Israel does not appear to be heading towards a conventional election in which parties simply compete over programmes and parliamentary seats. Instead, it is entering a battle over how security itself should be defined.
Recent opinion polls point to a turbulent political landscape. Benjamin Netanyahu is clearly losing ground, Gadi Eisenkot is gaining support, and other political forces are advancing as voters search for an alternative to Likud. Yet no clear ideological alternative to the policies of the Israeli right has emerged.
This raises a central question as the election approaches: is the objective merely to replace Netanyahu, or to change the approach that led Israel into a war and escalation across several fronts, none of which it has yet been able to decisively resolve?
While Netanyahu’s image as the only strong leadership option weakens, the military fronts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Jerusalem remain open. At the same time, rhetoric around the possibility of resuming war against Iran is intensifying.
This is where the contradiction becomes clear. The more Netanyahu’s electoral position weakens, the more valuable the security issue becomes in the political contest. Security remains the field on which Netanyahu has always sought to dominate, presenting himself to Israeli voters as the leader best able to deliver it.
Eisenkot’s Rise and the Search for an Alternative
The most notable development in the Israeli electoral landscape is the rise of Gadi Eisenkot, a figure drawn directly from the Israeli security establishment.
In the latest opinion poll published by Kan, Eisenkot’s Yashar party won 24 seats, two more than Likud. The Bennett Beyachad alliance, which includes Yair Lapid, received 14 seats, while the Arab parties collectively secured 12.
Beyond the importance of the numbers themselves, the more significant finding is that Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett are outperforming Netanyahu when voters are asked who is best suited to serve as prime minister.
If similar results continue to appear across successive polls, they would indicate that Netanyahu no longer enjoys the political standing he has long claimed before Israeli voters as the country’s most entrenched political figure, particularly after three years of war across multiple fronts.
But this does not mean that Israeli voters have shifted from the right towards the left or even decisively towards the centre.
That distinction is critical when reading the rise of Eisenkot.
He comes from the Israeli security establishment, having previously served as chief of staff, and remains closely associated with one of the central institutions shaping Israeli decision-making.
His rise therefore reflects, to a significant extent, a desire among sections of the Israeli electorate to replace Netanyahu rather than replace Israel’s underlying security and political doctrine.
More precisely, Eisenkot may succeed as an alternative to Netanyahu without necessarily becoming an alternative to Netanyahu’s policies.
That distinction will become increasingly important as election day approaches.
The Opposition’s Real Question
The central question confronting the Israeli opposition is not simply how to remove Netanyahu.
It is what comes after him.
Would Eisenkot represent a genuinely different way of managing the war? What would his policies be towards the Palestinian people after October 7? How would he approach Hezbollah in Lebanon, relations with Iran and Israel’s relationship with the United States?
None of these questions currently has a clear answer.
The controversy surrounding Mansour Abbas, the Arab list and recognition of a Palestinian state exposed the narrow limits of political debate inside Israel.
Rather than becoming a strategic discussion about the future of the conflict, the issue quickly became a test of political loyalty, forcing Eisenkot to distance himself from the proposal out of concern that he would pay an electoral price.
This reveals that the problem is not confined to Netanyahu as an individual. It also concerns the broader boundaries shaping political life in Israel.
A significant segment of voters wants Netanyahu replaced because of the failures of October 7, his management of the war, the political crises that followed, tensions with the security establishment and the deterioration of Israel’s international image as a result of the genocidal war in Gaza.
But that does not necessarily mean those voters want a fundamental change in Israel’s approach to the Palestinian people or in its conception of security.
This is the difference between opposition to Netanyahu and opposition to Netanyahu’s political and security approach, particularly since October 7, 2023.
Netanyahu’s Strongest Card Remains Security
Netanyahu is fully aware of this landscape.
He has built much of his political identity around his claimed experience in confronting what he has repeatedly described as external threats. He also understands that security crises can rapidly reorder the priorities of Israeli voters.
If the election becomes a contest between Netanyahu on one side and Eisenkot and his allies on the other, the central question may become: who is more capable of protecting Israel’s security?
Netanyahu has long presented himself as the master of this issue.
That is why the military and political fronts cannot be entirely separated from the domestic electoral battle, even without assuming that every military operation in Gaza, Lebanon or elsewhere is launched for electoral reasons.
There is an important difference between claiming that Netanyahu deliberately ignites every front for electoral gain and recognising that a heightened security environment gives him greater space to rebuild his image as the leader most capable of protecting Israel.
The latter assessment carries considerably more political logic.
Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated a strong ability to exploit events through a security narrative.
For example, when kites flown by children in Gaza are framed as a security threat, the central issue is not the kite itself. It is the capacity of Netanyahu’s political and military discourse to transform something relatively minor into a security narrative capable of justifying military escalation in Gaza or elsewhere.
It would therefore be wrong to reduce everything happening in Gaza to electoral calculations alone.
The continuing war on Gaza is driven by military and strategic considerations. But ignoring Israel’s domestic political factor would be an equally serious mistake, particularly when security becomes the issue most capable of reshaping public opinion.
Multiple Fronts, One Electoral Narrative
Gaza is not the only open front as the election approaches.
Israel is operating in a regional environment involving Lebanon, Syria and Iran, while also pursuing policies in the West Bank and Jerusalem, including efforts connected to resolving the conflict through annexation of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty.
As each front heats up, security becomes more dominant in Israeli political life, while discussion of other issues recedes.
This gives every escalation or security crisis additional political significance.
The greater the perceived threat, the less the Israeli electoral debate centres on the country’s long-term future and the more it focuses on which leader can manage the immediate danger.
That is precisely the terrain Netanyahu is best positioned to exploit.
For Israeli voters, a heightened sense of insecurity often increases support for whoever appears most capable of providing protection, even if voters are dissatisfied with that leader’s political performance.
But this equation also carries risks for Netanyahu.
If the war continues without a clear political or military outcome, and if the consequences of October 7 remain deeply embedded in Israeli public consciousness, Netanyahu will increasingly face the question that threatens him most: how did October 7 happen under his government in the first place?
The Election May Become a Referendum on October 7
The coming Israeli election is likely to become a battle over how October 7 is interpreted.
It may therefore be less a referendum on Netanyahu personally than a referendum on the narrative Israel constructs around what happened.
Several competing explanations are likely to emerge.
Was October 7 the result of a successful strategic deception by Hamas?
Was it the result of an intelligence and military failure that could be corrected by replacing the leadership?
Or was it the product of a deeper policy failure rooted in Israel’s approach to Gaza before October 7, its management of the conflict with the Palestinian people and the way decisions were made inside the Israeli government?
These questions are likely to dominate the campaign, alongside increasingly competitive claims over which leadership can provide the strongest security response.
The decisive issue will be whether Israel believes it merely needs different leaders, more competent security leadership, or a fundamental reassessment of its strategy towards the Palestinian people and the other open fronts.
If the election remains confined to the question of Netanyahu versus someone else, it could produce a new leadership while leaving much of the existing security policy intact.
If, however, the debate shifts towards a broader question of what kind of Israel should emerge after the war, the election could become a strategic turning point.
So far, the available indicators do not suggest that such a transformation has been decisively established.
Eisenkot Is Not the End of the Israeli Right
Eisenkot’s rise should therefore not be interpreted as the end of the era of the Israeli right, nor as the beginning of a new political course leading towards a settlement with the Palestinian people.
Israel is more likely heading towards a redistribution of power within the Israeli security establishment, alongside growing pressure to replace the current leadership under Netanyahu.
At the same time, the right-wing bloc remains powerful, while the security establishment continues to play a central role in shaping policy across Israel’s open military fronts.
Any political proposal that can currently be portrayed as a concession on the Palestinian issue is therefore likely to carry a significant electoral cost.
This helps explain how Eisenkot can outperform Netanyahu in opinion polls without, so far, presenting a project that fundamentally departs from the traditional Israeli security doctrine pursued under Netanyahu.
That is central to Eisenkot’s rise.
He offers sections of the electorate the possibility of leadership change without requiring them to abandon the existing security framework.
A Battle Over Leadership, Security and the Future of War
Israel is heading towards an intense and unpredictable election campaign.
It will be a battle over security, over the legacy of October 7, over the future of the wars involving Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, and over the identity of the leadership that will manage the next phase.
Eisenkot’s rise appears to reflect the desire of important sections of the Israeli electorate for change without a leap into the unknown.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, continues to rely on security and war because he understands that fear of the future remains one of the most powerful forces capable of reshaping the electoral map.
Between now and the election in October, the biggest question will remain unresolved: does Israel want only to replace Netanyahu, or is it genuinely prepared to reconsider the policies that brought it to its current position?
The election may remove Netanyahu and bring Eisenkot to power. It may redistribute the political map.
But none of that would necessarily change the nature of the conflict with Gaza, Lebanon or Iran.
If the military fronts remain active, Israel may not be heading into an election centred on creating a new reality at all. Instead, it may be heading into a contest over who can best claim the ability to lead it out of the escalating and continuing crises that have defined the period since October 7.
