Even if the war between Iran and Israel/ the United States were to pause for now, it is not difficult to imagine another round of this conflict erupting at any moment — especially since Iran has demonstrated that its stockpile and ballistic capabilities can threaten Israel’s depth. Should another war break out, its declared goal could be regime change — even if this requires a ground invasion or stirring internal chaos within Iran.
Such a scenario prompts the question: what if Iran — with its current regime — vanished from the Middle East equation? The following explores some of the potential consequences.
1. The Palestinian Cause
One of the most significant political and security consequences of any serious development in Iran would be Israel and the United States exploiting the situation to single-handedly shape the future of the Palestinian cause — by freezing it, or even attempting to liquidate it entirely.
This would happen through practical steps including annexing more land, accelerating settlement construction, and imposing a new reality on the ground — alongside proposing a new formula for dealing with Gaza, which Arab states had previously rejected. This plan is now referred to as “the day after” the massacres and genocide that have destroyed all aspects of life in the Strip.
In this context, Palestinian resistance groups — despite holding the prisoner exchange card — would be under immense psychological pressure, which could affect their commitment to armed struggle.
It is certain that Jerusalem and the holy sites in Hebron and elsewhere — alongside the Palestinian Authority’s presence in Ramallah under the Oslo Accords, which symbolises nominal control over parts of the West Bank — could all fade into obscurity.
This scenario becomes more likely given the current Israeli government’s far-right orientation and its excessive sense of victory and overconfidence, especially following direct American involvement in the war.
What further emboldens Israel in these policies is the conviction within the United States — and the European powers that have supported Israel since its creation — that Tel Aviv is the victorious party entitled to impose its vision and conditions.
Consequently, all previous statements about a two-state solution, rejecting settlements, and preserving Islamic and Christian holy sites would be shelved and treated as relics of the past.
2. Israel and Its Geographic Neighbours
In its immediate Arab surroundings, Israel’s plans appear more complex. On the southern border with Egypt, there looms the scenario of displacing Gaza’s population to Sinai — a dangerous possibility that could enter the realm of execution.
Despite Egypt’s clear rejection of this idea, regional and international pressure could be unprecedented this time. Confronting this plan may require Cairo to take extraordinary measures, even threatening military confrontation — although this remains unlikely for now.
In Jordan, the situation appears more flexible from the Israeli perspective. A scenario could emerge to transfer large numbers of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordanian territory in exchange for generous American economic support — which Washington might not provide directly but through other international parties, assuming they even fulfil their promises.
In Syria, undisclosed scenarios are being floated that could lead to new field arrangements, redrawing the balance in the south in a way that grants the current regime a degree of stability.
In Lebanon, ending the UNIFIL mission on the southern border could become a matter of time. A single bullet — or even a fabricated incident — would suffice for Israel to use it as a pretext for military intervention and the imposition of a border strip stretching several kilometres south of the Litani River.
3. The Abraham Accords
As part of its efforts to reshape the region according to its own vision, Israel — at the peak of its perceived power — would seek to accelerate normalisation with the remaining major Arab states that have not yet joined the “Abraham Accords.”
This time, however, it would not be limited to formal or diplomatic relations. Israel would pursue comprehensive agreements covering political, economic, military, and security dimensions.
The goal of these agreements goes beyond rapprochement. It aims to gradually diminish the sovereignty of those states, making Israel the pivotal player in managing the region’s resources and wealth.
These efforts would receive broad American backing, as Washington sees them as an effective tool to expel Russian and Chinese influence from the Middle East and to reshape the region in line with Western interests first and foremost.
4. Fragmenting the Already Fragmented
In its euphoria over what it deems a “victory,” Israel may reveal the cards of its old plan — long circulated within its strategic circles behind closed doors — to support religious and ethnic minorities within the Arab world, not just indirectly as in the past, but through an explicit, declared effort aimed at breaking the region into small, weak entities.
Old partition projects would be revived, transforming some sectarian and ethnic groups into quasi-states: Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Maronite, Coptic, Circassian, Kurdish, and Amazigh.
These entities may be armed at times to confront the central state and could later be drawn into mutual conflicts with other sectarian or ethnic counterparts (such as Sunni/Shiite, Arab/Kurdish, or Muslim/Coptic conflicts).
The chaos may not stop there but could extend to infighting within each group: Kurd against Kurd, Christian against Christian, and so on — ensuring that Israel’s surrounding environment remains unstable and poses no future threat.
5. A New Middle East
Among the strategic tasks Israel seeks to execute is preparing a regional environment that allows it to impose full dominance without any real competitors. Within this framework, Israeli investments — backed by political and economic cover — would be offered to wealthy Arab states, gradually making these countries hostages to Israel’s interests and subordinate to it economically and strategically.
The Red Sea, once viewed in the 1950s as an Arab strategic domain, is today poised to become something akin to an Israeli lake — through control over sea lanes and islands stretching from Bab al-Mandab in the south to the northern reaches of the sea. Israel has concluded that whoever holds the keys to this corridor has decisive leverage to threaten or secure its international trade.
In the eastern Mediterranean — specifically Gaza’s maritime area extending to the shores opposite Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey — Israel aims to extend its full control over gas and oil resources, subjecting this maritime stretch to its vital interests.
These ambitions even extend into Africa, where Israel — through its strong ties with Ethiopia and Eritrea — seeks to expand its economic and military influence, competing with major global powers like China, Russia, and France for markets, resources, and sway in these vital areas.
Confronting the Zionist Strategy
In this tangled landscape, the urgent need arises more than ever for Arab states — especially Egypt — to seek regional and security alternatives to curb the anticipated Zionist expansion. Egypt, as the region’s foremost military power, is well positioned to play a pivotal role in crafting this counterbalance.
It would be unwise for Cairo or other Arab capitals to wait until the moment of a strike on Tehran is complete. Preventive measures must be taken now.
Among the most critical measures is firmly resisting any plan to displace Palestinians into Egyptian territory — given how vital this stance is to keeping the Palestinian cause alive on the global stage.
Strengthening strategic cooperation among Arab states on one hand, and with Russia, China, and Turkey on the other, is also a realistic and promising option. This could help curb American and Israeli interference in the region, especially if these partnerships evolve into robust economic and military frameworks.
Equally important is reassessing the path of the “Abraham Accords” and working to halt the accelerating normalisation wave — particularly since its previous justification — the “Iranian threat” — has receded or vanished altogether. Some Arab states no longer have to succumb to the American fear narrative that has long been used to push them toward overt or covert security alliances with Israel.
Among the strategic pressure points too is encouraging Iran to forge military alliances with China or Russia — a step Tehran previously hesitated to take, but one that it might now see as necessary after its nuclear facilities were targeted, making it more willing to engage.
The current realities impose an obligation on Arab states to act swiftly to safeguard their national security and not merely react after it is too late. Postponing confrontation may lead to an even more painful and complex reality in the near future.
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