Israel has presented its laser defence system, Magen Or, more recently referred to in media coverage as Or Eitan, as a historic transformation in warfare: interceptions costing only a few dollars, an effectively unlimited ammunition supply, and the ability to counter rockets, projectiles and drones.
Yet the latest wars, alongside reporting published by the Hebrew-language press itself, reveal a wide gap between the system’s genuine engineering achievements and the image Israel has constructed around it.
The technology is not an illusion, but it has not yet become the “laser Iron Dome” promised by politicians and military companies.
The Economic Promise
The marketing case for Or Eitan is built around reversing the cost equation.
Instead of launching an Iron Dome interceptor missile, estimated to cost tens of thousands of dollars, against a cheap drone or projectile, the system uses a laser beam requiring only a few dollars’ worth of energy.
On 4 June 2025, Yuval Azulai, a military industries correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Calcalist, reported that a senior defence official had estimated the cost of a laser interception at only a few shekels, compared with tens of thousands of dollars for an Iron Dome interception.
The same source estimated that the laser could be directed at threats on approximately 90 per cent of the days in a year, while the principal version was designed to operate at a range of up to around 10 kilometres.
This cost difference provided Israel with an exceptional marketing argument, particularly after its stockpiles of interceptor missiles were depleted during the war that has continued since October 2023.
However, a low cost per “shot” does not mean that building a defensive shield is cheap, nor does it mean that the system can fire an unlimited number of beams simultaneously.
Tested in War
A report by Oded Yaron published in TheMarker on 21 July 2026 placed the system against its most demanding test.
During the war with Iran, ballistic missiles remained beyond the laser’s capabilities, while Israel provided no clear figures concerning the number of interceptions carried out by the system, its success rate or the area it was assigned to defend.
Its inability to intercept ballistic missiles does not, by itself, constitute a failure, since Or Eitan was not designed to replace the Arrow and THAAD systems.
However, the war exposed the limits of claims that laser weapons alone would resolve the depletion crisis facing air defence systems. Heavier and longer-range threats continued to require expensive interceptor missiles available only in limited numbers.
In March 2026, journalist Assaf Gilad asked directly in the Israeli newspaper Globes: “Where did Israel’s new laser system disappear to?”
He reported that the system’s activity during a round of fighting in the north remained extremely limited, despite dozens of drones penetrating Israeli airspace, and that the military declined to disclose how much the system contributed to intercepting them.
Different Systems Blurred Together
Part of the exaggeration resulted from confusion between the main system and smaller laser models.
Israel announced in May 2025 that it had carried out dozens of interceptions against Hezbollah drones. According to TheMarker, however, the systems used were shorter-range and lower-powered versions, not necessarily the principal Or Eitan system, which has a power output of approximately 100 kilowatts.
Limited operational successes against specific targets were therefore transformed into the impression that a comprehensive system capable of protecting cities and intercepting different types of barrages had already entered active service.
Even after the completion of development was announced, the Hebrew-language press continued to report that only a small number of batteries were available and that the system remained in an absorption and preparation phase rather than being widely deployed.
Globes reported that the system completed its testing stage in September 2025, was declared operational at the end of the year and had its first units delivered to the Israeli military.
This confirms genuine technical progress, but provides no data about its performance under the pressure of a simultaneous attack or in changing weather and operational conditions.
The Limits of Physics
A study by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, prepared by senior researcher Yehoshua Kalisky and researcher Anna Sokolenko and published on 25 May 2025, explained why laser systems have struggled to achieve widespread deployment despite decades of investment.
The study stated that a laser beam loses part of its power while passing through the atmosphere and is affected by humidity, dust, smoke, fog and clouds.
It also requires a direct line of sight and must remain precisely focused on the target for long enough to damage it.
The greater the distance, or the faster the target moves, the more difficult tracking and concentration become.
Kalisky also identified a further problem involving energy efficiency. Only around 30 per cent of the electricity used is converted into an effective laser beam, while the remainder becomes heat that must be removed.
As laser power increases, cooling systems become larger and more technically complex. According to Globes, this helps explain the difficulty of installing powerful systems on mobile platforms or operating them continuously.
The laser also works sequentially. It focuses on one target before moving to the next.
As a result, the system may struggle against drone swarms or heavy barrages unless a large number of units are deployed and connected to radars and sensors.
The Hidden Cost
These limitations show that the claim of an “interception costing a few dollars” is accurate only when calculating the electricity consumed by the beam.
The full cost includes the battery, targeting system, cooling equipment, radar, maintenance, personnel, electrical infrastructure and protection of the site.
Globes estimated that a single system costs tens of millions of shekels, adding that establishing effective coverage along the borders would require billions of shekels in additional investment.
The system may therefore reduce the cost of individual interceptions after deployment, but only after an expensive and dense network of batteries has first been constructed.
Reserve Brigadier General Ran Kochav, a former commander of Israel’s air defence system, told Globes that the laser represented a “remarkable technological breakthrough”, but warned that exaggerated expectations had been built around it, as though it would solve the air defence problem.
He noted that the system remained short-range and weather-sensitive, and that its current performance was focused primarily on drones and light, slow-moving targets rather than ballistic missiles and long-range Iranian threats.
A History of Delayed Promises
The problem is not purely technical. It is also connected to a long history of missed timetables.
In a report published by Globes on 8 November 2024, Din Shmuel Elmas documented a series of promises beginning with forecasts in 2014 that the system would become operational within two years.
This was followed by a 2018 promise that it would enter service within one year, and a statement by Naftali Bennett in 2022 that it would become operational within approximately a year.
The report also recalled the joint American-Israeli Nautilus project, which demonstrated experimental capabilities but was frozen in 2007.
It further stated that development of Magen Or took between 15 and 20 years because of problems involving beam concentration, cooling, weather conditions and budgetary constraints.
These precedents do not prove that laser defence cannot succeed, but they show that Israel repeatedly marketed each stage of progress as evidence that a revolution was imminent.
A Revolution Still Delayed
Or Eitan is not a complete fabrication.
The laser has successfully intercepted aerial targets, could become an important defensive layer against drones and short-range projectiles, and may save considerable sums when operated under suitable conditions.
The marketing deception lies in presenting this limited capability as an ammunition-free shield with an almost negligible interception cost and the immediate ability to transform the air defence equation.
For now, the system appears to be a delayed engineering revolution rather than a completed operational one.
It possesses promising capabilities but remains short-range, weather-sensitive, expensive to deploy, and limited against heavy barrages and more powerful targets.
Between the beam that succeeded in testing and a system capable of protecting Israel’s skies, a considerable distance remains. Israeli propaganda attempted to close that gap before the technology itself could do so.
