Professor Martin Sherman, an Israeli political researcher and strategist, recently published an article in the Zionist outlet JNS outlining his vision for the future of the Gaza Strip. His proposals appear increasingly close to the policies Israel is pursuing for Gaza.
Sherman is not simply a journalist or commentator. He previously served as a political adviser to former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, has worked as a senior adviser within the Israeli military establishment, and taught political science at Tel Aviv University. He was also involved in founding the Herzliya Conference and strategic research institutions, and is associated with the Kohelet Policy Forum.
His article, published by JNS on 2 October 2026 under the title “What Is the Way to Solve the Gaza Crisis?”, sets out an approach centred on the large-scale removal of Gaza’s Palestinian population.
Sherman: The Solution Is Mass Removal From Gaza
Sherman wrote that the only viable solution to the Gaza question was the large-scale relocation of Palestinians from the Strip, arguing that any proposal excluding this option would merely repeat what he described as the failures of the Oslo Accords and Palestinian self-rule.
He argued that Israel made a serious mistake when it withdrew from Gaza in 2005, claiming that the withdrawal made the situation in the Strip more difficult to resolve.
According to Sherman, a “misleading dream” prevailed following the 1993 Oslo Accords that Palestinian or Arab self-rule in Gaza could provide strong governance, security and stability for the small coastal enclave.
He said Israeli political leaders ignored warnings against this approach. Referring to Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007 after the Palestinian parliamentary elections and the removal of the Palestinian Authority from the Strip, Sherman said he had warned as early as 1992 that Israeli withdrawal would bring disaster and destruction to Jews and Arabs alike.
Sherman wrote:
“Previous events have proved that the only solution for imposing stability in Gaza is to relocate the largest possible number of Gaza’s residents to other countries. This relocation would free them from their authoritarian leaders who oppressed and misled them for years and dragged them into disasters.”
He added that supporters of what he called political demagoguery had continued to invoke the principle of self-determination for a population that, in his words, was “clearly incapable of succeeding”.
Gaza Described as Unviable Without External Support
Sherman went on to describe Gaza as a small coastal strip lacking basic requirements for life, including potable water and electricity, and dependent on foreign assistance.
He also claimed that Gaza suffers from an oversized public sector and widespread corruption, accusing Hamas of taking control of much of the aid entering the territory and diverting resources towards tunnels and rocket production.
Sherman praised US President Donald Trump’s proposal to remove Gaza’s population and place administration of the territory in the hands of what he described as capable and powerful parties.
He criticised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to take full advantage of Trump’s proposal or to persuade other countries to adopt it.
Instead, Sherman argued, Netanyahu referred the proposal to Israel’s security cabinet, whose members he described as incapable of advancing it effectively, causing the idea to lose political momentum.
Why Sherman Rejects Palestinian Rule in Gaza
Sherman repeated that any plan not based on large-scale relocation of Gaza’s population would fail in the same way, in his view, as Oslo and Palestinian self-rule.
He argued that Israel’s demand for the complete disarmament of Hamas, combined with restrictions on full Palestinian political freedom, could expose Israel to accusations of maintaining an apartheid system.
He also argued that even if Israel found a Palestinian leader capable of establishing an authority committed to peaceful coexistence with Israel, such a leader could not remain in power without Israeli military protection.
According to Sherman, dependence on Israeli protection would eventually undermine that leader’s position, encourage political retreat and possibly lead to his replacement by a more radical figure.
He further claimed that a demilitarised Gaza administration would be unable even to secure the border with Egypt. For that reason, he argued, Israel would struggle to find a viable ruler for Gaza unless Israel itself became the territory’s effective governing authority, something he acknowledged would be difficult to sustain.
His conclusion was explicit: “There is therefore no escape from relocating most of Gaza’s population.”
The Absence of a Palestinian Counter-Strategy
The significance of Sherman’s article lies not only in his influence within Israeli strategic circles, but also in the apparent absence of a broadly supported Palestinian national strategy addressing the future of Gaza and the West Bank.
While Israeli strategists openly discuss long-term plans for Gaza, much Palestinian political debate remains consumed by internal disputes, mutual accusations and factional rivalries.
Prominent researchers, political figures and ideological commentators frequently devote their attention to criticising one another rather than developing a coherent strategy capable of confronting Israel’s plans for Gaza and the wider Palestinian territories.
Another section of the political debate has focused heavily on attacking the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.
Some critics have portrayed the committee as exercising influence beyond the capacity of major states. Others have argued that it has failed to perform any meaningful national role. Some figures from the traditional left have gone further, describing it as an American-Israeli colonial creation designed to eliminate the Palestinian cause and adapt it to a new political order stripped of earlier principles of armed resistance, liberation, justice and the restoration of legitimate rights.
Yet many of those same critics initially welcomed the committee’s formation and regarded it as a potential solution to Gaza’s crises.
The Technocratic Committee and Resolution 2803
The committee was established in January 2026 with the approval of the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 2803.
It was conceived as a temporary technocratic body, effectively a small interim administration agreed upon by several states. According to the framework under which it was created, its principal role was not political but administrative: to provide services to Gaza’s devastated population and oversee reconstruction until the Palestinian Authority could be reformed and become capable of resuming control over the Strip.
Nevertheless, many Palestinian writers and political analysts came to treat the technocratic committee as though it were a new Palestinian political organisation whose central function was to undermine the two-state solution and weaken the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
Criticism of the committee consequently evolved into accusations that it bore responsibility for repairing every consequence of the catastrophe that followed 7 October.
Why Israel Has Not Allowed the Committee Into Gaza
Critics of the technocratic committee have also overlooked Israel’s hostile position towards it.
Israel has still not permitted the committee to enter Gaza and carry out its responsibilities. The reason, according to this analysis, is that Israel’s own plans are incompatible with transferring meaningful authority over Gaza to such a body, despite Israel having formally welcomed its establishment.
Granting the committee genuine authority could revive an issue Israel seeks to suppress: the two-state solution, which remains rejected by much of the Israeli political establishment.
It could also obstruct two major elements of Israel’s Gaza policy.
The first is Israel’s continued freedom to carry out assassinations, further destruction and population displacement. These remain central files Israel seeks to retain under its own control.
Israel also continues to insist on the surrender of Hamas’s weapons in Gaza, although the precise scope of what Israel means by “disarmament” remains difficult to define.
The second issue concerns efforts to establish an international force responsible for Gaza’s security and administration. Under such proposals, participating states would have diplomatic relations with Israel while also possessing sufficient military capacity to impose security arrangements inside the Strip.
A Gaza Reduced to Labour Camps?
Israel, according to this analysis, is unlikely to allow any party, even a major power such as the United States, to obstruct what it regards as its central project.
Israeli officials are working with several countries in an effort to persuade them to accept displaced Palestinians, while the wider plan for Gaza, the author argues, would transform the Strip into a network of controlled labour zones.
Under such a scenario, Palestinians who remain in Gaza would become workers in construction, commerce and other economic sectors, subjected to daily security checks at Israeli-controlled checkpoints and dependent on wages for survival.
The author’s argument is that this model reveals the underlying purpose of Israel’s longer-term plans for the Strip.
Rafah as a Testing Ground
These plans have, according to the article, become particularly visible in Rafah.
A project is reportedly being implemented there to construct 100,000 small housing units at a cost of $5 billion, with capacity for around 500,000 displaced Gazans whose homes have been destroyed.
A second phase would involve the construction of another 500,000 caravans at an estimated cost of $30 billion.
These projects are presented not merely as reconstruction initiatives, but as part of a broader attempt to reorganise Gaza’s population and future living arrangements under conditions shaped by Israeli security and political objectives.
Palestinian Infighting While Gaza’s Future Is Being Decided
Meanwhile, Gaza has increasingly disappeared from public attention beneath waves of internal Palestinian political confrontation.
Disputes between leaders, personalities and factions dominate social media, while the killing, hunger and despair affecting Gaza and the West Bank, as well as growing tensions between Palestinian families, risk becoming treated as ordinary developments.
The central question therefore remains unanswered.
While Israeli strategists are openly discussing displacement, demilitarisation, international security forces and new systems of control over Gaza, where is the comprehensive Palestinian plan for Gaza and the West Bank capable of confronting Israel’s project?
