis in the Eastern Mediterranean would not become an obstacle to deeper strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.
“Egypt needs to comprehensively rebuild its strategic positioning. It is not required to antagonise anyone, nor to join any alliance without calculation, but its decision should first emerge from its national interests and from an understanding of its true weight.”
Did Egypt Leave, or Was It Pushed Out?
Strategic management consultant Dr Mohamed Zuweil told Arabi21 that Egypt had remained part of the four-party consultation framework with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan as recently as June, with the fourth meeting held in Cairo at Egypt’s invitation.
He said this made it necessary to distinguish between Egypt being “excluded” and Egypt “choosing not to join”.
“The publicly available information so far does not prove that Cairo was formally excluded,” he said.
Zuweil, a researcher in political affairs and conflict management, added: “There is still insufficient public evidence to say that Egypt was pushed out of the alliance. It is more accurate to say that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan moved towards a trilateral format involving a greater degree of military commitment, while Egypt did not enter it. That is a major strategic distinction.”
He said the more relevant question may therefore be why Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad accepted the transition towards a defence alliance while Cairo preferred to remain outside it.
Asked whether Egypt had chosen the UAE over Saudi Arabia, Zuweil rejected that interpretation as too simplistic because the UAE is not itself a party to the trilateral agreement.
“The picture is not Egypt plus the UAE against Saudi Arabia plus Türkiye plus Pakistan,” he said.
“It is closer to Saudi Arabia rebuilding a new regional security network in which Türkiye and Pakistan are two pillars, while Egypt chose not to move from being a consultation partner to becoming a party to an automatic defence commitment.”
Zuweil said the argument that Cairo “chose the UAE over Saudi Arabia” required additional evidence.
There was, however, a deeper strategic dimension.
“Egypt has an interest in maintaining its strategic relationship with the UAE, but it cannot afford to abandon Saudi Arabia. For Egypt, Saudi Arabia represents Arab and Gulf depth, an economic and investment partner, an important component of Red Sea security, and an Arab power with which Cairo can hardly afford to enter a strategic confrontation.”
He said Cairo appeared to be seeking room to manoeuvre between the two Gulf powers rather than aligning with Abu Dhabi against Riyadh.
Avoiding Tensions With Israel?
Zuweil said there was no evidence that Israel had directly asked Egypt not to join the alliance.
“There is no evidence that allows us to say Israel asked Egypt not to join,” he said. “But there is a clear strategic logic. An agreement that gives Türkiye a larger military role, includes nuclear-armed Pakistan and establishes the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all could be viewed in Israel as the emergence of an independent regional deterrent capability outside Tel Aviv and Washington.”
Egypt, he said, has its own calculations.
“Cairo is bound by a peace treaty with Israel and has close security and military relations with the United States. Sinai, Gaza and Red Sea security place it in direct contact with Tel Aviv. Joining a military alliance partially led by Türkiye at a highly sensitive moment between Ankara and Tel Aviv would place Egypt under strategic obligations it may not want.”
He said this did not necessarily mean Egypt’s position was simply based on a desire not to anger Israel.
“Perhaps Cairo’s thinking was instead: we will not enter a military arrangement that could place us in an indirect confrontation with Israel, the United States or Iran before defining where our interests begin and end. That is more realistic than the theory of Israeli dictates.”
Zuweil said the development did not necessarily herald a crisis between Cairo and Riyadh, but it could reflect a difference in how each defines regional security.
Saudi Arabia, he argued, appears more prepared to establish a multilateral regional security umbrella as confidence in external protection declines.
The agreement combines Saudi money and energy resources, Turkish military industry and technology, and Pakistani military experience and nuclear deterrence.
“That is a combination with a clear strategic logic,” he said.
“Egypt, by contrast, appears closer to a model of maintaining multiple partnerships without committing to a single military axis. This difference may cause political friction, but it does not necessarily mean an Egyptian-Saudi crisis.”
He added that if Cairo handled the situation intelligently, its previous membership of the R4 framework could even become a channel connecting Riyadh and the new alliance with the rest of the Arab system.
What Does Egypt Stand to Lose?
Zuweil argued that Egypt’s potential loss goes far beyond simply losing “a seat in an alliance”.
“The real loss is losing part of its influence over the architecture of regional security,” he said.
“Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan now have a security platform they can develop, while Egypt finds itself outside the alliance once it moved from consultation to defence commitment. That is a political loss.”
A second potential loss is the opportunity to participate in building a Red Sea security system.
“This may be the most dangerous point,” Zuweil said.
“Egypt has the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab as fundamental parts of its national security, and the new agreement comes at a time when shipping routes and strategic facilities across the region are under significant pressure.”
He also pointed to the lost opportunity to benefit from Turkish and Pakistani military capabilities.
“Türkiye has an advanced defence industry, particularly in drones and naval and air systems, while Pakistan provides military experience and a different form of strategic depth. Egypt remaining outside this framework may mean it is missing the opportunity to help build a regional defence market and system.”
A fourth potential loss, he said, is collective deterrence.
“If Saudi Arabia comes under attack, Türkiye and Pakistan now have a political basis for entering alongside it. Egypt does not possess the same commitment. Conversely, if Egypt is subjected to a similar attack, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan would not, under this agreement, be automatically obligated to enter the war on its behalf.”
Does Egypt Gain Anything by Staying Out?
“Yes, significantly,” Zuweil said.
The first gain, he argued, is avoiding what he described as “the trap of automatic commitment”.
“Egypt has borders and interests in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa and Sinai. It is not necessarily in its interest to become obliged to enter a war simply because an allied state comes under attack.”
The second gain is preserving its relationship with Washington.
“The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement sends a clear message to the United States that its regional allies want a greater degree of self-reliance. Egypt, by remaining outside it, retains greater room in its security relationship with America.”
A third potential gain, he said, is avoiding indirect confrontation with Israel.
“Egypt does not currently need to open a new strategic front.”
The fourth and perhaps most important gain is preserving balanced relations with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE.
“Instead of Cairo becoming part of one axis, it can become a state that balances between competing axes,” he said.
Zuweil warned, however, that this strategy carries a serious risk if Egypt continues to stay outside new security alliances without building an alternative of its own.
“If Egypt continues with a policy of neither entering the alliance nor building an alternative one, the problem becomes serious. The world is moving from traditional alliances towards multilateral security networks, and Saudi Arabia understood this early.”
