The US-Iranian confrontation entered an exceptionally sensitive phase over the past week after American attacks expanded beyond military bases and facilities used in combat operations to include civilian infrastructure, such as airports, power and electricity stations, bridges and roads.
This shift represents both a vertical and horizontal expansion of Washington’s target bank and indicates that the United States has begun adopting a new strategy in its confrontation with Tehran.
Traditional strategies pursued since the beginning of the war have failed to achieve Washington’s objectives, particularly amid Iran’s refusal to compromise over the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway has become a persistent problem for President Donald Trump’s administration, placing it in an increasingly difficult and politically embarrassing position internationally.
This strategic shift, moving beyond limited deterrence towards military coercion, raises questions about its possible consequences and whether it can force Tehran to accept conditions it previously rejected under more conventional pressure.
What does Washington seek to accomplish by making such a sensitive change to its targets inside Iran?
Cutting Iran’s Arteries
The most notable feature of the latest attacks is their concentration on Iran’s southern coastal belt, stretching from Khuzestan Province in the west to Sistan and Baluchestan in the east.
The region has been subjected to a series of systematic strikes against extensive infrastructure along the coastline directly overlooking the Strait of Hormuz. This area represents one of Iran’s most important centres of command and control over maritime traffic through the waterway.
The operations began with attacks on several road bridges in Hormozgan Province, including three bridges in the coastal city of Bandar Khamir. These bridges connect the port of Bandar Abbas, located on the strait, with Tehran and central Iran.
The Bandar Khamir railway station was also struck. It is one of the principal stations used to transport personnel, equipment and supplies to areas surrounding Hormuz.
The attacks extended to Iranshahr Airport in Sistan and Baluchestan Province and the main control tower at Chabahar Port, which had been used to monitor commercial and naval traffic.
Electrical infrastructure and desalination plants in Jask and several other southern provinces were also targeted, cutting electricity and water supplies to tens of thousands of residents.
What Do These Strikes Mean on the Ground?
These systematic attacks on southern Iran cannot be treated as merely another passing round in the prolonged war between the United States and Iran.
The intense concentration on the coastal belt, including attacks on bridges, roads, electricity and water facilities, airports and observation towers, suggests an effort to achieve several military and strategic objectives.
The first is to isolate the southern coastal region, to varying degrees, from the rest of Iran, particularly Tehran.
Bandar Abbas is especially important in this context. It is the Islamic Republic’s principal naval and logistical centre and one of the main bases used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain control over maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.
This isolation is being reinforced by cutting supply arteries through attacks on bridges, roads and railway lines linking the south with Tehran and the country’s central regions.
Such strikes could slow or disrupt commercial and military supply chains running from other Iranian cities to the southern provinces. The crisis would be intensified by the limited availability of alternative logistical routes, exposing residents to growing daily pressure on living conditions and essential services.
The tightening pressure also includes attacks on maritime and aerial surveillance systems.
This was demonstrated by the strike on the main control tower at Shahid Kalantari Port in Chabahar. According to US Central Command, the Revolutionary Guard used the tower to monitor Iran’s coastline overlooking the Gulf of Oman and track ships moving through the area.
Washington justified the attack by describing the tower as one of the most important maritime surveillance tools the Revolutionary Guard had used for decades to monitor shipping connected to the Strait of Hormuz.
Under this targeting strategy, the Strait of Hormuz appears to be the central issue behind the entire campaign.
The strikes reflect American efforts to paralyse Tehran’s ability to manage the waterway, weaken its capacity to control navigation and deprive it, at least temporarily, of one of its most important sources of leverage at the negotiating table.
Iran’s control over Hormuz has strengthened its diplomatic position and placed the Trump administration under growing political pressure and embarrassment.
What Does Washington Want?
By shifting its target bank inside Iran from military bases to infrastructure, the US administration appears to be pursuing three principal objectives.
Weakening Iran’s Control Over Hormuz
The first objective is to force Tehran gradually to retreat from its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz.
Washington seeks to achieve this by weakening Iranian command systems, separating command and control centres in the south from the country’s interior, and disrupting supply and logistical chains between central Iran and the coastal regions.
Through this new strategy, the United States is attempting to settle the most urgent question in the current phase: who has the authority to establish the rules of passage through the strait?
Raising the Cost of Confrontation
The second objective is to exert maximum pressure on Iran through a policy of compounded strangulation, commonly described in political terms as military coercion.
This approach seeks to raise the cost of confrontation for the Iranian leadership and persuade it that continued escalation and refusal to compromise will be more costly than demonstrating flexibility.
Washington is therefore attempting to maximise Iran’s economic and military losses, intensify internal pressure on the authorities and force the leadership to reassess its calculations.
Strengthening Washington’s Negotiating Position
The third objective is to improve the American position at the negotiating table.
By depriving Tehran of the Hormuz card and intensifying military and economic pressure, Washington hopes to negotiate from a position of strength, provided this strategy succeeds.
The United States believes this could force the Iranian leadership to modify its positions and recalculate its approach during future rounds of negotiations.
There is also another objective that cannot be ignored, even if it is not directly visible in the current campaign.
Trump is seeking to reassure his Gulf allies that Washington remains committed to confronting Iranian threats in the region.
These messages come amid growing doubts about the effectiveness of American protection and declining confidence in Washington’s security umbrella following Iran’s ability to strike Gulf capitals.
How Has Tehran Responded?
Tehran appears to have understood Washington’s message regarding Hormuz quickly and with considerable accuracy.
Iranian army spokesman Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia said the armed forces would not compromise in the slightest over the Strait of Hormuz.
He stressed that the only way to reopen the waterway was to respect the rights of the Iranian people and for the United States to comply with the provisions of the memorandum of understanding intended to end the war between the two countries.
This interpretation was not confined to the military establishment.
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Iran’s sphere of national influence and power extended to the Strait of Hormuz and that this power would remain intact.
His statement represented a direct response to Washington’s message and its attempts to undermine Tehran’s control over the strait.
Alongside these military and political statements, Iran responded on the ground by targeting several locations in Gulf capitals, including states acting as mediators and others maintaining close relations with Tehran.
The Revolutionary Guard announced that it had attacked military and logistical facilities it said were being used by the United States to conduct operations against Iran.
So far, Iran’s response has remained within the traditional framework it has adopted since the beginning of the war, involving drone and missile attacks against American bases and positions in Gulf states.
The most notable development, however, was a warning issued by Major General Mohsen Rezaei, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council and former commander of the Revolutionary Guard.
He said: “If the United States continues the war during the coming days, Iran will move from the response phase to the attack phase, and we will then announce the end of both the conditions for negotiations and the conditions of war.”
Rezaei did not explain the nature of this offensive phase, its geographical limits or the instruments Iran might use.
Nevertheless, his warning opened the door to several scenarios that could significantly widen the war, particularly if the Iranian establishment concludes that it faces a genuine threat to its survival.
Such a perception could push Tehran beyond the current rules of engagement and towards a strategy aimed at expanding the confrontation and engulfing the entire region in war.
The Race Against Time and the November Dilemma
Tehran understands that Washington does not want to become trapped once again in a full-scale war because of its enormous political, military and economic costs.
Iran also believes that every day that passes without the United States fully achieving its declared objectives represents a symbolic victory, despite the heavy losses caused by the intensification of American military operations.
Time has therefore become a shared wager between the two sides.
The United States views time as an instrument of pressure intended to force Iran into concessions, particularly over the Strait of Hormuz, and to provide the Trump administration with a political victory it can promote domestically.
Tehran, by contrast, regards its continued survival in the face of the American military machine as a victory in itself, provided it is not forced to make concessions on strategic issues over which it has established red lines.
These include the nuclear programme, missile capabilities, the unity of the regional fronts and the Strait of Hormuz.
Under this calculation, the US administration finds itself facing a genuine dilemma.
As the November midterm elections approach, political pressure on the administration will intensify. Trump is seeking a victory that could bring the war to an end before the election, particularly amid declining public support caused by his management of the confrontation and its economic and political consequences for American citizens.
Tehran understands why Washington has intensified its operations and made a qualitative change to its target bank.
At the same time, Iran is also racing against the clock to preserve the current situation and withstand the attacks until November.
It hopes Trump will then find himself compelled to conclude an agreement that allows him to save face, even if it does not include substantial Iranian concessions or cross Tehran’s strategic red lines.
Could Washington Escalate Further?
The remaining question is whether Washington will be satisfied with the current level of pressure.
Several indicators suggest it may resort to harsher options, even if those options currently appear unlikely in theory.
These could include a ground intervention along Iran’s coastline aimed at depriving Tehran of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, or a comprehensive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Such options remain conceivable given the presence of approximately 50,000 American military personnel in the region.
Some may regard this as an exceptionally dangerous and self-destructive course because of its expected costs.
Yet it could still enter Washington’s political calculations if Trump fails to achieve his objectives and believes that his political future is at risk.
The question most likely to determine the future of the confrontation is therefore how long the Iranian establishment can withstand the current escalation and how effectively it can absorb its economic, military and political consequences at home and abroad.
