When the memorandum of understanding was signed, discussions surrounding the conflict focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear programme. Diplomatic efforts revolved around enrichment levels, inspections, sanctions relief and the extent to which Tehran would accept new restrictions on its nuclear activities.
With the resumption of hostilities, however, Iran’s nuclear programme is no longer the principal obstacle to resolving the conflict. Its strategic centre of gravity has shifted elsewhere.
The most urgent question is no longer whether Iran will enrich uranium, but whether the Strait of Hormuz can remain open safely and reliably. The conflict has entered a new phase in which military success, diplomacy, economics and political legitimacy now converge in one place: the Strait of Hormuz.
The Conflict’s New Centre of Gravity
In military strategy, a “centre of gravity” is not merely the most important target. It is the central issue upon which all other objectives increasingly depend. Once that centre shifts, the entire conflict begins to reorganise around it.
With the renewal of hostilities, the strategic centre of gravity has clearly moved to the Strait of Hormuz. The objectives of every major actor now pass through this vital waterway.
As soon as military operations began, Iran adopted an asymmetric policy of restricting maritime navigation through the strait. Tehran sought to establish the perception that passage had become dangerously unsafe for commercial shipping.
To achieve this, Iran used mines, drones and missile attacks to disrupt maritime traffic, destabilise energy markets and pressure the global economy, while simultaneously increasing pressure on the United States to reach a settlement ending the conflict.
One essential point must be remembered: Iran did not need to physically close the strait. It merely needed to convince insurers, shipping operators, commercial companies and foreign capitals that attempting to use it had become an unacceptable risk.
Why Hormuz Matters to the Global Economy
Few maritime chokepoints exert greater influence over the global economy than the Strait of Hormuz.
Approximately 20 per cent of global oil consumption passes through it, representing nearly one-quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade. In addition, 89 per cent of the crude oil and condensates crossing the strait are destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan and South Korea accounting for around 74 per cent of these shipments.
More than 20 per cent of global liquefied natural gas exports also pass through the strait, alongside petrochemicals, food imports for Gulf states, fertilisers and industrial equipment.
Iran’s strategy of restricting maritime navigation has therefore raised serious concerns among shipping companies and insurers. This demonstrates that disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are not merely regional incidents. Once they occur, they rapidly develop into global economic crises.
Under these conditions, the strait has become the true test of whether diplomacy can succeed.
How the Memorandum of Understanding Unravelled
The first phase of hostilities ended with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 17 June, after which attention returned to Iran’s nuclear programme.
That focus quickly changed because Washington and Tehran interpreted the memorandum’s ambiguities differently.
The United States maintained that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to freedom of navigation. Iran, by contrast, believed it had been granted the authority to secure the waterway and that all maritime traffic was required to coordinate with Tehran before passing through it.
Iranian statements went even further, raising the possibility of imposing transit fees on ships crossing the strait.
For Washington, this constituted a red line. Negotiations collapsed and the conflict resumed after Iran targeted tankers attempting to cross through the Omani shipping lane.
The memorandum itself therefore demonstrated that Hormuz, rather than the nuclear issue, had become the determining factor in whether diplomacy would succeed or fail.
Uncertainty Inside Iran’s Leadership
The strait has also exposed another major challenge: the fragmentation of decision-making within the Iranian government.
Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader of the Revolution following the assassination of his father at the beginning of the conflict. Reports suggested that he had also been injured in the attack that killed his father.
He has not appeared publicly since then and has released no audio recordings. His activity has been limited entirely to written statements.
His absence from public view appears to have deepened uncertainty over who is actually making decisions in Iran.
Has authority shifted to President Masoud Pezeshkian? Is policy being directed by the Supreme National Security Council? Or has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps gained greater operational independence?
Pezeshkian led the political effort to resolve the conflict, supported by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who headed the negotiation process. Both men helped push Iran towards accepting the memorandum of understanding, despite fierce criticism from hardliners who wanted the fighting to continue.
Can Tehran Enforce Its Own Commitments?
Reports indicated that Iranian officials told their American counterparts that attacks on three tankers on 7 July had been carried out by rogue elements.
President Trump then announced on 11 July that an agreement had been reached with Tehran. Yet only one hour after the announcement, elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attacked an oil tanker and published a social media post declaring that “the Strait of Hormuz is closed until further notice”.
This sequence of events exposes the central challenge surrounding Hormuz: can Tehran honour its commitments if another agreement is reached?
Signing an agreement is fundamentally different from possessing the institutional capacity to implement and enforce it.
Iran’s leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not operate as a unified front following a coherent strategy. Although both Tehran and Washington face internal divisions, the decisive difference in this conflict lies in whether all institutions responsible for carrying out a decision will actually comply once that decision has been made.
Peace is difficult to build when one party cannot be certain who controls the other side. Without that certainty, trust cannot be established and a durable settlement capable of ending the fighting becomes far more difficult to construct.
Hormuz as the Condition for Peace
Diplomacy is not dead, despite the collapse of the ceasefire. An agreement ending the conflict remains possible, but both sides must recognise that resolving the Strait of Hormuz dispute has become the essential condition for settling the wider confrontation.
The most difficult challenge ahead will not simply be whether negotiations can produce another ceasefire or a final peace settlement. It will be whether Tehran can implement and enforce any agreement that is reached.
Failure to resolve the Hormuz issue will inevitably prolong the fighting and increase the likelihood that miscalculation could trigger unintended escalation and a further intensification of hostilities.
Until confidence in the Strait of Hormuz is restored, the waterway will remain the conflict’s true centre of gravity and the arena in which the ultimate outcome of the confrontation will be determined.
