The recent war against Iran has triggered a major reassessment inside Gulf capitals, exposing the fragility of long standing security assumptions and forcing regional governments to reconsider their dependence on both American protection and Israeli military dominance.
An analysis published by Foreign Affairs, written by defence and security expert H. A. Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute, argued that the conflict fundamentally reshaped Gulf security calculations after governments across the region found themselves directly impacted by a war they neither initiated nor supported.
According to the article, the conflict exposed the limits of American security guarantees while simultaneously reinforcing growing concerns that Israeli regional supremacy does not provide stability for the Gulf, but instead increases the likelihood of future escalation.
Gulf States Confront the Limits of American Protection
The article noted that the regional atmosphere appeared very different during Iran’s first direct strike on Israeli territory in spring 2024, when more than 300 drones and missiles were intercepted by American, British, French, and Jordanian forces.
That coordinated military response sent a clear message to Gulf governments that attacks on Israel would trigger rapid Western intervention.
However, the deeper concern inside Gulf capitals remained unresolved: what would happen if Gulf states themselves became targets of Iranian retaliation?
That question was answered following the launch of the joint American Israeli war on Iran on 28 February, a conflict strongly opposed by Gulf governments.
According to the report, Iran quickly responded by targeting airports, ports, oil facilities, and desalination plants across multiple Gulf countries.
Although American forces assisted in intercepting some attacks, the image of the Gulf as a stable and secure hub for global investment suffered a major blow. Foreign Affairs argued that damaging international confidence in Gulf economies formed part of Iran’s broader strategic objective.
Strait of Hormuz Disruption Intensified Economic Pressure
The article stated that Iran went beyond direct strikes and effectively paralysed traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting exports from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar while also affecting shipping activity linked to Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The resulting pressure placed Gulf economies under unprecedented strain.
For nearly a decade, Gulf states relied on three core principles to preserve regional stability:
Maintaining Neutrality With Iran
Gulf governments sought to avoid direct confrontation with Tehran and positioned themselves as neutral actors wherever possible.
Strengthening Ties With Washington
Regional states expanded defence partnerships with the United States and deepened military cooperation to maintain deterrence.
Preserving Open Channels With Tehran
Gulf capitals also maintained diplomatic communication with Iran in an effort to prevent military escalation.
According to Foreign Affairs, the recent war has forced Gulf governments to reconsider all three pillars simultaneously, with some now questioning whether parts of that framework remain viable at all.
Growing Rejection of Israeli Led Regional Security
The report argued that Gulf capitals increasingly reject the American Israeli vision of integrating Arab states into a regional security structure dominated by Israel.
That model depends on preserving overwhelming Israeli military superiority, unrestricted operational freedom, and the ability to dictate the rules of engagement across the region.
The article stressed that the war demonstrated how Israeli ambitions for regional dominance do not necessarily protect Gulf states. Instead, they may expose them to greater danger because Israel is prepared to launch preemptive wars serving its own strategic interests regardless of the consequences for neighbouring countries.
Foreign Affairs pointed to normalisation agreements as one of Washington’s primary tools for integrating Gulf states into this emerging security order.
Historically, Gulf governments linked recognition of Israel to a full withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, a position formally embedded in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
However, several Gulf states, particularly the UAE, moved toward normalisation in pursuit of military, technological, and economic advantages while seeking deeper integration into the American regional security network.
The article noted that during the first administration of Donald Trump, Washington approved the sale of F-35 Lightning II fighter jets to the UAE as part of those arrangements, although the deal later stalled under the Biden administration.
At the same time, the United States reportedly pursued parallel negotiations with Saudi Arabia over a defence agreement tied to normalisation with Israel.
Gulf Capitals No Longer View Israeli Interests as Aligned With Their Own
Despite openness toward normalisation, the article stressed that Gulf governments never fully embraced the concept of supporting Israeli regional hegemony.
That reluctance intensified following Israel’s military campaign after 7 October 2023 and the broader expansion of Israeli military operations throughout the region.
Foreign Affairs argued that the war against Iran provided Gulf leaders with perhaps the clearest evidence yet that their interests fundamentally diverge from Israeli priorities.
Many Gulf officials reportedly believe Israel succeeded in drawing the Trump administration into confrontation with Iran while Gulf states ultimately absorbed the economic and security consequences of a war they did not want.
The article further noted that earlier Gulf attempts to reduce tensions with Tehran failed to shield the region from Iranian retaliation. Within hours of the opening American Israeli strikes, Iranian drones and missiles targeted multiple Gulf countries.
Three Gulf Approaches Emerged During the Conflict
As the conflict evolved into a prolonged war of attrition, the article identified three distinct Gulf responses.
Oman Pursued Restraint
Despite Iranian strikes targeting Duqm Port, Oman maintained its policy of de escalation. Muscat quickly congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader following the killing of his predecessor during American Israeli strikes and issued statements condemning attacks by all sides.
UAE Shifted Toward Harder Confrontation
The UAE reportedly concluded that rebuilding ties with Tehran no longer provided sufficient protection after sustaining the largest number of Iranian strikes.
According to the article, Abu Dhabi imposed broad restrictions on Iranian passport holders and signalled willingness to support American operations aimed at securing the Strait of Hormuz while deepening ties with both Washington and Israel.
Bahrain reportedly adopted a similar position.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait Took a Middle Position
These states balanced between Abu Dhabi’s harder approach and Oman’s restraint, attempting to avoid both direct escalation and complete strategic detachment from Washington.
Toward a More Independent Gulf Defence Structure
Foreign Affairs argued that Iranian strikes may push Gulf states toward building a more independent regional defence architecture despite their political differences.
For decades, Gulf security rested on a transactional relationship with Washington:
energy resources, capital, and military basing rights in exchange for implicit American protection.
This arrangement was reinforced through multiple legal and military agreements, including the designation of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia as major non NATO allies, expanded American military access in Oman, the hosting of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and an executive order signed by Trump after the Israeli bombing of Qatar in 2025 obligating Washington to defend Doha.
Yet the article argued these arrangements created expectations of protection that recent events failed to fully deliver.
Gulf States Search for New Military Partners
The report stated that Gulf concerns regarding declining American commitment date back to former US President Barack Obama and his 2011 “pivot to Asia” strategy.
Still, the article acknowledged that no global power currently possesses the ability to fully replace the United States as the Gulf’s primary defence provider in terms of aircraft, naval systems, maintenance, logistics, training, and advanced military technology.
At the same time, Gulf governments are increasingly diversifying defence partnerships.
According to the article:
- The UAE launched joint drone manufacturing projects with Turkish firms in 2024.
- Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan.
- Gulf states began exploring alternatives to American weapons systems, including Turkish fighter aircraft, South Korean missile defence systems, Ukrainian drones, Japanese interceptor missiles, and British low cost anti drone technologies.
The report added that both the European Union and China are entering Gulf strategic calculations through trade, technology, and industrial cooperation, though Gulf governments remain cautious about provoking Washington through formal defence alignments.
Israel Increasingly Viewed as a Strategic Threat
Foreign Affairs concluded that Gulf governments are becoming more sceptical of Israeli regional ambitions.
Statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about reshaping the Middle East and proposals for pipeline networks linking the Arabian Peninsula to Israeli ports as alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz reportedly failed to convince Gulf leaders.
Instead, many Gulf decision makers increasingly view Israel as a destabilising force comparable to Iran itself.
The article linked that perception to Israel’s expanding military operations across neighbouring states since 2023, its continued occupation of additional territory in Lebanon and Syria, and growing international condemnation tied to the war on Gaza.
Foreign Affairs cited remarks from Oman’s foreign minister stating that Israel, not Iran, represents the primary source of instability in the region, reflecting the widening divide between Israeli strategic ambitions and Arab security priorities.
Gulf Security Is Entering a New Phase
The article concluded that Gulf states are likely to deepen cooperation with Washington out of military necessity, but no longer see the United States as the sole guarantor of their long term security.
The combination of Washington’s close alignment with Israel, its inability to decisively deter Iran, and repeated disregard for Gulf concerns has accelerated regional efforts to pursue strategic autonomy.
According to Foreign Affairs, true independence will not come from replacing one foreign guarantor with another, but through constructing a unified Gulf defence framework built around intelligence sharing, integrated air defence coordination, joint anti drone capabilities, and expanded domestic defence industries.
The report argued that the past year shattered the longstanding American assumption that Israeli and Gulf security interests naturally align, exposing a widening gap between Netanyahu’s vision of a Middle East reshaped through force and the Gulf states’ pursuit of security rooted in sovereignty and regional stability.
