The United States says its naval blockade has prevented Iran from exporting at least $25 billion worth of oil. Its trade routes are closing, thousands of lorries are stranded at border crossings, and its economy is contracting under mounting pressure. Yet after eight months of war, Washington is still confronting a problem that sanctions and military superiority have failed to resolve: Iran has not been forced into submission.
Despite the economic damage inflicted by a blockade extending across land, sea and air, Tehran retains the ability to prolong the confrontation, threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, and potentially target vulnerable economic infrastructure across the Gulf.
For Washington, the question is no longer simply how much damage it can inflict on Iran. It is whether that damage can produce a decisive political outcome without triggering a regional escalation that makes victory even more costly.
President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested that the United States could bring the war to a rapid conclusion. As he renewed threats of further strikes, he also questioned whether Washington should instead allow the confrontation to fade away.
Eight months into the conflict, however, his familiar prediction that the war will end soon remains unfulfilled.
Observers have described the confrontation as a game of cat and mouse, with Washington and Tehran each waiting for the other to accept its conditions. The Middle East Institute in Washington has warned that the prolonged stalemate risks becoming the region’s new normal.
An analysis published by The Washington Post suggests that Tehran, despite suffering approximately $25 billion in oil-related losses, is pursuing a war of attrition designed to establish a new deterrence equation against future American and Israeli attacks.
Washington Can Strike Again. But Can It Control Iran’s Response?
Another round of American and Israeli strikes could undoubtedly inflict substantial additional damage on Iran. The more difficult question is whether such attacks would achieve anything beyond another cycle of destruction and retaliation.
Iran’s response could extend well beyond military targets.
Oil and gas facilities, airports and other economically sensitive infrastructure across Gulf countries could become targets of Iranian retaliation, exposing regional economies to considerable disruption.
Such an escalation could further destabilise global energy markets, particularly as winter approaches and demand for heating fuels increases.
An analysis published by The National Interest argues that Iranian decision-makers have drawn lessons from the Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia, particularly the vulnerability of economically important facilities to attacks by an adversary with fewer conventional military resources.
If Tehran interprets another American-Israeli assault as an existential threat to the Iranian state and its political system, the analysis suggests it may abandon previous limits on retaliation.
Under those circumstances, Iranian leaders could conclude that restraint no longer serves their interests because they have little left to lose.
The likely result would not necessarily be Iranian surrender.
Instead, another bombing campaign could further exhaust Iran’s military and economic capabilities while failing to produce the political capitulation Washington seeks.
The United States would once again be fighting a militarily unequal confrontation without a guarantee of a decisive outcome.
Iran’s Borders Are Closing, and the Economic Damage Is Mounting
The pressure on Tehran is not confined to airstrikes or naval operations. Iran is increasingly losing access to the overland trade routes that have helped sustain its economy under sanctions.
Iraq and Pakistan have closed or restricted vital border routes used by Iranian commercial traffic, tightening the economic isolation already imposed by the American naval blockade and stringent sanctions affecting aviation companies.
According to The Wall Street Journal, American pressure is now directly affecting Iran’s overland trade, disrupting exports and cross-border transport operations.
The consequences are reaching ordinary Iranians, with food prices reportedly rising by approximately 128 per cent.
Following restrictions at Iraq’s Al-Sheeb border crossing, Pakistan prevented lorries arriving from Iran from entering through two major crossings, Gabd and Taftan.
Both routes had served as alternative overland connections to the largest port in eastern Iran.
A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on Friday that the restrictions were linked to sanctions compliance.
“Pakistan complies, and will continue to comply, with all applicable sanctions regimes, in accordance with international and domestic laws,” the spokesperson said.
The pressure has also created severe congestion along Iran’s remaining commercial corridors.
In late September, Ehsan Malekzadeh, head of Iran’s Association of International Transport Companies, told the Iranian Mehr News Agency that approximately 17,000 lorries were waiting at Iran’s borders with Türkiye, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.
Waiting periods had commonly reached 20 days, illustrating how restrictions on international trade were translating into prolonged disruption for transport operators and exporters.
The broader economic figures are equally severe.
Data from the Statistical Centre of Iran showed that the country’s gross domestic product contracted by 10.1 per cent year on year between 21 March and 20 June 2026.
Activity in the oil and gas sector declined by 26.4 per cent during the same period.
The International Monetary Fund’s July forecast projected a 5.4 per cent contraction in Iran’s economy for 2026 as a whole, accompanied by consumer price inflation of approximately 68.9 per cent.
These figures demonstrate the scale of the economic pressures confronting Tehran. They do not, however, establish that economic deterioration will translate into political surrender.
A 100-Day Naval Blockade and $25 Billion in Blocked Oil Exports
The United States has presented its naval blockade as one of the central achievements of its pressure campaign against Iran.
Marking 100 days since the blockade was resumed, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the operation had prevented Tehran from exporting crude oil valued at no less than $25 billion.
In a statement published on X, CENTCOM said the measure had helped restrict the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ability to finance affiliated groups.
The command also claimed that Iran had conducted no maritime imports or exports during the period, apart from humanitarian assistance authorised to pass through the blockade.
The American assessment presents the blockade as an effective instrument for restricting Iranian revenues and external trade.
Yet the strategic question remains unresolved: whether denying Tehran financial resources can compel it to accept Washington’s political demands, particularly when Iran retains opportunities to impose costs of its own.
The War Is Becoming a Political Liability for Trump
While Iran is absorbing substantial economic damage, the war is also creating political difficulties for the administration directing the American campaign.
Trump described the war against Iran on Wednesday as “one of the greatest accomplishments we have achieved”.
The claim contrasts with the increasingly negative public mood surrounding his handling of foreign affairs and the economic consequences of the confrontation.
A CNN poll published on Wednesday found that approximately 70 per cent of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of foreign affairs.
The war’s effects on fuel prices and the cost of living have emerged as particularly sensitive issues ahead of the US midterm elections.
Many Americans interviewed by CNN, including people attending Trump campaign rallies, identified rising household expenses and the economic consequences of the Iran confrontation as major electoral concerns.
The political unease is also emerging within Trump’s own party.
Several Republican candidates facing difficult electoral contests this autumn have begun distancing themselves from the president’s position on the war, while others have called for the confrontation to end.
Eight months after the conflict began, the administration must therefore contend not only with Iran’s continued resistance to its demands but also with the domestic political price of a prolonged military confrontation.
November’s Elections May Change the Timing, Not the Risks
The Trump administration has suggested that any decision to resume military operations against Iran would come after the midterm elections scheduled for 3 November.
But removing the immediate electoral constraint would not remove the strategic problems confronting Washington.
Higher energy prices, potential American military casualties and the possibility of becoming trapped in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict would remain substantial political liabilities regardless of the election results.
Nor can Washington determine the duration of a military campaign simply by declaring that it will be brief.
Trump previously promised a rapid conclusion, yet the confrontation did not follow the timetable he had envisaged.
Iran also retains a role in determining when the fighting ends.
A renewed American assault would not automatically grant Washington control over the pace, scope or eventual political outcome of the confrontation. Tehran’s willingness and capacity to retaliate would remain central to those calculations, as they were during the previous round.
This is the difficulty confronting any strategy built around the assumption that overwhelming military power can dictate an adversary’s political decisions.
Iran Does Not Need to Defeat the US Military to Deny It Victory
Perhaps the most consequential feature of Iran’s strategy is the considerable difference between what Tehran and Washington would need to achieve to claim success.
Iran does not necessarily need to defeat the United States in a conventional military confrontation.
It needs to preserve a functioning state, retain sufficient retaliatory capabilities and prevent its adversaries from securing a decisive political victory at a cost they consider acceptable.
That is a substantially lower threshold than the objectives associated with Washington’s more ambitious demands, including complete nuclear disarmament and regime change.
An Iranian government capable of continuing to administer the country, maintaining institutional cohesion and imposing military or economic costs on its adversaries could therefore survive a confrontation in which its conventional military capabilities had suffered extensive damage.
Evidence cited by Deutsche Welle points to Tehran’s efforts to prepare for precisely such a scenario.
Iranian preparations reportedly include rebuilding missile and drone capabilities, replacing officials killed in earlier attacks and strengthening internal security structures.
These measures indicate that the Iranian leadership is prioritising institutional continuity and the ability to sustain resistance over achieving conventional military parity with the United States.
For Tehran, maintaining the state’s capacity to function may be more important than matching American firepower.
That distinction creates a fundamental problem for Washington’s calculations.
A strategy that measures success primarily through destroyed infrastructure, disrupted oil exports or degraded military assets may fail to account for the political endurance of the Iranian state.
Iran’s objective is not necessarily to become stronger than the United States. It is to remain capable of functioning and retaliating long enough to deny Washington the decisive outcome it seeks.
If that remains achievable, further military escalation could impose enormous costs on Iran without guaranteeing that the United States and Israel secure the political transformation they are seeking.
