With Mosques and Bayraktar Drones: How Turkey Defeated Its Rivals in Africa

“Turkey’s relations with Africa have risen to levels that were once unimaginable.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

While Niger’s Defence Ministry secretary-general, General Sani Kache, was touring the 2025 International Defence Industry Fair in Turkey, he was approached by a French journalist. Kache quickly told him that he was in Turkey because Turkey had become the most important country for Niger. The French journalist then surprised him with a question: “What about France?” The general’s answer was immediate and firm: “No, it no longer matters to us at all.”

The general’s response reveals just how strongly Turkey has established itself in Africa, and how its growing influence has, in some cases, begun to outweigh the influence of traditional powers on the continent. Turkey still appears determined to deepen its presence in Africa. In January, Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin confirmed that Turkey attaches major importance to Africa at a time of accelerating strategic competition. He proudly added that the activities of Turkish intelligence across the continent had drawn the attention of many countries, from supporting stability in Libya to contributing to counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, according to his own phrasing. Kalin argued that “Turkish intelligence diplomacy” had produced fruitful results from Chad and Niger to Kenya and Tanzania.

In reality, Turkey’s interest in Africa did not begin recently. What Ankara is now harvesting on the continent is the result of two decades of a multi-layered policy that combined hard power and soft power. It is a policy that adopted its own rhetoric and ideological framework, setting it apart from others. Turkey’s success story in Africa is important not only because it has recently become more visible, with Western media outlets, especially French ones, speaking about Turkey’s expansion into former French spheres of influence, but also because Turkey achieved this success despite having far fewer financial resources than many of its competitors.

What Has Turkey Achieved in Africa?

Africa has become the focus of many global powers. First, the continent holds enormous reserves of oil, gas, minerals and raw materials essential for industrial production, including cobalt, gold and diamonds. Second, Africa is an ideal market, with a population of around 1.4 billion people. More importantly, the African market continues to expand due to population growth and the rising purchasing power of its middle classes, which is why many global companies are now building strategies tailored to the African market.

From this perspective, one of Turkey’s most important goals in Africa, alongside gaining international political standing, is opening markets for its products. According to the BBC, the Turkish economy experienced continuous growth during the first decade of the millennium and was searching for new markets. Africa provided profitable opportunities for Turkish exporters and businesspeople. Deutsche Welle also noted that Turkish investors were drawn to Africa’s massive youth population and the growing demand for goods that this demographic represents.

Turkey’s expanding influence in Africa has helped secure that objective. Bilateral trade between Turkey and African countries has risen over the past two decades, from $5.4 billion in 2003 to around $37 billion by the end of 2024.

Turkey’s economic expansion in Africa has reached the point where French investors have begun to complain about it. Sophie Vidos-Vicat, vice-president of the French Vicat Group, says Turkish companies now have a heavy presence in Africa, and as a result, French companies have lost part of their market share. François Gay, CEO of the French company Ebano, says the information he has indicates that Turks work quickly in Africa and offer products of higher quality than many Chinese goods. Jean Dulac, head of the French company Dulac, believes the French must reassess their assumptions about countries whose markets they thought they dominated, because others, meaning the Turks in particular, have already “surpassed us”.

On another front, Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa has reached vital sectors. In the middle of last year, Turkey’s state oil company signed an agreement with the Somali Petroleum and Minerals Authority for oil and gas exploration and production in Somali areas covering around 16,000 square kilometres. It is also worth noting that Chad announced years ago its desire for Turkish companies to contribute to extracting oil from its territory.

Defence Exports and Military Expansion

Much has recently been written in the Western press about Turkey’s success in opening large African markets for its advanced defence industries. Turkish defence exports to Africa increased by 653% between 2015 and 2021. Turkey became the third-largest arms supplier to West Africa in 2024, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Eighteen African countries have also obtained Turkish drones. The Bayraktar TB2 drone has become one of the most sought-after drones on the continent, with many military officials praising Turkey’s speed and flexibility in delivery, as well as the drone’s ease of operation.

Turkey has also expanded its military presence in Africa. In September 2017, it opened the military base known as TURKSOM in Mogadishu, Somalia, making it Turkey’s largest military base outside its own territory. The base was established to train the Somali army. Naturally, the existence of this base in Somalia makes Turkey an important military player in one of the most dangerous and unstable regions, the Horn of Africa, which has witnessed a struggle for influence for years. Turkey’s presence in this sensitive region, which is linked to major trade routes, is no longer only political or economic. It has become military as well.

Islam as a Foundation of Soft Power

“Across Africa, ports, airports and hospitals carry Turkish fingerprints. These contracts go beyond being commercial deals. They anchor Ankara’s position within the national fabric of the continent.”
Shay Gal, former adviser to the Israeli government

Turkey built its growing presence in Africa through several means, with patience and persistence over two decades. Soft power may have played a role no less important than hard power. Culture, religion, arts and development aid became key entry points for Turkey to secure a place among the major competitors.

One of the most prominent cards Turkey brought into the African arena was Islam. On a continent where Muslims are estimated to make up around half the population, identity plays an important role. Ankara presented itself as a developed Muslim partner that helps Muslims in Africa, supports moderate Islam and, at the same time, assists governments in confronting extremism and terrorism.

Since Turkey began its plan to increase its presence in Africa in 2005, the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet and affiliated with the Turkish presidency, has been an effective instrument of Turkish soft power. It sponsored conferences for Muslim religious figures across the continent, built many mosques in Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Chad, and carried out charitable activities such as digging wells and installing solar panels in African countries. It also received many African students in Turkish imam-training schools, who later returned to their countries as scholars and religious leaders. Diyanet also provided many translations of the Quran, recognised jurisprudence books and Islamic studies, distributing them across various African countries.

In reality, Diyanet is active across most of Africa. According to its officials, it is welcomed in African countries because it does not conduct missionary activities, but rather provides services to Muslims, implements relief initiatives, provides meat to the poor during Eid al-Adha, and builds Quranic schools and mosques. In Ghana’s capital Accra, for example, the institution funded the construction of the second-largest mosque in West Africa. It also funded the largest mosque in East Africa in Djibouti, while ensuring that the mosques it establishes reflect Ottoman architectural styles.

Alongside this, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, known as TIKA, carries out charitable work, particularly funding medical facilities and schools in Africa. This agency is Turkey’s official state arm for development aid. Over 15 years, it opened offices in 22 African countries and supervised 7,000 aid programs across the continent.

At the same time, the Maarif Foundation, the official educational arm of the Turkish Republic, now operates in more than 20 African countries and runs schools that teach Turkish curricula and the Turkish language. Maarif is a government institution established in 2016 to spread Turkish education abroad as an instrument of soft power. The foundation also invites some African students to continue their education in Turkey, with the aim of forming future elites with strong links to Ankara.

A Diplomatic Revolution Across the Continent

On the diplomatic level, Turkish-African relations have witnessed a revolution over the past two decades. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the increase in the number of Turkish embassies on the continent. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa rose from 12 in 2002 to 44 in 2023. According to the BBC, this figure is close to the number of embassies held by the United States, with 49, and France, with 46, though it remains lower than China, which has 53 embassies. It is worth noting that President Erdogan has announced his aim to increase the number of Turkish embassies to 50 in the near future.

Beyond embassies, since 2005, Turkish Airlines flights between Turkey and Africa have increased by around 1,140%. Ankara has also made sure over the past decade to conduct high-level visits to Africa at least once every year.

Turkey also trains African diplomats in Ankara. This resembles education and scholarships in that it contributes to creating future political elites with close ties to Turkey. For example, Turkey has trained 80 diplomats from Somalia over the past 15 years.

Another aspect of Turkish soft power in Africa is the cultural influence left by Turkish television dramas, which have enjoyed success in many parts of the continent. In 2023, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation launched TRT Africa, a channel broadcasting in four languages: English, French, Hausa and Swahili. This reflects the extent of Turkey’s interest in competing in Africa’s media arena.

Weapons and Victories: Turkey’s Hard Power

In late 2019, General Khalifa Haftar’s forces were approaching Tripoli. At that moment, Turkey decided to intervene militarily to rescue the besieged Government of National Accord. Turkey’s intervention included military advisers, drones and military assistance. The intervention succeeded. By mid-2020, Khalifa Haftar’s offensive had collapsed, and the Government of National Accord appeared firmly established due to Turkish support.

In autumn 2020, war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia and lasted 44 days. Azerbaijan achieved a major victory with Turkish political and military assistance, as the Azerbaijani army prevailed in a war where advanced Turkish drones stood out.

On 8 December 2024, Turkey-backed Syrian rebels managed to bring down the regime of Bashar al-Assad after many years in which many had assumed the Syrian revolution would never succeed.

From Libya to Azerbaijan to Syria, these rounds helped build Turkey’s image as a powerful state capable of supporting its allies. They also projected Turkey as a country with military strength and advanced weapons capable of changing the course of wars, in addition to being the second-largest army in NATO.

This image contributed greatly to the expansion of Turkish influence in Africa, where many African states face threats from armed groups of various orientations and need advanced military technologies to win battles against them.

Another factor strengthening Turkey’s image as a powerful partner capable of backing its allies is its significant military presence beyond its borders. Turkey maintains a military presence across three continents and in more than 12 countries.

The strongest element of Turkey’s hard power, which has helped extend its influence in Africa, is the Bayraktar TB2 drone. It has proven its effectiveness in Libya, Karabakh and various other parts of the world, and many African countries view it as the best tool for fighting armed groups, especially given its relatively low cost.

Turkey has sold its drones to Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Niger and Sudan. These are countries in or adjacent to the Sahara region, some of which are fighting fierce wars against extremist groups. This exchange strongly serves both sides. On one hand, Turkey needs to create a market for its weapons and present itself as Africa’s partner in the war against extremist groups, especially as it presents itself as a representative of moderate Islam. On the other hand, African countries need affordable technologies and weapons to confront the dangers surrounding them.

In addition, there are Turkish private security companies, including SADAT International Defence Consultancy, which is active in nine African countries and provides military training and advisory services.

It is also worth noting that Turkish drones are promoted positively in African media. In Burkina Faso and Niger, drone handover ceremonies are portrayed as symbols of national sovereignty and evidence of proper armament, far from France’s notorious exploitation. For example, Mali’s state television referred to the effectiveness of Turkish drones in targeting “terrorists” in the country.

Learning from France’s Failure

When Turkey began taking major steps to strengthen its influence in Africa, many competing states were already struggling on the continent due to their reputations. Turkey, by contrast, entered as a new player without a colonial memory attached to it, and Ankara used this skilfully.

Israel, for example, had a violent past with Africans due to its sale of weapons to Rwanda during the genocide, in addition to the Israeli spyware program Pegasus, which several African regimes purchased to spy on political opponents. France, meanwhile, faced growing anti-French sentiment across the continent throughout the previous decade, alongside the burden of its colonial past. China, for its part, had for years been viewed as a major power extending its strength through a “debt trap” that leaves African states threatened with surrendering their assets.

This does not mean Turkey was never viewed with suspicion. However, the degree of suspicion was not the same. Turkey’s presence in Africa is relatively recent, which allowed it to craft an image that learned from the mistakes of other actors. It does not have a recent colonial past that creates sensitivities like France, nor has it been implicated in broad violations like Israel.

Turkey was highly aware of the need to present a different face in Africa. Its real engagement began in 2011, a starting point that gave it a strong foundation for building a positive narrative around its African role. At a time when most Western powers had abandoned Somalia and viewed it merely as a failed state trapped in crises, with famine spreading and al-Shabaab, affiliated with al-Qaeda, controlling large areas in the south of the country, Turkey entered and provided support to Mogadishu.

Turkey found that intervention in Somalia was the best possible opening into Africa. Erdogan became the first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in two decades. He pledged more than $200 million in humanitarian aid and reopened his country’s embassy there. Unlike Western countries, Turkish Airlines became the first non-African airline to resume flights to Somalia.

Erdogan’s bet on the poor Arab-African state quickly proved successful. Somali forces regained large areas from al-Qaeda in 2014, assisted by the presence of African Union forces. Turkey later rebuilt Mogadishu’s port and airport and opened a major hospital in the Somali capital.

Success in Somalia enabled Ankara to present itself through the new face with which it entered the continent. It was an image carefully crafted to show that Turkey wanted relations with Africa based on mutual benefit, and that it was not like other countries that only wanted to exploit Africa. This image played a major role in opening closed doors to Turkish influence in Africa.

Turkey did not only learn from France’s failure by focusing on building partnerships based on mutual respect and shared gains. It also benefited from anti-Paris sentiment in African states. Turkish platforms directed at African audiences offered sharp criticism of France’s role on the continent.

In the Sahara region, for example, after French military forces withdrew from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger due to rising nationalist anti-French sentiment, Turkey managed to fill part of the vacuum left by France. It presented itself as a partner that respects the sovereignty of those states and adopts anti-colonial rhetoric.

In Mali, for instance, as soon as relations with France deteriorated in 2022 and French forces left the country, Turkey sent a delegation to Bamako. A few weeks later, Turkey delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mali.

Turkey’s behaviour also differs from Russia’s, the new and perhaps most important ally of Sahel states that rejected France. Russian support is tied to direct economic interests, such as control over mines and minerals.

In brief, Turkey presented itself to Africa as part of the Global South, rejecting colonial arrogance and joining the continent in criticising states and international organisations that marginalise it. At the same time, it stresses its respect for the sovereignty of African states. Turkish financial grants in Africa are not subject to the conditions long imposed by Western states and organisations.

The Flashpoint: Turkey and Israel

Last February, The Times of Israel published an article by Abdi Ali Barkhad, known for his strong support for the separatist ambitions of Somaliland. He claimed that Turkey, by arming Somalia, was fuelling conflict in the Horn of Africa, turning into a dangerous enemy of what he called the “Republic of Somaliland” and obstructing its pursuit of international recognition. Through the Israeli newspaper, the writer appealed to the international community to recognise what he described as Turkey’s hostile role towards Somaliland through its military and financial support for Mogadishu.

At the end of last year, Israel announced through its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, its formal recognition of what it called the “Republic of Somaliland” as an independent and sovereign state. This made the occupation state the first United Nations member state to recognise Somaliland as an independent state. The move was condemned by many countries and bodies, foremost among them Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African Union.

It is worth noting that the president of the separatist Somaliland region, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, welcomed Israeli investment and confirmed that he would not rule out granting Israel a port on its territory.

With the anticipated Israeli presence in Somaliland, Ankara and Tel Aviv stand on the edge of confrontation in one of Africa’s most volatile arenas.

We can imagine the potential tensions that may emerge in the coming period between Turkey, which has invested heavily over the past decade in Somalia and maintains a military base there, and Israel, which recently recognised the Somaliland region. This is especially significant given that Turkey’s National Security Council publicly announced its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity following Israel’s recognition. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also visited Turkey days after the Zionist move to discuss the matter with the Turkish president.

According to observers, Israel is attempting through this recognition to eventually establish a military base in Somaliland, which lies directly opposite Yemen. Such a base would allow Israel access to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, and enable it to exercise influence in East Africa.

But this is not its only goal. Another objective is to challenge Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa, especially given that Turkey and Somalia had previously been planning to establish another Turkish military base at a port in Somalia’s Khatumo State, which covers nearly half of the territory claimed by Somaliland.

So far, it remains unclear how far the competition between Turkey and the occupation state in the Horn of Africa will go after the steps both states have taken regarding the Somali question. What is certain, however, is that Israel’s move to recognise Somaliland represents a major challenge to Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa.

This means Turkey’s presence on the continent has matured to the point where Turkey is no longer merely an investor or a player with cultural influence. It has become a central actor in shaping Africa’s political and military future, after around two decades of persistent diplomatic, media, commercial and military work.