Several questions are dominating discussions about the position of Yemen’s Houthi movement, known as Ansar Allah, regarding the ongoing war involving its ally Iran on one side and the United States and the Israeli occupation on the other. Among the most prominent questions are whether the group will enter the war, when it might move from condemnation to openly declaring support for Tehran, and why such involvement has not yet occurred.
On Saturday, the Houthi movement condemned the joint American Israeli attack on Iran, stating that expanding the scope of targeting would only lead to an expansion of confrontation.
In a statement issued by its Supreme Political Council, the group expressed what it described as its “complete and unwavering solidarity” with Iran’s leadership, government and people. The statement also affirmed Tehran’s “legitimate right to defend its sovereignty, security and independence of decision”.
The Houthis further held the United States and Israel fully responsible for the consequences of what they described as this dangerous escalation and the potential repercussions it may have on the security and stability of the region.
Possibility of Wider Intervention
Adel Al Shujaa, a professor of political science at Sana’a University, said the Houthi movement views itself as part of the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran, which also includes Hezbollah in Lebanon and several Iraqi factions.
Speaking to Arabi21, Al Shujaa explained that in principle the group maintains both ideological and political commitments to support Iran in its confrontation with the United States and Israel.
However, he noted that moving from “political and media support” to “direct military engagement” depends on several factors, including the nature of the war itself.
According to the Yemeni academic, if the conflict remains limited to reciprocal strikes, the Houthis are likely to restrict themselves to limited escalation such as maritime operations or symbolic missile attacks.
If the conflict turns into a comprehensive war that threatens the survival of the Iranian system, the probability of broader military involvement by the Houthis could increase.
Al Shujaa added that one of the main factors shaping the group’s decision is what he described as “local survival calculations”. The Houthis control extensive territories in northern Yemen, and any large scale involvement could expose them to direct American strikes that threaten their military and economic infrastructure. As a result, they must balance ideological commitments with their interest in maintaining their position.
He explained that the group may choose to intervene in a calculated manner by expanding attacks in the Red Sea or against Israeli targets without declaring a comprehensive war, as part of a strategy of indirect pressure.
Al Shujaa also pointed out that following the strikes that weakened Hezbollah’s structure in Lebanon and the decline of Tehran’s influence in Syria after the weakening of Bashar al Assad’s regime, the Houthi movement has emerged as one of Iran’s most active operational arms in the region.
He added that the Houthis view any war against Iran as a war against the entire axis rather than Iran alone. In their perspective, such a conflict represents an attempt to redraw the balance of power in the region and a strategic threat to their political and ideological project.
At the same time, Al Shujaa said the group understands that it has become Tehran’s most prominent card on the southern Arab front. This gives it greater negotiating weight but also places a heavier burden upon it.
The professor outlined three possible scenarios that could push the Houthis to intervene widely alongside Iran.
The first would involve a direct strike on major sovereign facilities in Iran or an attempt to overthrow the Iranian system.
The second would be a public request from Tehran to activate multiple fronts if the Iranian leadership decides to open all arenas of confrontation.
The third scenario would involve direct American or Israeli strikes targeting Houthi leadership, transforming the confrontation into a direct conflict rather than a proxy struggle.
Three Phases of the War
Adnan Al Jabrani, a journalist specialising in military affairs and the Houthi movement, said the delay in Houthi involvement has led some observers to rely on what he described as a simplistic explanation that attributes the delay to independent calculations by the group. According to him, this interpretation is inaccurate.
Writing on Facebook, Al Jabrani argued that Iran appears to be fighting this battle through three main operational phases.
The first phase highlights Iran’s own military capabilities, with the exception of its strategic missiles.
The second phase involves the entry of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi armed factions into the confrontation.
The third phase would involve the participation of the Houthi movement, the use of strategic missiles by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the closure of key maritime passages including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and special operations carried out by the Quds Force.
The military affairs journalist said that Iran is currently fighting primarily through the first phase, while the second phase has only recently begun to appear over the past two days. According to him, Tehran has not yet transitioned to the third phase.
He suggested that this decision is linked to expectations regarding the final objectives of the United States and Israel in the conflict, particularly the possibility of efforts to overthrow the Iranian system, launch a ground intervention or support movements on the ground, in addition to the possibility of new actors entering the war.
According to Al Jabrani, the third phase may represent Iran’s strategic reserve for a prolonged war, referring to statements attributed to Ali Larijani.
He added that the way Iran has managed its military response so far, including the scale and nature of strikes against Israel, suggests that Tehran may prefer the war to remain at its current level of air strikes and targeted killings. In this context, Iran appears to be seeking to raise the cost of the confrontation by targeting regional interests and threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz.
He concluded that as long as the conflict remains at this level from Iran’s perspective, even if the Houthis were to join the war, their involvement would not significantly add to the impact already created by Iranian missiles or by the missiles launched by Hezbollah and Iraqi factions.
A Possibility That Still Exists
Saif Al Muthanna, a writer and researcher at the Washington Centre for Yemeni Studies, said the possibility of Houthi involvement theoretically exists, but the decision depends on several considerations. Among the most important are the group’s ability to withstand confrontation with the United States, particularly after the recent agreement, as well as the nature of its relationship with Tehran and its own internal and regional calculations.
Speaking to Arabi21, Al Muthanna said the group may prefer to keep escalation below the threshold of a comprehensive war.
According to him, the most likely scenario is the continuation of indirect military and political support for Iran, potentially accompanied by calculated escalation against Israel in the Red Sea without an official declaration of participation in an open war against Washington.
Al Muthanna added that the growing prominence of the Houthi movement in the regional landscape following the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, the earlier killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the departure of Bashar al Assad reflects a shifting dynamic within the alliance. As each ally weakens, the remaining actors gain greater importance.
He said the Houthis may view the current moment as an opportunity to demonstrate that they represent the spearhead of the axis at this stage and to transform pressure into opportunity. In this sense, targeting Iran may be used to mobilise domestic support through rhetoric centred on defending the Muslim Ummah and confronting American dominance.
At the same time, he noted that a collapse or severe weakening of the axis could leave the Houthis regionally exposed. This forces them to balance between demonstrating loyalty to Tehran and avoiding self depletion that could weaken their position inside Yemen.
For this reason, Al Muthanna believes it is unlikely that the movement will declare a comprehensive war alongside Iran. Instead, it will probably continue limited escalation while providing clear political and media support for Tehran.
He added that the group may also seek to use the war to strengthen its negotiating position regarding the Yemeni conflict.
He concluded that the Houthis may operate according to what he described as a strategy of “participation without self destruction”, meaning support for the Iranian axis without entering a direct existential confrontation with the United States.
On Saturday, United States President Donald Trump announced that Washington had launched what he described as “large scale combat operations” in Iran.
In announcing the attack, Trump said the United States would seek to destroy Iran’s missile programme, dismantle its missile industry and eliminate its naval fleet.
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