Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to retract an MBC report that insulted martyrs who are symbols of resistance in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran, along with the subsequent investigation and deletion of tweets by regime supporters in the same vein, is a clear indicator. It suggests that the Kingdom’s leadership does not yet see any benefit in advancing normalization of relations with Israel, despite what the latter perceives as “achievements” in undermining the resistance. Thus, Saudi authorities viewed the actions of its media and online supporters as a hasty attempt to reap benefits that not only appeared unfruitful but actually counterproductive.
Those eager for normalization, driven solely by the desire to appease their superiors by intensifying hostility towards the resistance and gloating over the martyrdom of its leaders—who demonstrated exceptional courage in battle—failed to grasp the complexities facing Saudi rulers in making a decision of this magnitude. They overlooked the potential backlash such a decision could trigger.
It is evident that Saudi Arabia is handling this issue purely from a standpoint of regime interests, not principles. Otherwise, why would Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly express indifference to the Palestinian cause, as leaked by American media following a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken? According to these reports, many millennials, whom he considers his popular base, have never even heard of this cause. The new Saudi behavior indicates that the October 7 attack, regardless of the current balance of power on the ground, whether in Gaza or Lebanon, has so far succeeded in derailing the continuation of the normalization process, which Saudi Arabia was on the verge of joining on the eve of this attack.
Normalization Now Seems More Distant Than Ever
The prospect of normalization appears farther than ever. Saudi leaders consider three factors when contemplating relations with Israel:
-
- Security Benefits for the Regime: This was expected to be achieved through an alliance that included other Gulf and Arab nations, along with Israel and the United States.
-
- Popular Acceptance in Saudi Arabia: Currently, this is at an all-time low.
-
- Potential Impact on Alignments Against Iran: Iran and its allies would never accept the Gulf as a platform or corridor for aggression against them.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia has officially shifted its stance, leaning towards listening to Tehran’s concerns. This shift was evident from the collective meeting held earlier this month between the Gulf Cooperation Council’s foreign ministers and their Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, following Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes on Israel. This meeting aimed to assure Tehran that the GCC states would not serve as a conduit for a potential Israeli attack on Iran. This is also the essence of Araqchi’s extensive tour of the region, which included visits to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey.
Riyadh’s Reassessment Following the October 7 Attack
As a result of these complexities, Riyadh found itself compelled to reassess all negotiations that had been ongoing with Washington since before October 7, possibly including talks with Israel. This led Saudi Arabia to reaffirm its condition for establishing a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for normalization, a condition that the Kingdom was not insisting upon on the eve of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation.
Some individuals close to the Crown Prince’s circle do not hide such thinking. Ali Shihabi, for instance, mentioned that “Saudi Arabia sees the United States as losing authority or influence over Israel to a humiliating degree. The Israelis have no intention of allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Therefore, as Shihabi conveyed to The New York Times, “The Abraham Accords are purely symbolic, with nothing substantive when it comes to a real, lasting peace, while several of the signatory states saw Israel as a pathway to influence in Washington.”
The Balance of Profits and Losses
What the Saudi regime has concluded is that the quasi-free normalization Israel seeks entails significant risks, both domestically and from neighboring countries. However, this does not mean Saudi Arabia has abandoned the option of normalization, as without it, the U.S. might not guarantee the regime’s security. The issue remains under discussion, awaiting objective changes that could allow the Kingdom to return to that path.
Even the unofficial media policies, epitomized by the MBC report, remain unchanged, despite the report’s retraction due to widespread public outcry. In some ways, Riyadh, regardless of the normalization issue, sees itself as benefiting from Israel’s war against the resistance in all its forms—a resistance that the rulers of Riyadh have never truly supported.
