The phrase “Today Gaza, Tomorrow Turkey”, displayed on billboards across Istanbul over the past two years, was not merely an emotional expression of solidarity. It reflected deeper anxieties shaping public opinion and strategic thinking in Ankara. Many Turkish policymakers and observers view Israel’s war of annihilation in Gaza not only as a humanitarian catastrophe, but also as a geopolitical project with direct implications for Turkey’s national interests.
The war on Gaza has damaged Turkey’s regional interests and has been interpreted in many Turkish circles as the bloody opening phase of a broader Israeli hegemonic project backed by the United States. According to this view, the objective is to redraw the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean while strategically containing Turkey. Against this backdrop, the joint American-Israeli confrontation with Iran is seen as another stage in the regional struggle reshaping the wider Middle East, particularly the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Global Power Struggle Behind Regional Escalation
Developments in the region cannot be separated from the broader transformation underway within the global order, most notably the escalating rivalry between the United States and China. Since Xi Jinping came to power in Beijing in 2013, China’s leadership recognised that breaking through the American security containment strategy would not come through direct military confrontation in the Pacific, but through expanding Chinese influence outward across Asia and beyond.
Beijing pursued this through the Belt and Road Initiative, inspired by the historical Silk Road that once connected Asia to global trade networks. The initiative aims to strengthen Chinese influence through major infrastructure investments, particularly across Central Asia, while reducing dependence on maritime routes dominated by the United States in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
In this context, China’s expansion is no longer viewed purely as an economic project. It increasingly carries military dimensions that have directly shaped American strategic planning. In its 2023 report, the US Department of Defence described China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and the growing capability to do so”. The Pentagon consequently classified Beijing as the “pacing challenge” driving the pace of American military modernisation.
American concerns are not confined to Asia alone. The report also highlights China’s expanding global reach, stating that the Chinese Communist Party has tasked the People’s Liberation Army with developing capabilities to project force beyond China’s borders in order to secure Beijing’s growing overseas interests and foreign policy objectives.
Washington’s Strategy to Contain China
Rather than entering into direct military conflict with China, Washington has developed what could be described as an integrated containment strategy aimed at controlling the flow of raw materials and energy toward Beijing while preserving the dominance of the US dollar.
This strategy rests on four main pillars:
Technological Supremacy
The United States seeks to maintain dominance in advanced technology sectors through measures such as the 2022 CHIPS Act, designed to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors.
Critical Mineral Supply Chains
Washington is also attempting to weaken China’s overwhelming control over critical and rare earth minerals, a sector in which Beijing currently dominates global production.
Preserving the Petrodollar System
Another objective is protecting the dollar’s position as the dominant global currency through the continuation of the petrodollar framework.
Control of Strategic Trade Routes
The final pillar centres on dominance over strategic corridors, energy transit routes, and global infrastructure networks.
This fourth pillar became particularly visible during the 2023 G20 summit with the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). To support the project, India was integrated into the I2U2 alliance alongside the United States, the UAE, and Israel. The corridor is widely viewed as part of Washington’s broader strategy to counter Chinese influence.
The route begins in India, crosses the Arabian Peninsula, passes through Israel, and ultimately connects to Europe via maritime transport.
IMEC Versus the Belt and Road Initiative
The India-Middle East-Europe corridor is being promoted as an alternative to Chinese-controlled trade routes associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. It also forms part of a wider G7 effort to invest $600 billion into global infrastructure projects aimed at challenging Beijing’s influence.
Unlike China’s infrastructure-heavy approach, the IMEC model focuses more heavily on digital connectivity and financial integration, presenting itself as a supposedly more sustainable and reliable alternative to Chinese lending frameworks often criticised in Western discourse as “debt traps”.
However, the scale of the two initiatives remains vastly different.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative spans more than 170 countries, involves investment estimates exceeding $8 trillion across infrastructure, energy, and technology sectors, and connects regions representing around 70 percent of the world’s population.
By comparison, the India-Middle East-Europe corridor involves slightly more than 20 countries. Its more limited scope is intended to promote tighter regional integration and operational sustainability.
Strategic Maritime Chokepoints Remain Decisive
Despite the rise of overland trade corridors, maritime chokepoints continue to dominate global trade realities. Strategic waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and Bab al Mandab remain indispensable to international commerce.
This explains why actions taken by the Yemeni Houthi movement near Bab al Mandab during the Gaza war, alongside Iranian pressure in Hormuz, are viewed as direct threats to global trade flows.
During recent escalations, proposals emerged advocating a “bypass of Hormuz” through overland energy routes connecting Gulf exports to Red Sea ports or through Iraq and Turkey into Europe. Yet the overwhelming majority of Gulf energy exports continue to flow toward East Asian markets, especially China, rather than Europe.
While China would be among the largest victims of any closure of Hormuz, Beijing also has a long term strategic interest in weakening American control over vital maritime chokepoints.
The Geopolitical Isolation of Turkey
Trade corridors have become central to American plans for reshaping global geography. Within this framework, Turkey and Egypt were notably excluded from the India-Middle East-Europe corridor.
Ankara viewed this exclusion with deep suspicion, interpreting it as a deliberate attempt to elevate Israel into the primary geopolitical anchor of American influence in the Eastern Mediterranean while sidelining Turkey.
Turkish concerns intensified further as American lawmakers, supported by pro-Israel lobbying networks, began embedding this exclusionary framework into congressional legislation.
The 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, commonly known as the Menendez-Rubio Act, marked a significant turning point in American strategy. The legislation effectively abandoned Washington’s traditional reliance on Turkey as NATO’s southern flank guardian and instead sought to establish a new deterrence structure centred on Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.
The law lifted the American arms embargo on Cyprus while imposing sanctions on Turkey that contributed to Ankara’s exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet programme.
This exclusionary trajectory has since expanded through the proposed 2026 Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee with bipartisan support. The legislation seeks to deepen energy cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus while also attempting to draw Egypt into the alliance framework.
Under this vision, the Eastern Mediterranean would become a central gateway for the India-Middle East-Europe corridor under American strategic dominance.
Israeli and Greek Lobby Influence in Washington
These legislative shifts reflect recommendations made by think tanks closely aligned with Israeli strategic interests.
One notable example is the report “A Sea of Change” issued by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, which argued for replacing Turkey with an Israeli-Greek-Cypriot “democratic alliance”.
Within Congress, anti-Turkey lobbying networks have become increasingly influential. Former Senator Bob Menendez played a leading role in efforts to isolate Ankara before resigning amid corruption scandals. His long time political ally Marco Rubio now continues many of these policies as Secretary of State under the current Trump administration.
Beyond Menendez and Rubio, numerous lawmakers continue advocating policies aligned with Greek and Israeli regional interests. According to data from the Hellenic American Leadership Council, several members of Congress of Greek origin actively promote Athens’ agenda against Turkey.
Among the most prominent are Republican Congressman Gus Bilirakis and Democratic Congressman Chris Pappas, who previously pressured the Biden administration to block F-16 sales to Turkey.
Other lawmakers associated with these efforts include Democratic Representative Dina Titus and Republican Representative Nicole Malliotakis. Some participate in formal alliances such as the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance established in 2013 to strengthen cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States.
Turkey’s Shift Toward the “Assertive Buffer” Strategy
To understand Turkey’s response, it is necessary to examine Ankara’s transformation from what geopolitical literature describes as a “marginal buffer” into an “assertive buffer”.
Historically, Turkey functioned as a geopolitical barrier separating Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia from the Balkans, and Russia from the Mediterranean. In this role, Ankara absorbed regional shocks without fundamentally shaping the regional order itself.
Today, however, Turkey increasingly sees itself as an assertive regional power constrained by hostile geopolitical arrangements.
Within this framework, Ankara views Eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries not merely as economic assets, but as instruments for establishing Turkey as a major energy hub.
To counter exclusionary alliances, Turkey has adopted the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which seeks to expand Turkish maritime influence across surrounding waters. Ankara has increasingly relied on naval deployments and assertive maritime diplomacy to defend what it considers its continental shelf rights.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan previously described Western companies involved in Eastern Mediterranean gas exploration as “pirates of the sea”.
Western Opposition to the “Blue Homeland” Doctrine
In many Western capitals and in Tel Aviv, Turkey’s maritime strategy is viewed as an aggressive expansionist doctrine.
Consequently, the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance has continued to strengthen. Within this highly polarised environment, Washington’s broader strategy appears to encourage a prolonged regional competition that drains all competing powers simultaneously.
From Ankara’s perspective, the danger extends beyond diplomatic exclusion. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly stated that after confronting the so called “Shiite axis”, Israel’s next challenge would be the “emerging Sunni axis”, referring to growing cooperation between Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
This strategic encirclement has pushed Turkey to expand its regional footprint, particularly across Syria and Lebanon.
Ankara has also accelerated efforts to establish alternative regional trade and energy routes. Alongside the Iraq-Turkey Development Road Project, Turkey signed a major memorandum of understanding with Syria and Jordan in April 2026 to revive the historic Hejaz railway.
The initiative aims to connect Turkish and Syrian ports to Jordan’s Aqaba port and eventually onward to Saudi Arabia, creating a rapid land-sea corridor linking Europe to the Gulf.
For Ankara, this represents one of the most important strategic alternatives to bypass the geopolitical containment effort led by Israel with American backing.
Lebanon and Syria as Strategic Frontlines
Turkey increasingly views Lebanon as a secondary arena within the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical struggle.
After being excluded from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, Ankara sought to undermine the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot alignment by offering technical assistance to Lebanon in defining its Exclusive Economic Zones.
This competition became particularly visible after the Beirut port explosion, when Turkey proposed using the port of Mersin as an alternative logistical hub.
Ankara also expanded its influence through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), initially focusing on northern Lebanon before expanding social, educational, and healthcare initiatives into Beirut itself.
Despite gaining a degree of public support, Turkey’s influence within Lebanese state institutions remains limited compared to Iranian and Western influence.
The strategic importance of Lebanon for Turkey was highlighted by statements from Turkish Nationalist Movement Party MP Conor Alp Koçak during discussions surrounding the extension of Turkish participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in October 2025.
Koçak warned of “malicious operations” aimed at surrounding Turkey, arguing that Turkish national security must begin beyond its own borders. He stated that the security of Beirut, the Golan Heights, Damascus, Kirkuk, and Baghdad could not be separated from the security of Turkish cities such as Hatay, Urfa, Konya, and Izmir.
He further stressed that Turkey’s peacekeeping presence must be understood within the broader geopolitical balance of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus dispute, arguing that Israel, Greece, Greek Cypriot authorities, and several Western states are attempting to construct a geopolitical order excluding Turkey.
Turkey’s Bid to Break Israeli Dominance
Ankara believes the current escalation forms part of a broader regional restructuring project.
Turkish officials fear that if Israel succeeds in forcibly integrating Lebanon into Eastern Mediterranean security arrangements through normalisation initiatives or other frameworks, Israeli logistical dominance would effectively seal off Turkey’s southern Mediterranean coastline.
For this reason, Turkish policymakers increasingly view the defence of the Lebanese-Syrian arena as an existential strategic necessity aimed at preventing the Eastern Mediterranean from becoming an Israeli-controlled security zone.
To maximise its geopolitical gains, Ankara has adopted a strategy separating tactical flexibility from long term strategic goals. While direct confrontation with Israel remains concentrated further south, Turkey continues investing in Sunni demographic and institutional networks in Beirut and Tripoli.
Within this context, President Erdoğan’s February 2026 visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia represented attempts to break through the diplomatic wall surrounding Turkey.
Ankara recognises that dismantling Israeli logistical dominance requires securing the support of the Arab world’s two most influential powers, Cairo and Riyadh.
Turkey’s broader strategic argument is that escaping the perceived Iranian threat in Hormuz does not require submission to American-backed regional plans. Instead, Ankara is attempting to present alternative regional corridors capable of protecting the interests and independence of all parties involved.
