The Financial Times published an article by Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and author of Iran’s Grand Strategy, arguing that the United States and Iran are once again sliding towards war.
Nasr said the renewed confrontation was not caused by either side misunderstanding the terms of the memorandum of understanding they signed to end the first phase of the conflict.
Although the memorandum was ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, he said it was based on maintaining the balance of power that existed when it was signed. Washington, however, sought to alter that balance, while Tehran remained determined to preserve it.
Iran Viewed the Agreement as a Temporary US Retreat
According to Nasr, the United States began the war in February with the objective of overthrowing the Islamic Republic or, failing that, forcing it to accept American demands restricting its nuclear programme and regional role.
The war, however, ended by handing Iran a strategic victory through its control of the Strait of Hormuz, he argued. That outcome compelled the United States to accept the memorandum of understanding.
Nasr said Iran’s leadership viewed the memorandum as a temporary American retreat intended to ease pressure on the global economy and prepare for another round of war.
He cited public remarks by US Vice President JD Vance, who suggested that President Donald Trump was satisfied with the agreement because it gave the United States time to rebuild its declining strategic oil reserves.
Iranian officials saw several other developments as reinforcing that assessment. Frozen Iranian assets were not released, while a US-brokered agreement between “Israel” and Lebanon ignored Iran’s demand for a ceasefire there.
US military reinforcements also began arriving in the Gulf, while Washington encouraged commercial vessels to disregard Tehran’s instructions requiring them to coordinate with Iranian authorities and use Iranian channels while crossing the Strait of Hormuz.
Some vessels instead travelled through channels close to the Omani coast, in a move the Americans expected would weaken Iran’s claim to control the strait and its ability to enforce that control.
Nasr said that none of these measures, taken individually, may have amounted to a serious violation of the memorandum. Collectively, however, they represented a coordinated effort to undermine the leverage Iran had gained during the war and which had been reflected in the ceasefire agreement.
Tehran Believes Restraint Will Invite More Pressure
Nasr argued that Iran’s current rulers believe any display of restraint would only invite further American pressure.
They therefore consider aggressive conduct and escalation beyond what the United States can accept or endure necessary to deter Washington and compel it to negotiate seriously over ending the war and reaching a broader nuclear agreement.
Such an agreement, in Tehran’s view, would provide Iran with the security and economic relief it seeks.
Nasr said control over the Strait of Hormuz and the ability to regulate maritime traffic through it represent strategic leverage that Iran cannot afford to surrender.
Losing dominance over the strait would deprive Tehran of its most important instrument of pressure in any future negotiations.
Iran’s leadership has consequently concluded that maintaining control is essential both to securing future gains at the negotiating table and ensuring that the United States complies with any agreement rather than withdrawing from it.
Hormuz Becomes a National Cause
Nasr also pointed to the large public turnout at the funeral of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was recently killed.
He said the mobilisation strengthened the leadership’s belief that the Iranian public would support a hardline position over the Strait of Hormuz, which has become a national issue enjoying broad popular backing.
Within this context, Iran decided to obstruct US plans to reopen the strait by attacking two tankers sailing near the Omani coast, according to Nasr.
The United States responded with a broad and deliberate bombing campaign targeting Iranian drone and missile batteries deployed along the Gulf coast, as well as military and civilian infrastructure across the country, with the aim of increasing the cost of resistance.
Iran Believes an Earlier War May Work in Its Favour
Despite the scale of the US response, Nasr argued that Iran had expected the war to resume.
Although the confrontation began earlier than Tehran anticipated, Iranian officials regard the timing as an advantage. If war was inevitable, they believe it was preferable to fight before the United States could fully reorganise its forces and before the global economy recovered from shocks to the energy sector and supply chains.
Based on this calculation, Nasr expects Iran to absorb US military pressure while intensifying attacks on American military targets, energy infrastructure and civilian facilities across the Gulf.
The objective is to demonstrate that the war will not remain confined to the geographical and operational boundaries chosen by Washington.
At the same time, Tehran is expected to accept the inevitable economic hardship created by a renewed US naval blockade.
Iran is betting that the pressure it can impose on the global economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz, and potentially the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, will force Trump to retreat first.
An Existential War and a Strategy of Endurance
Nasr acknowledged that Iranian leaders may be overestimating their ability to sustain this strategy.
They nevertheless believe that their willingness to escalate benefited Iran during the first phase of the conflict and that war may be the only means of convincing Trump to treat diplomacy seriously.
He concluded that the Iranian system is fighting an existential battle and is betting that its willingness to endure greater suffering will provide it with a strategic advantage when negotiations eventually resume.
