Arms deals, advanced technologies and cooperation in civilian nuclear programmes may appear to transfer power and expertise from one state to another. Yet historical experience and modern agreements show that buying or leasing technology does not necessarily mean gaining full control over it.
From Washington’s latest military and nuclear systems, which remain tied to support networks and continuing legal and operational restrictions, to historical models in which major powers used technical expertise and technological dependence as instruments of influence, one question continues to arise: where does partnership end, and where does technical guardianship begin?
The Saudi Nuclear Agreement
According to the US Department of Energy, the nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia, concluded under the American legal framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation known as a Section 123 Agreement, establishes the legal foundation for a decades-long partnership worth billions of dollars.
The agreement would give US companies broad access to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy programme, while supporting American industry and employment.
The central restriction concerns uranium enrichment. According to Time magazine, the agreement is expected to run for 30 years and place American companies at the forefront of developing Saudi nuclear infrastructure.
However, the establishment of a uranium enrichment facility would depend on a two-year joint US-Saudi study to determine whether enrichment is justified and commercially viable.
More importantly, Riyadh has refused to commit to what is known as the “gold standard”, adopted by the United Arab Emirates in its 2009 nuclear agreement, under which it renounced domestic enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel.
According to CNN, even if enrichment were later authorised, any facility would be built by the American side without an actual transfer of sensitive technology. This would leave final decisions extending across decades and likely passing to future US administrations.
As a result, the most sensitive part of the programme would remain under direct or indirect American control rather than being entirely controlled by Saudi Arabia.
According to the Atlantic Council, reports also indicate that the agreement may prevent Saudi Arabia from importing nuclear energy technology from any source other than US companies, with only a possible secondary role for some foreign suppliers working with those firms.
Restricting the source of technology to a single country lies at the heart of American control over the emerging programme. Riyadh would be unable to develop or maintain it without passing through an American gatekeeper.
The US Congress would retain the authority to review and potentially block the agreement. A two-thirds majority would be required to stop it and override any possible presidential veto.
This means that Saudi nuclear policy would also remain dependent on the internal balance of power in the United States, rather than on the will of Riyadh and the US administration alone.
Congressman Ed Markey has warned that the agreement could open the door to a regional nuclear arms race. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, has also questioned what precedent the Saudi agreement could establish for other regional states, including the UAE, Türkiye and Egypt.
Markey had previously called for both the gold standard and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol to be made conditions of any nuclear agreement with Riyadh, particularly after the Saudi crown prince stated that his country would follow Iran if Tehran acquired a nuclear weapon.
The F-35
Debate over the existence of a “kill switch” in European F-35 fighter jets intensified after the Trump administration temporarily suspended military assistance to Ukraine in early 2025.
US officials and experts denied that such a button existed in the literal sense, but argued that the issue was more complex.
According to an analysis published by The National Interest, there is no actual shutdown button. However, the effective “kill switch” lies in complete dependence on American defence companies for the software, maintenance and data links required to operate the fifth-generation aircraft.
The same analysis described the F-35 as closer to a “flying computer chip” than a conventional aircraft.
Experts from the Center for a New American Security told Breaking Defense that while the United States does not have the ability to take remote control of the aircraft, cutting maintenance support, spare-parts shipments and foreign F-35 fleets off from US networks could gradually produce the same result.
US policies prevent countries operating the aircraft from performing certain categories of work on the jet and its systems. Some functions must be carried out at government or contractor facilities located within the continental United States.
The aircraft also depends heavily on its Mission Data system, which identifies the flight path least exposed to radar detection. That system is managed and updated by American entities.
According to The Aviationist, more than 400 F-35 aircraft are expected to be delivered to Europe by 2030. Yet this technical integration carries a contradiction: the aircraft’s technological superiority comes at the cost of strategic vulnerability.
Restrictions on conducting independent testing outside the United States have deepened concerns among allies such as Italy, Germany and Britain about “operational sovereignty”.
“Israel” remains the only substantial exception. It is currently the only state permitted to operate a fully independent system for its F-35I Adir aircraft.
Regarding Saudi Arabia specifically, a report by the National Security Journal said Washington had shown fewer reservations about selling the aircraft to Riyadh than it had in the case of Türkiye.
However, any sale would be tied to regional security cooperation as part of the “Abraham Accords”, similar to the framework applied to the UAE.
This means that even the decision to approve the sale would be politically conditional on alignment with Washington’s regional priorities, rather than based only on the financial ability to purchase the aircraft.
The report described buying the aircraft after meeting all “American standards” as closer to “subscribing to a service” than owning an independent military asset.
Its real value lies in the continuing American data and support network, not in the metal airframe alone.
Missile Defence Systems
Alongside fighter aircraft, almost every Gulf Cooperation Council state now owns or hosts advanced American air defence systems.
According to a report by Manara Magazine, every Gulf state except Oman has acquired advanced US missile defence systems. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE operate versions of the Patriot system, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE also possess the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as THAAD.
Despite their sophistication, these systems remain tied to a centralised American command-and-control structure.
According to Army Recognition, THAAD can operate independently or as part of an integrated air and missile defence network, sharing real-time data with Patriot batteries, naval platforms equipped with the Aegis system and allied systems through the American command-and-control architecture known as C2BMC.
In practical terms, the system’s maximum effectiveness depends on integration into the American network rather than on isolated operation.
The Israeli case reveals the most direct form of this dependence. In October 2024, the United States deployed a THAAD system to “Israel” accompanied by American soldiers to operate it.
Axios described the deployment as evidence of growing Israeli dependence not only on US weapons, but also on direct American operational military assistance. This raises the possibility that US soldiers could become directly involved in any confrontation involving “Israel”.
A report by the Arms Control Association also indicates that when Washington needs to redeploy its systems to other regions, as occurred when radars and Patriot systems were moved from South Korea and Germany to the Middle East and Türkiye during escalation with Iran, such decisions are governed by American interests rather than solely by the needs of the local ally.
An ally that “owns” the system may therefore find itself pushed to the back of the priority list if another crisis requires scarce US assets, including radar systems and interceptor missiles, to be transferred elsewhere.
The Suez Canal
The American practice of granting power or technology while ensuring that ultimate control remains with the provider is not unprecedented. Its roots extend back more than a century and recur across successive and competing international systems.
British control over the Suez Canal began economically when Egypt’s heavily indebted Khedive Ismail Pasha was forced to sell his shares in the Suez Canal Company to Britain in 1875.
The British became the largest single shareholder, although France remained the largest shareholder overall.
The financial stake quickly became direct political and military influence. In 1882, Britain effectively seized control of the canal and withdrew only under pressure 75 years later, after Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power and Washington and the United Nations opposed the British-French-Israeli tripartite military intervention in 1956.
More important than the withdrawal itself was the context that forced it.
When Egypt nationalised the canal in 1956, the decision came as a direct response to the withdrawal of Western financing for the Aswan High Dam project.
After the United States and Britain withdrew their funding offers in mid-1956, Egypt sought an alternative source of revenue and turned to the canal’s toll income as an available and viable resource.
The strategic consequences of the crisis extended beyond Egypt.
According to an analysis by Geopolitical Futures, French President Charles de Gaulle concluded that France should never again depend on the British-American alliance.
France subsequently developed its own nuclear weapons, withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 and adopted an independent foreign policy to preserve its strategic sovereignty.
The Soviet Union and China
In July 1960, at the height of the dispute between Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw all of its advisers and experts from China.
Around 1,400 personnel had left Chinese territory by the end of August, and more than 200 scientific and technical projects under development were halted.
According to the Wilson Center, the number of Soviet experts in China peaked at 3,113 by the end of 1956.
Soviet assistance covered highly sensitive fields, including nuclear energy, computing, electronics, automation, semiconductors, electric power, precision mechanics and optics.
The Soviet decision was not merely the product of a passing diplomatic dispute.
According to the same centre, the cancellation of nuclear cooperation and the withdrawal of specialists sent a powerful signal that the “honeymoon” between the two communist allies had ended.
The abrupt withdrawal left entire industrial projects suspended midway through development at a time when China was already suffering the consequences of its drive for rapid advancement and modernisation.
Beijing was later pushed to accelerate its own independent nuclear programme, free from external supervision.
China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, only four years after the withdrawal of Soviet experts.
