Drone attacks on civilian areas in Sudan have intensified, with a mosque in the al-Droshab neighbourhood of Khartoum North struck and drone wreckage falling in the al-Samrab area among residential neighbourhoods.
Sudanese sources said a UAE-supplied drone operated by the Rapid Support Forces targeted a mosque in al-Droshab, causing material damage to the building. Images from the area showed the destruction inflicted on the mosque.
The strike comes amid a growing reliance on drones around Khartoum and other parts of the country, with Sudanese authorities repeatedly accusing the Rapid Support Forces of obtaining such weapons through regional networks linked to the United Arab Emirates.
Recent reports indicate that the Rapid Support Forces have increasingly relied on drones in recent months to attack locations inside and outside the capital, while Khartoum North and Omdurman have been subjected to repeated strikes.
Field sources confirmed in June that drones attributed to the Rapid Support Forces flew over al-Droshab and al-Samrab, while Sudanese army air defences attempted to intercept them.
The latest attacks are particularly dangerous because they have taken place in densely populated areas. UAE-supplied drones have become a major component of the Sudan war, while civilians have little ability to protect themselves from aerial attacks amid the continuing collapse of essential services.
Another drone fell in al-Samrab, according to Sudanese sources, scattering debris across residential neighbourhoods and raising fears of injuries and further damage.
Evidence of UAE Support for the Rapid Support Forces
Khartoum has long accused Abu Dhabi of providing military and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces, allegations the UAE categorically denies.
However, recent human rights reports and international investigations have presented evidence of a UAE-linked support network for the Rapid Support Forces involving weapons, equipment and foreign fighters.
A Human Rights Watch investigation published in May 2026 concluded that hundreds of Colombian military contractors had been recruited through a company based in Abu Dhabi and that some passed through Emirati military facilities before being deployed to Sudan to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces.
The organisation also documented military equipment that reached the Rapid Support Forces despite sales contracts to the UAE containing restrictions against re-exporting the equipment to other parties.
International criticism of the UAE’s role intensified after the European Parliament adopted a resolution in July that explicitly named the UAE as a party contributing to the continuation of the Sudan war and called for measures to halt support to the Rapid Support Forces.
Human Rights Watch also said accumulating evidence indicates that Emirati support has strengthened the Rapid Support Forces’ capacity to commit widespread abuses. It urged the international community to apply direct pressure on Abu Dhabi to stop any military support for the paramilitary force.
These findings have raised broader questions about the responsibility of parties providing weapons, financing and logistical services to a force using drones in populated areas.
According to critics, responsibility does not rest only with those who launch the missiles, but also with those who make access to the weapons and the capacity to use them possible.
Sudan Alleges Organ Trafficking Network in Darfur
In a more serious development, the Sudanese government accused the UAE-funded Rapid Support Forces of operating a human organ trafficking network inside detention centres in Darfur.
In a letter to the United Nations Security Council in June, the government said foreign medical personnel were allegedly participating in operations to extract organs from detainees.
The allegations add another dimension to mounting accusations surrounding abuses committed during the war and the networks accused of sustaining the Rapid Support Forces militarily and logistically.
New Fronts Emerging Along the Ethiopian Border
Attention is also turning to Kurmuk and Geissan in Blue Nile State, where fighting has intensified along the border with Ethiopia.
Sudanese officials and analysts believe the opening of new fronts in the area is intended to stretch the Sudanese Armed Forces and force them to distribute their troops across multiple battlefronts.
Amjad Farid al-Tayeb, political and foreign relations adviser to the head of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, described the war as a conflict whose consequences are increasingly extending beyond Sudan’s borders.
He warned of the risks posed by the expanding influence of the Rapid Support Forces and rejected any settlement that would grant the force legitimacy over areas under its control.
His comments align with broader warnings that Blue Nile could become a new strategic front, particularly because of the Ethiopian border and the overlap of regional interests.
Recent studies indicate that the Kurmuk-Geissan-Damazin axis has become one of the main centres of escalation in the latest phase of the war, alongside the continuing intensive use of drones.
Humanitarian Crisis Continues to Deepen
The developments come as the humanitarian cost of the war, which began in April 2023, continues to rise.
The conflict has produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, displacing millions of Sudanese people, expanding hunger and contributing to the collapse of essential services.
The UAE’s role remains at the centre of international controversy surrounding the war.
Human rights organisations say evidence that the UAE has provided extensive support to the Rapid Support Forces continues to accumulate, warning that failure to address the issue allows weapons and fighters to continue flowing into the battlefield.
