After lengthy mediation efforts led by several Arab and Muslim countries, particularly Pakistan and Qatar, the final version of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States was officially announced.
The development was warmly welcomed by leaders around the world, with one notable exception: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
While mediators worked intensively to bridge the remaining gaps and secure the agreement, Netanyahu was reportedly doing everything possible to derail the negotiations.
He sought to block any potential understanding between Iran and the United States, which, according to this view, explains his decision to launch an attack on Beirut’s southern suburbs during the final stages of the talks.
The assumption was that such an attack would provoke a violent response, prevent any agreement with Iran and possibly reignite war.
That, at least, was Netanyahu’s hope.
Instead, the opposite occurred.
His actions reportedly pushed President Donald Trump, who was eager to secure a deal as quickly as possible due to domestic, regional and international pressures, to offer concessions that convinced Iran to avoid responding to Netanyahu’s provocation.
In return, the memorandum included an explicit commitment requiring the United States to end military conflicts on all fronts, particularly the Lebanese front, which Netanyahu had believed could be exploited to sabotage any agreement.
A New Regional Phase
Once the memorandum is formally signed, the Middle East may enter a new phase fundamentally different from what the United States and Israel had envisioned.
The agreement does not settle every dispute.
Those issues will be addressed in follow-up negotiations beginning tomorrow and lasting 60 days, with the possibility of extension.
However, the memorandum establishes limits that cannot be crossed and provides a framework for evaluating the gains and losses of each side as negotiations proceed.
Although the official text has not yet been published, the details that have leaked so far and have been widely reported are sufficient to outline the broad features of the post-war Middle East.
Before the Twelve Day War, the United States and Israel demanded that Iran:
- Dismantle its nuclear programme along the Libyan model.
- Reduce its missile programme to a level that would pose no threat to Israeli security.
- Sever its financial and military ties with all allied groups in the region.
When Iran refused to comply, the United States and Israel jointly launched a war against it in June 2025, aiming to destroy both its nuclear and missile programmes.
That objective was not fully achieved.
This failure explains Netanyahu’s persistent efforts to convince Trump that the Iranian regime was at its weakest point and that it could be removed through a decisive military strike targeting both political and military leaders.
When he eventually succeeded, a second war was launched on 28 February 2026.
It lasted 39 days.
Its declared objective was the overthrow of the Iranian government.
That goal was not achieved either.
Nevertheless, Trump continued to insist that Iran had suffered military defeat and had no option except complete surrender.
This remained the prevailing narrative until the United States found itself compelled to sign a memorandum of understanding with Iran.
The agreement disappointed Netanyahu and revealed a new balance of power in the region.
What Did Iran Gain?
According to this analysis, the 39 Day War enabled Iran to achieve three major outcomes.
Control of the Strait of Hormuz
Iran was able to impose control over the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously exposing the inability of the United States to reopen the passage by force.
This carried serious consequences for global trade, the international economy and America’s standing in the world order.
Military Resilience
Iran inflicted substantial damage not only on Israel but also on American military bases across the region.
At the same time, it preserved most of its missile and drone capabilities, demonstrating that it remains capable of fighting future wars if necessary.
Preserving Nuclear Capability
Iran succeeded in safeguarding approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
This amount is considered sufficient to produce eight nuclear warheads within a relatively short period should such a decision be made.
As a result, Iran remained what is often described as a “threshold nuclear state”, retaining both strategic status and negotiating leverage.
What Did the United States Concede?
These realities forced Washington to make several important concessions.
Recognising the Iranian Government
The United States entered negotiations with the very government it had previously sought to overthrow.
This effectively required acknowledging its legitimacy and accepting it as a regional actor capable of participating in solutions rather than being treated solely as a source of instability.
Ending Regional Wars
Washington accepted Iran’s demand that military conflicts on all fronts, particularly Lebanon, be brought to an end as a prerequisite for negotiations over major issues.
This, according to supporters of the agreement, limits the possibility of using negotiations as a cover for future wars.
A Principle of Reciprocity
The agreement reportedly establishes a principle of equal obligations.
Iran’s commitments regarding its nuclear programme and the Strait of Hormuz are tied directly to American commitments concerning the release of frozen Iranian assets and the lifting of sanctions.
Iran’s Return to the Regional Stage
If the memorandum is implemented faithfully, the likely outcome would be Iran’s commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for the removal of sanctions.
Such an outcome would permanently end Iran’s isolation.
It would transform Iran into a major regional actor and shift the balance of power in a direction fundamentally different from what Israel, backed strongly by the United States and particularly the Trump administration, had hoped to achieve.
Netanyahu’s Vision of a New Middle East
It is worth recalling that Netanyahu had his own vision for a new Middle East led by Israel.
He outlined this vision during a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2023, only weeks before the events of 7 October.
According to this perspective, Netanyahu later used those events as a justification for expansion and for pursuing the vision of a Greater Israel through military force and a series of wars.
In Palestine, Israel succeeded in devastating the Gaza Strip, reoccupying 70 percent of its territory and causing casualties affecting approximately 10 percent of the population.
It also seized large areas of the occupied West Bank, establishing new settlements and military bases while insisting on the disarmament of all Palestinian resistance factions.
In Syria, Israel occupied more than 500 square kilometres of additional territory.
It subsequently became more involved in Syrian internal affairs and, under the banner of protecting the Druze community, was accused of contributing to tensions that could lead to civil conflict.
In Lebanon, Israel eliminated much of Hezbollah’s senior political and military leadership and occupied territory south of the Litani River while continuing to push for the group’s disarmament.
The Iran Factor
Netanyahu understood that the Greater Israel project could not become reality without politically and militarily subduing Iran.
He therefore worked tirelessly to convince Washington to join him in a joint war against Tehran.
He succeeded only after Trump returned to office.
Yet two major wars failed to achieve the central objective of overthrowing the Iranian government.
This eventually forced Trump to enter direct negotiations with Iran, as previously noted.
A New Crossroads
Few expect Netanyahu to abandon his dream of a Greater Israel.
Nevertheless, new power dynamics are emerging in parallel with Trump’s decision to sign an agreement with Iran that falls far short of Netanyahu’s ambitions.
The region now appears to stand at a crossroads.
Either Netanyahu succeeds in undermining the agreement before it enters full implementation, thereby reviving his long-held ambitions.
Or the Arab and Muslim countries that invested considerable diplomatic capital in preserving the agreement succeed in protecting it.
If that happens, the countdown may begin for the Middle East to escape the bottleneck created by decades of overlapping crises that have shaped the region for the past half century.
Achieving that outcome, however, depends on several conditions that have yet to mature and which require a separate discussion.
