Israel could be approaching the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, but his departure would not necessarily mean an end to the policies that have defined Israeli rule over Palestinians. As Israelis prepare to vote on Tuesday, the deeper question is whether replacing the prime minister would change the country’s political direction or simply place a different leader in charge of largely the same policies.
The election comes amid profound political and social divisions, the unresolved consequences of the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, and Israel’s subsequent genocidal war in the Gaza Strip.
Former Israeli military chief Gadi Eisenkot has emerged as a leading challenger to Netanyahu, raising the possibility of a change in government after years of political confrontation over security failures, judicial independence and the expansion of Israeli settlements.
Yet analyses published by the Financial Times, The New York Times and Foreign Affairs suggest that the significance of this election extends beyond which politician occupies the prime minister’s office.
The contest is also testing the future of Israel’s democratic institutions, the political accountability of those responsible for the failures surrounding 7 October, and the extent to which any incoming government would reconsider its approach towards Palestinians and the wider Middle East.
The central contradiction is that Israeli voters could remove the leadership they blame for a historic security failure without fundamentally changing the policies that have shaped their country’s confrontation with Palestinians.
The Battle to Replace Netanyahu Is Also a Battle Over Israel’s Identity
The Financial Times, in an analysis titled “The Battle for Israel’s Soul”, describes an electoral contest that reaches into the foundations of the Israeli political system.
At stake are questions surrounding judicial independence, civil liberties and political pluralism, particularly as nationalist and religious hardline movements have acquired increasing influence over state institutions.
For Netanyahu’s opponents, removing him represents an opportunity to restore institutional checks and balances and challenge the political direction of recent years.
But Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, presents a more complicated picture in his Foreign Affairs analysis, “What Israel’s Election Won’t Change”.
Benn argues that an Eisenkot government could introduce meaningful changes in the management of Israel’s domestic institutions without delivering a comparable transformation in foreign policy, particularly on the question of Palestinian statehood.
This distinction places two separate questions before Israeli voters.
The first concerns whether Netanyahu’s removal could restore institutional balance and address the domestic political crisis.
The second is whether the opposition possesses a genuinely different approach to Palestinians, settlements and the security doctrines maintained by successive Israeli governments.
The answers, Benn suggests, are not necessarily connected.
October 7 Could Remove Netanyahu Without Changing Israel’s Security Doctrine
The Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023 remains central to the election campaign, particularly in the battle over political responsibility for Israel’s failure to prevent it.
Eisenkot and other opposition figures have sought to hold Netanyahu accountable for the security breakdown, criticising his handling of intelligence warnings and his refusal to establish a comprehensive independent investigation into the events surrounding the attack.
Netanyahu and his supporters, meanwhile, have directed part of the responsibility towards the military establishment and intelligence agencies.
These competing positions have transformed accountability for 7 October into a major dividing line between Israel’s political camps.
Yet Benn identifies a notable similarity beneath their disagreements.
Despite competing over who should bear responsibility for the security failure, both camps broadly maintain a security outlook built around threats confronting Israel and scepticism towards the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Palestinians.
In this respect, the election could produce a political reckoning over the failure to anticipate an attack without generating an equivalent reassessment of the policies governing Israel’s relationship with Palestinians.
The distinction matters because responsibility for a particular intelligence or military failure is not the same as responsibility for the broader political approach that preceded it.
A change in leadership could satisfy demands for accountability within Israeli society while leaving the foundations of its security strategy largely untouched.
Winning the Election Is Not Enough to Form a Government
Even if Eisenkot’s party secures more seats than Netanyahu’s Likud, the electoral system could prevent him from immediately assuming power.
Israel operates under proportional representation, with 120 seats in the Knesset. A prospective prime minister must assemble a governing coalition supported by at least 61 lawmakers.
As Efrat Livni explains in The New York Times article “Israel’s High-Stakes Election: What to Know”, becoming the largest parliamentary party does not automatically confer the right or ability to govern.
Official election results are expected on 4 November, after which President Isaac Herzog will begin consultations with representatives of the parliamentary factions.
The president will then assign a candidate the task of forming a government.
That candidate receives 28 days to negotiate a governing coalition, with the possibility of requesting an additional 14 days.
According to historical figures from the Israel Democracy Institute, cited by The New York Times, Israeli government formation has previously taken between 20 and 100 days.
Consequently, the election results may not resolve the country’s political uncertainty. They could instead initiate another prolonged period of negotiations between parties with sharply different priorities.
Smaller parties may become particularly influential in this process, using their parliamentary support to negotiate ministerial portfolios or concessions on religious policy, judicial affairs and security.
For Palestinians, those negotiations could also determine how much room a future government has to alter settlement policy or engage with questions of sovereignty and statehood.
The Polls Reveal a Problem for Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot
An Israeli Kan broadcaster poll conducted with Kantar on 18 October placed Eisenkot’s Yashar party ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud.
The projected distribution was:
- Yashar, led by Gadi Eisenkot: 23 seats.
- Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu: 21 seats.
- Netanyahu’s political bloc: 51 seats.
- Opposition bloc: 57 seats.
These were polling estimates rather than election results, but they illustrated the coalition difficulties facing both camps.
Neither bloc reached the 61-seat parliamentary majority required to form a government independently.
In their New York Times analysis, “Four Ways Israel’s Election Could Ultimately End”, Aaron Boxerman and Josh Holder outlined four potential outcomes.
An Eisenkot-led coalition
Eisenkot could attempt to unite opposition parties and form a government. However, ideological differences among those parties, along with difficulties surrounding cooperation with Arab political parties, could complicate negotiations.
Netanyahu retains power
Netanyahu could seek to reconstruct a majority through his established right-wing and religious allies, potentially drawing additional parties into a governing arrangement.
A unity government or power-sharing agreement
The rival camps could pursue a coalition arrangement that allows them to share power, rather than attempting to govern through their existing political alliances alone.
Another election
If neither side succeeds in building a viable parliamentary majority, coalition negotiations could collapse and Israel could return to an early election.
These possibilities demonstrate why the largest party on election night may not ultimately control the government.
They also reveal another limitation on political change: even a prime minister seeking to alter government policy could remain dependent on coalition partners determined to preserve the existing approach.
Would Eisenkot Offer Palestinians Anything Fundamentally Different?
For Palestinians, the most consequential question is not simply whether Netanyahu loses office, but whether his replacement would challenge the policies maintained under successive Israeli governments.
Benn argues that an Eisenkot victory would not automatically deliver a fundamental change in Israeli policy towards Palestinians.
According to his analysis, most Jewish Israeli political parties do not currently support the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Several opposition groups that criticise Netanyahu have also supported Israel’s military operations in Gaza and attacks against Iran, even while disagreeing with how those campaigns were conducted and the outcomes they produced.
This overlap exposes the limits of treating the election as a straightforward contest between two opposing visions of regional policy.
Disagreements over military leadership, the effectiveness of operations and Netanyahu’s political judgement do not necessarily amount to disagreements over the wider strategic objectives being pursued.
There are, however, identifiable differences between Netanyahu and Eisenkot.
Benn notes that Eisenkot has been more critical of Israeli settler violence in the occupied West Bank.
He also opposes the controversial E1 settlement project, which critics warn could undermine the territorial continuity necessary for a viable Palestinian state.
The project is particularly sensitive because of its implications for the geographical connection between Palestinian areas in the occupied West Bank.
Eisenkot’s position could therefore create room for changes in the government’s response to settler attacks and certain settlement expansion plans.
But whether those differences translate into concrete government policy would depend heavily on the composition of his coalition.
If Eisenkot requires the support of right-wing parties to command a parliamentary majority, he may struggle to advance measures that contradict their positions on settlements or Palestinian sovereignty.
The result could be a government more critical of particular Israeli practices without being prepared to fundamentally reconsider the political framework within which those practices occur.
The International Cost of Israel’s Policies Is Becoming Harder to Ignore
The election is also unfolding against a backdrop of mounting international criticism of Israel’s military operations and settlement expansion.
Benn warns that continued warfare and expanding settlements could deepen Israel’s diplomatic and economic difficulties.
International criticism of the destruction in Gaza has intensified, while governments have increasingly scrutinised activities connected to Israeli settlement construction.
His analysis points to measures announced by Britain in September 2025 concerning settlements and organisations involved in financing and building them.
The United States, Israel’s most important international security partner, is also experiencing a growing debate over whether military assistance and transfers of technology to Israel should face additional restrictions.
These developments create another dimension to the electoral contest.
An Eisenkot government might have greater opportunities to improve relations with international partners frustrated by Netanyahu’s policies and political approach.
But Benn cautions that such improvements would remain limited if Israel’s underlying policies towards Palestinians did not change.
Replacing Netanyahu could alter the tone of Israel’s diplomatic engagement without necessarily resolving the substantive disagreements over settlement expansion, military operations and Palestinian statehood.
Conversely, Netanyahu’s continued leadership alongside his existing political allies could expose Israel to further international isolation and pressure over its conduct in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.
In either scenario, the relationship with Washington would remain central to Israel’s security and diplomatic calculations.
A Different Prime Minister, but the Same Political Constraints?
The election presents Israelis with decisions about democratic institutions, political accountability and the formation of a stable government.
But those domestic questions do not automatically resolve the issues shaping Israel’s policies towards Palestinians.
The analyses published by the Financial Times, The New York Times and Foreign Affairs converge on a significant distinction: changes in political leadership and domestic governance are possible, while the prospects for a fundamental change in regional and Palestinian policy remain far more uncertain.
If Netanyahu loses power, his successor may seek to reform aspects of domestic governance, restore relations with international partners and reconsider particular settlement projects.
However, coalition bargaining and the prevailing positions of major Jewish Israeli parties on Palestinian statehood would continue to constrain the government’s choices.
If Netanyahu remains in office, confrontations over judicial independence and democratic institutions could continue alongside the possibility of greater international pressure concerning military operations and settlements.
For Palestinians, therefore, the outcome cannot be measured solely by whether Netanyahu remains prime minister.
The more consequential test is whether any future Israeli government is prepared to move beyond changing the management of existing policies and confront the underlying questions of occupation, settlement expansion and Palestinian statehood.
Without such a change, Israel’s election could produce a new leadership and a different political atmosphere while leaving many of the conditions driving the Palestinian crisis intact.
