Benjamin Netanyahu may have emerged from Israel’s latest election with the largest party and a narrow advantage over his political rivals, but the numbers have left him facing a familiar problem: winning an election does not necessarily mean being able to form a government.
With neither political bloc securing the 61 parliamentary seats needed for a stable majority, attention is shifting from the ballot box to negotiations behind closed doors, where political defections, abandoned campaign promises and unlikely alliances could determine who governs Israel next.
Israeli political analysts have identified five possible outcomes, ranging from a broad unity government under Netanyahu to a temporary administration supported by Arab parties, or another election within months.
One scenario, however, could prove particularly consequential: Netanyahu’s Likud party reportedly prepared in advance to recruit lawmakers from the rival political camp, potentially allowing him to secure a parliamentary majority without negotiating a formal coalition agreement with its leaders.
The political calculations are unfolding as the final results of Israel’s 2026 election continue to emerge, with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and US President Donald Trump also potentially influencing the negotiations over the next government.
Netanyahu Won the Largest Bloc, but Not the Numbers to Govern
The central conclusion from Israel’s near-final election results is that neither Netanyahu nor his opponents have secured a decisive victory.
Moran Azulay and Ofir Yonatan, political correspondents for the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, reported that forming a government following the election for Israel’s 26th Knesset would require at least one political leader to abandon a campaign commitment.
Neither of the two main political camps is close to securing the 61 seats required to govern independently.
The opposition bloc, commonly referred to as the “change camp” and led by Gadi Eisenkot, remains unable to form an alternative government without additional political arrangements. Even with the 19 seats won by Arab parties excluded from the calculations, the bloc falls short of the numbers needed to replace Netanyahu.
Although Netanyahu’s bloc holds a slight advantage over Eisenkot’s camp, neither side possesses a clear route to power.
That mathematical deadlock is now forcing political leaders to confront promises they made to voters, particularly those who categorically rejected serving in a government alongside Netanyahu.
The question is no longer simply who received the most votes, but which political figures are prepared to reverse their positions to secure power.
Scenario One: Netanyahu Forms a Unity Government With His Rivals
The first possibility is a broad national unity government led by Netanyahu, bringing together parties currently divided between the competing political blocs.
On paper, such an arrangement could provide the parliamentary stability missing from the election results. Politically, however, it would require concessions from almost every major participant.
Netanyahu would first need to abandon his repeated commitment to establishing a government that includes all the parties belonging to his existing coalition.
He reaffirmed that position throughout the final weeks of the election campaign.
His potential partners would face an equally difficult reversal.
Eisenkot, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have all publicly committed themselves to refusing a coalition with Netanyahu.
Joining his government would therefore mean breaking one of their central electoral promises.
Yet the proposal appears consistent with the position of Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who has urged political leaders to “do everything” necessary to prevent another election.
His remarks have been interpreted as encouragement for a unity arrangement capable of ending the political deadlock.
Trump could also favour such an outcome.
Having already intervened in the Israeli election process, the US president may see a broad Israeli coalition as an opportunity to advance regional political initiatives, including the expansion of normalisation agreements between Israel and other countries.
For Netanyahu, the attraction would be a more stable government. For his opponents, the political cost could be substantial.
Scenario Two: Netanyahu Shares Power, but Takes the First Turn
A second possibility involves a rotation agreement under which Netanyahu and a leader from the opposing bloc would alternate as prime minister.
Under the arrangement being discussed, Netanyahu would initially lead the government before transferring the premiership to another coalition partner.
Such agreements could theoretically overcome the parliamentary deadlock without requiring either political camp to surrender its influence entirely.
But Netanyahu’s electoral position complicates the proposal.
His success in securing leadership of both the largest individual party and the largest political bloc, excluding Arab parties, could make him reluctant to share the premiership.
From his perspective, agreeing to a rotation arrangement might mean surrendering a portion of the political advantage he gained at the ballot box.
The obstacle is even greater for opposition leaders.
Their election commitments went beyond merely refusing to serve under Netanyahu.
Some openly questioned whether he should be eligible to hold any ministerial position following the attacks of 7 October.
Agreeing to a power-sharing arrangement that begins with Netanyahu as prime minister would therefore require a considerable political reversal.
While the proposal remains possible, it depends on rival leaders accepting an arrangement they previously rejected before their voters.
Scenario Three: Netanyahu Breaks the Opposition From Within
Of the five scenarios, one could allow Netanyahu to preserve much of his existing political position without negotiating a formal unity agreement with opposition leaders.
It involves attracting individual lawmakers from Eisenkot’s political camp into Netanyahu’s parliamentary bloc.
If enough lawmakers defect, Netanyahu could obtain the additional seats required to establish a government.
The prospect is more than a theoretical calculation.
According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Likud began preparing for such an outcome well before the election.
The party reportedly established a dedicated team tasked with identifying and recruiting Knesset members from Eisenkot’s party, with the aim of persuading them to cross into Netanyahu’s camp after the vote.
That preparation suggests Likud anticipated the possibility of an inconclusive election and considered defections a potential route to securing a parliamentary majority.
Unlike a broad unity government, this scenario would not necessarily require Netanyahu to negotiate directly with the leaders of the change camp.
Instead, individual lawmakers would have to abandon their electoral commitments not to join his government.
For Eisenkot, the danger would be losing parliamentary support from within his own political ranks.
For Netanyahu, the advantage would be the possibility of securing the numbers needed to govern while avoiding some of the concessions demanded by formal coalition partners.
Whether Likud can persuade enough opposition lawmakers to defect remains uncertain, but the reported preparations indicate that Netanyahu’s party has already considered how to exploit divisions within the rival bloc.
Scenario Four: Arab Parties Become the Deciding Force
A fourth scenario would place Arab political parties at the centre of negotiations over Israel’s next government.
Under this arrangement, Eisenkot could lead a temporary or transitional minority government with parliamentary support from Arab parties.
The proposal would fundamentally alter the calculations facing the change camp, whose leaders have taken sharply different positions on cooperating with Arab political representatives.
Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats party, has been among the strongest advocates of such cooperation.
During the election campaign, Golan argued that Arab parties should be regarded as legitimate partners in the next government.
Other figures within his party went further, calling on political leaders to demonstrate “political courage” by participating in a government that includes Ra’am, the Arab political party.
Eisenkot himself did not rule out the possibility during the campaign, particularly when questioned about cooperation with Ra’am.
However, two of his principal allies, Bennett and Lieberman, opposed the idea.
Their objections could become a major obstacle to forming any alternative government dependent on Arab parliamentary support.
Arab Parties Signal Willingness to Help Remove Netanyahu
The possibility has also received attention from Arab political parties themselves.
In statements made over the preceding 24 hours, Arab party representatives did not dismiss the prospect of supporting an alternative government and expressed willingness to contribute to removing Netanyahu from office.
Their position follows a campaign in which Netanyahu targeted Arab parties and accused them of “stealing the election” after their electoral gains became apparent.
With Arab parties securing 19 Knesset seats, their parliamentary representation could become decisive in efforts to challenge Netanyahu’s political position.
However, cooperation would not necessarily require the establishment of a full coalition government.
One possibility involves a limited parliamentary arrangement between the change camp and Arab parties, focused on specific institutional decisions.
These could include replacing Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, thereby securing control over the parliamentary leadership.
Another potential objective would be establishing a government commission of inquiry into the events surrounding the 7 October attack.
Such cooperation could allow Netanyahu’s opponents to achieve particular parliamentary objectives without immediately resolving their disagreements over forming a permanent government.
The Knesset could then be dissolved after those steps are completed, triggering another election.
In that scenario, Arab parties could help reshape Israel’s parliamentary leadership and advance an investigation into 7 October without necessarily becoming full members of a governing coalition.
Scenario Five: Israel Returns to the Polls Within Months
The fifth scenario is perhaps the most familiar: another election.
Before 27 October, a fresh vote had appeared to be one of the most likely outcomes of Israel’s political divisions.
The election results have not eliminated that possibility.
If Netanyahu and the leaders of the change camp refuse to abandon their campaign commitments, and no coalition can assemble a workable parliamentary majority, Israel could return to the polls within months.
But another election would carry risks for both political camps.
The latest results showed a slight decline in Likud’s electoral support, despite the party retaining its position as the largest in the Knesset.
That decline was not anticipated by most opinion polls, adding uncertainty to calculations about whether a repeat election would improve Netanyahu’s position.
Nevertheless, some assessments circulating within Israel’s political establishment suggest another election could ultimately work in his favour.
The reasoning centres on voter mobilisation.
A prolonged political crisis could generate frustration among supporters of the change camp, potentially reducing turnout in centre-left constituencies.
Another election could also affect Arab voter participation, which reached levels described as unprecedented in the latest vote.
If opposition supporters become disillusioned and fewer voters participate in a subsequent election, Netanyahu could benefit even without making substantial gains among his existing electorate.
For that reason, the prospect of another election is not necessarily an outcome his political camp would seek to avoid at any cost.
The Political Promises That Could Decide Israel’s Next Government
Across all five scenarios, the same obstacle remains: the parliamentary arithmetic does not match the commitments made during the election campaign.
A unity government requires rival leaders to abandon their refusal to cooperate with Netanyahu.
A rotation agreement demands that Netanyahu share power while his opponents accept his return to the premiership.
A government built through defections would depend on opposition lawmakers breaking ranks with their political leadership.
An Eisenkot-led minority administration would require cooperation with Arab parties despite objections from key members of his own camp.
And if none of those arrangements proves possible, another election could become unavoidable.
The decisions of Herzog, the potential involvement of Trump and the willingness of individual Knesset members to change political allegiances could influence which scenario ultimately emerges.
For now, Netanyahu’s narrow parliamentary advantage has not delivered him a government, while his opponents have yet to demonstrate that they can assemble one without him.
