Iran’s Shahed drones have demonstrated how a relatively low-cost weapon can impose enormous financial and operational burdens on militaries equipped with advanced defence systems.
But the rise of the Shahed was not the product of an isolated Iranian industrial effort. According to the Wall Street Journal, it emerged from a complex global supply chain in which China played a pivotal role by providing engines, electronic components and spare parts.
In early July, a more advanced version of the Shahed appeared during a Russian attack on Kyiv, the newspaper reported. The drone was equipped with a turbojet engine rather than the conventional propellers used in earlier models.
According to Ukrainian officials, the upgraded Shahed can reach speeds of around 480 kilometres per hour, nearly three times faster than older versions.
The Russian attack involving the upgraded drones, which was carried out alongside ballistic and cruise missile strikes, killed around 30 people.
The development presents a new challenge for Ukrainian air defences.
Ukrainian officials told the newspaper that their forces can shoot down more than 90 per cent of older one-way attack drones. The faster versions, however, can outrun some cheaper interceptor systems, forcing Ukraine to rely on fighter aircraft or limited and expensive air defence missiles.
A Drone Born Under Sanctions
The development of the Shahed formed part of Iran’s long-term effort to rebuild its air power after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, particularly as US sanctions weakened the country’s conventional air force.
Analysts cited by the newspaper believe Iranian engineers benefited from Western drone designs before adapting and developing them to meet Iran’s own requirements.
Early Iranian drones, however, suffered from poor accuracy.
Iranian engineers therefore shifted towards the concept of the one-way attack drone, which does not need to return to its base and can still inflict substantial damage even without achieving extremely precise targeting.
Low cost and mass production consequently became central features of the weapon’s development.
One of Iran’s biggest challenges was obtaining suitable engines.
It initially benefited from German-designed engines before developing its own engines based on that technology.
Over time, sanctions and international isolation failed to prevent Iran from obtaining the components it required. Instead, Tehran increasingly relied on an external network of suppliers in which China became a major player.
China Becomes the Key Link in the Supply Chain
According to American and Ukrainian officials and analysts cited by the Wall Street Journal, China has become a major source of Shahed components, including engines, gyroscopes, servomotors and electronic parts.
US investigations have also found that Western components, including microcontrollers manufactured by Texas Instruments and voltage regulators produced by STMicroelectronics, reached Iran and Russia through intermediaries and front companies in China and Hong Kong.
Former US Treasury official Kerry Bitesov said the earlier focus had been on obtaining Western-made components.
“But now, I think that focus has changed, as China’s ability to manufacture these kinds of components and technologies has improved,” she said.
More recently, Ukraine said Chinese-made turbojet engines had appeared in the latest Russian versions of the drone.
After engines linked to Chinese company Telefly were identified, the section featuring those engines disappeared from the English-language version of the company’s website while remaining visible in Chinese and other language versions, according to the newspaper.
A Weapon Designed to Drain Air Defences
The danger posed by the Shahed rests on a simple equation: low cost, large-scale production and the ability to attack targets from long distances.
Russia sometimes deploys the drones alongside ballistic and cruise missiles in an effort to exhaust Ukrainian air defences.
Ukrainian Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba said newer drones are equipped with more antennas, modems and SIM cards, allowing their flight paths to be corrected through local communications networks.
He said these components are increasingly coming from China.
Zaruba added that some drones had been found carrying anti-aircraft weapons, potentially making efforts to intercept them more dangerous.
Although some of those weapons were not operational, the concept itself points towards efforts to make the drones more capable of confronting interception systems.
Beyond the War in Ukraine
The significance of the Shahed extends well beyond the war in Ukraine.
Iranian drone technology has either been used by or transferred to other countries, while similar models and designs inspired by the Shahed have appeared elsewhere.
The US military itself has also begun developing low-cost drones, drawing lessons from the operational challenges these weapons have created on modern battlefields.
How the Shahed Changed the Rules of War
The story of the Shahed reflects a broader transformation in weapons manufacturing.
In the past, producing advanced weapons generally required a vast domestic industrial base. Today, a middle-ranking state such as Iran can combine designs, technical expertise and components sourced through a global network of suppliers, then manufacture an inexpensive weapon capable of affecting militaries far larger than its own.
The transformation does not end there.
Retired Australian Major General and military analyst Mick Ryan told the newspaper: “We are going to see these things everywhere.”
His assessment captures the broader significance of the Shahed.
Its advantage lies not simply in technological sophistication, but in being inexpensive, capable of mass production and able to force an opponent to spend far greater resources to intercept it.
At the centre of that transformation are global supply chains, particularly China, which has become an increasingly important source of the components that have made this model of warfare possible.
