Inside Lebanon, the 14-point “framework agreement” signed by the government with Israel last week is widely seen as the most controversial agreement between the two sides to date. A quick search for the word “withdrawal” in the 1,300-word document gives a clear indication as to why: the word does not appear anywhere in the text.
Although the Lebanese government has attempted to present the agreement to its citizens in language that stresses sovereignty, the only roadmap for ending Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon amounts to nothing more than a temporary and limited “redeployment” in two “pilot areas”. Under this arrangement, Israel allows the Lebanese army to enter these areas, but the army will not assume “full and effective security responsibility” until Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been fully dismantled.
This already points to an obvious dilemma: who determines whether an area has been demilitarised? The answer, naturally, is Israel, the very state occupying Lebanese territory. What this agreement effectively imposes is the legitimisation of Israel’s occupation of any land it considers a security threat, while the Lebanese government, in which Hezbollah itself participates, has no meaningful say in the matter.
At its core, what we are witnessing is confirmation of what Hezbollah itself had warned against: negotiating with an occupying power without first demanding an end to the occupation is a grave mistake. Yet this is precisely what the Lebanese government has done. It has entered talks with a militarily superior occupying power whose politicians have repeatedly threatened to destroy Lebanon.
Iran had included Lebanon in the memorandum of understanding it signed with the United States, tying the permanent end of the American-Iranian war to “guaranteeing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon”. According to reports, the United States and Iran also agreed to establish a “deconfliction cell” in Lebanon to ensure a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, notably excluding Israel from participation in any security arrangements on Lebanese territory.
Instead of using these points of leverage against Israel, the Lebanese government sought to distance itself from Iran and prevent Hezbollah from claiming a domestic political victory. But in a context where Israel is the occupying power, this has only made Lebanon more dependent on the United States and its unstable president, the same president who has repeatedly downplayed Israel’s war on Lebanon as secondary to the American-Israeli war against Iran.
What remains, then, is the only constant in the Lebanese government’s negotiating toolkit: hope. Lebanon has effectively handed its sovereignty to the United States under Donald Trump, as if the past two years had never happened, and as if Trump had not threatened to annex entire countries or clearly expressed his contempt for states he considers weak.
As I wrote at the beginning of this war for +972 Magazine, the Lebanese government has adopted the “land for peace” framework, which essentially involves trading recognition of Israel in exchange for the return of our land. In this specific case, however, recognition comes alongside the legitimisation of the Israeli army’s occupation, in return for little more than the hope that Israel under Netanyahu will abandon its long-established behaviour.
This does not mean, however, that Hezbollah’s position was acceptable either. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the Lebanese government was further weakened after Hezbollah repeatedly took unilateral action against Israel without the approval of the Lebanese government. This is precisely what generated domestic anger against the organisation, pushing the Lebanese government to turn directly to the Americans.
This dynamic was especially clear during the latest round of widespread violence, when Hezbollah decided to enter the war on Iran’s side following the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei by the United States and Israel. Khamenei does not command popular appeal in Lebanon beyond Hezbollah’s support base. For the majority of Lebanese people, already exhausted by the previous war, his assassination was not sufficient justification for re-entering a war against an American-backed military power with a long and established record of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The Path Not Taken
When considering the alternative choices that could have been made, we must first acknowledge the position in which the Lebanese government found itself. That position was shaped by Hezbollah’s unilateral decision to enter the war on one hand, and by Israel’s campaigns of mass destruction and ethnic cleansing on the other.
It is difficult to imagine any solution that would not have required some form of concession, and any such concession would have left a significant portion of the population dissatisfied. For the government, choosing direct negotiations always carried the risk of accusations of betrayal. At the same time, avoiding negotiations altogether would likely have exposed it to accusations of abandoning its national responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese government’s aggressive posture towards Iran has proven deeply short-sighted. Reducing Iranian influence in Lebanese affairs is certainly a legitimate objective. But making such a decision while large parts of the country are being bombed and occupied by Israel raises serious questions, particularly when the only armed force capable of confronting Israel is the one backed by Iran.
It is not as though a ready alternative existed that would allow Lebanon to end Iran’s role in its affairs without also sacrificing Lebanese sovereignty. Did the French, Turks, British or Saudis offer to assist us as an alternative to Iran? The Lebanese army, after all, is itself backed by the United States, the same country that financed Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its large-scale destruction of Lebanon. President Trump’s occasional outbursts against Netanyahu have so far produced no actual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, let alone a ceasefire, despite repeated references to what is being called a “ceasefire”.
What is effectively being demanded of southern Lebanon is that it abandon any form of resistance to Israeli occupation, resistance that, in the current circumstances, can only continue with Iranian support. No security guarantees have been proposed in exchange for disarming Hezbollah. No independent mechanism has been included as part of this agreement. Even the existing United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon has been repeatedly targeted by Israel.
Whatever may be said about the threats posed by Iranian influence to Lebanese sovereignty, only one state is occupying southern Lebanon and destroying entire Lebanese villages. That state is not Iran.
Could there have been a compromise that balanced the Lebanese government’s desire to distance itself from Iran with the necessity of Hezbollah’s role in deterring Israeli invasion? We may never know, because this is not the path the Lebanese government chose. Even if one argues that entering direct negotiations with an untrustworthy adversary was Lebanon’s only option, that still does not explain the government’s aggressive posture towards Iran.
Israel has killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon over the past few months without the Lebanese army, which depends on the United States, firing a single bullet in response. At the same time, the Lebanese government declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata, removed images of the Ayatollah and deported members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It even ordered media outlets not to use the word “resistance” when describing Hezbollah.
What did any of this achieve? Opposition to Hezbollah’s armed activities is understandable. But allowing Israel to impose its will on Lebanon has only made Hezbollah cling more tightly to armed resistance. Even if Hezbollah were ultimately defeated, what would come next? Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982 gave birth to Hezbollah in the first place, and the conditions that led to its rise have only worsened since then.
With the American-Israeli war on Iran failing to topple the regime, and perhaps even strengthening it, we may now see Hezbollah become more willing to take greater risks. If not Hezbollah, then there are hundreds of thousands of Lebanese people who have been forcibly displaced from their homes, many of whom then watched Israel destroy their entire world. As long as Israel’s impunity remains the rule, there will always be those prepared to take up arms against it.
A Divided Society
The war has widened the fault lines that already existed within Lebanese society, while the spectre of civil war remains ever present. As Lebanese journalist Justin Salhani told me, “half the country does not know how to live with the other half”, in other words, under continuous Israeli bombardment. This has produced two opposing positions on how Lebanon should deal with Israel.
Contrary to how this division is often reported, it is not rooted in disagreement over Israel itself. As a recent nationwide opinion poll showed, the overwhelming majority of Lebanese people, 87 per cent across sectarian communities, view Israel as their enemy. By comparison, 51 per cent and 38 per cent respectively view the United States and Iran as enemies.
The divide instead concerns how to respond to Israeli aggression: 54 per cent support diplomacy, while 35 per cent prefer armed resistance.
It is unsurprising that Israel’s intensive bombing of Lebanese civilians has not won it many friends. Regardless of their feelings towards Hezbollah, everyone in Lebanon has seen footage of children being pulled from beneath the rubble, and most have now had direct experience of the Israeli military, even if only through the constant noise of its drones. Israel has used every so-called “ceasefire” as an opportunity to continue bombing Lebanon with little response. Of the 54 towns and villages under Israeli control, at least 46 have been severely damaged or completely destroyed.
Those calling for Lebanon to stand with Iran, even if only out of short-term necessity, begin from the assumption that no other state is willing to support Lebanon in the way Iran has supported Hezbollah. So far, this has proven true. They also argue that whatever leverage Lebanon possesses exists, as Salhani put it to me, “because of the Iranian memorandum of understanding” with the United States. In other words, Iran’s demand that Israel’s occupation of Lebanon be ended as part of its negotiations with the Americans may be what pushed the Americans to pressure the Israelis.
As for those advocating negotiation and even “peace” with Israel, this should not be confused with a desire for normalisation. We will not soon see Israeli tourists skiing on the peaks of Mount Lebanon. The reality is simpler: the majority of the population has been exhausted by repeated wars and desperately wants them to end, even under terms Hezbollah has described as “humiliating”.
In any case, this agreement is unlikely to hold. Salhani told me, “It will be very difficult to implement.” The current situation is fragile and rests on Netanyahu’s whims, as well as a geopolitical landscape that remains highly unstable.
If Trump, who recently said Israel has been fighting Hezbollah “for a very long time”, somehow succeeds in forcing the Israelis to fully withdraw from Lebanon, this would vindicate those pushing for direct negotiations and undermine Hezbollah’s insistence on armed resistance. But in the absence of a complete Israeli withdrawal, tensions are expected to rise again, potentially leading to a new escalation that may push Iran to break its agreement with the United States.
Far from being a “secondary war”, as Trump recently described it, Israel’s war on Lebanon is a reflection of broader regional dynamics and is deeply tied to them. Israeli militarisation, expansionism and impunity have destabilising consequences far beyond Lebanon’s borders, as the continuing fallout from the American-Israeli war on Iran clearly demonstrates.
As long as this remains the case, any “ceasefire” or agreement should be treated with deep scepticism.
