The confrontation between the United States and Iran remains far from resolved, as the crisis enters a rapidly escalating phase following Tehran’s announcement that it no longer considers itself bound by the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding”.
Iran accused Washington of violating the agreement after US President Donald Trump declared the ceasefire over and revoked exemptions related to Iranian oil, steps Tehran viewed as a retreat from the understandings previously reached.
The escalation has been accompanied by mutual attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf, alongside international diplomatic efforts to contain the crisis and revive mediation between Washington and Tehran.
Iran specialist Mona al-Silawi told Arabi21 that the Iranian leadership has not abandoned its approach of “exporting the revolution” and seeking to control neighbouring countries, despite Trump’s claims that Iran’s position has changed.
Is the Strait of Hormuz Iran’s Last Remaining Card?
Al-Silawi said the Strait of Hormuz has become the Iranian government’s only remaining source of leverage after it gradually lost its other cards.
She referred to previous remarks by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who warned: “If we use the Strait of Hormuz card beyond what it can bear, it will turn against us.”
According to al-Silawi, the statement reflected Tehran’s own awareness of the risks involved in overusing the strait as a pressure tool.
She said affected countries had already begun searching for alternative routes. Iran had also recognised this development and asked the Houthis to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait as well, while economic and maritime restrictions returned with what she described as an “extremely severe” impact on the Iranian economy.
Most of Iran’s imports and exports pass through its ports because the country has not invested sufficiently in its railway network, she added.
Targeting Ships and Claims of Ownership Over Hormuz
Al-Silawi said hardline elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps do not view Iran or countries within its sphere of influence, such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, as homelands whose populations should enjoy prosperity.
Instead, she said, they regard them as instruments for the project of “exporting the revolution”.
She added that part of this faction holds an ideological worldview linked to “end-times theories” and sees the armed groups established by Iran across the region as tools serving that vision.
Responding to the contradiction between Tehran’s claim that it owns the Strait of Hormuz and its simultaneous efforts to open communication channels with Oman over its management, al-Silawi said: “If the strait belonged to Iran, it would not object to ships passing outside its territorial waters.”
She said the Revolutionary Guard seeks to force vessels to pass specifically through Iranian territorial waters so it can impose fees on them, even though the natural strait is wide enough for ships to avoid doing so, unlike artificial waterways such as the Suez and Panama canals.
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Genuine Setback or a Future Return?
Addressing the future of Iran’s nuclear programme, al-Silawi said “the science behind this programme has not died”.
Iran still has scientists, underground facilities and financial resources that could be reinvested in rebuilding the programme, she said. However, the cost would be extremely high, particularly after the assassination of several scientists in operations she attributed to the “Israeli side”.
Al-Silawi argued that possessing a nuclear bomb does not necessarily guarantee the survival of a government.
She cited the collapse of the Soviet Union despite its vast nuclear arsenal, saying its inability to provide a decent standard of living for its citizens ultimately proved decisive.
“The rebellion of the people is far more important than the issue of bombs” in determining the fate of governments, she said.
Could Pickaxe Mountain Withstand US Weapons?
Regarding the latest US threat to target the heavily fortified nuclear facility known as Pickaxe Mountain, al-Silawi said Tehran had promoted the site as a “granite” facility that would be difficult to penetrate.
However, she argued that Washington might not need to destroy the entire facility.
Closing its entrances could be enough to leave it “buried underground” and cut off from any communication, similar to what occurred at the Natanz facility, she said.
Any later Iranian attempt to reopen the entrances would remain vulnerable to further strikes.
On the fate of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, al-Silawi said the issue remained within the realm of unconfirmed “security information”.
She considered it unlikely that the stockpile was concentrated in a single location, suggesting instead that it may have been dispersed across several areas inside Iran to avoid detection, particularly given what she described as extensive Israeli security penetration of the Iranian system.
She also referred to unconfirmed leaks alleging that part of the uranium had been offered in exchange for the release of two US soldiers who had been missing in Iran.
Economic Pressure Inside Iran
Al-Silawi said the continued availability of internet services during the latest crisis had exposed the extent of public anger in areas such as Ahvaz, Abadan and Mahshahr.
Although these areas were not directly targeted, they were affected by the strikes, which caused water and electricity outages during a heatwave in which temperatures exceeded 50 degrees Celsius.
She said Iran had executed a third person this week on charges of “collaborating with Israel and the United States” in connection with previous protests, while public complaints over rising prices and power cuts continued to spread.
Al-Silawi linked the economic crisis to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s attempted resignation, which was rejected.
She said warnings from Iran’s central bank governor about an empty government treasury and the risk of a possible famine had pushed the Revolutionary Guard to accept negotiations.
Secret Talks Amid Public Escalation
Addressing the continuation of indirect communication between Washington and Tehran during the escalation, al-Silawi said the Iranians “want to talk, but they do not want to reach an actual agreement”.
She said neighbouring countries, including Qatar, Oman and Pakistan, were making intensive efforts to mediate because of the region’s global importance, not only in energy but also in agricultural fertiliser production.
Al-Silawi described the memorandum of understanding offered to Iran as “very good”, saying it included sanctions relief and investment in the oil and gas sectors.
She suggested that the Revolutionary Guard itself may be divided between a pragmatic faction willing to accept a settlement that spares the country from war, even if it later fails to honour it, and a more hardline faction that rejects entering any agreement from the outset.
How Iran’s Regional Allies View the Escalation
Al-Silawi said Tehran has deliberately avoided directing its missiles towards the Israeli occupation, despite continuing to launch them towards Jordan, in order to avoid bringing the occupation into a direct military confrontation with Iran.
She said Iran-aligned armed factions in Iraq had become more reluctant to enter a direct confrontation after many of them became integrated into Iraq’s economy and political system and acquired privileges they fear losing.
By contrast, she suggested that the Houthis may be the most prepared to enter any confrontation because of their near-total dependence on Iranian support.
She pointed to recent movements observed in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Regarding Hezbollah, al-Silawi said Iran does not want to lose this source of leverage and continues trying to deliver support to the group through the Syrian border, despite the recent interception of a weapons shipment bound for it through Iraq and Syria.
Iraq: Tehran’s Most Sensitive Arena
Asked whether Iran could accept a decline in its influence in Iraq as Washington pressures Baghdad to disarm armed factions, al-Silawi said Tehran would not surrender this card easily.
However, she said Iranian influence in Iraq had declined significantly since the killing of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, whose successor, Esmail Qaani, had been unable to fill the vacuum with the same influence and presence.
She described the Iraqi prime minister’s latest visit to Washington as an “extremely dangerous message” for Tehran.
Anti-corruption operations in Iraq, if serious and sustained, would also work against Iranian influence there, she said.
However, al-Silawi argued that completely excluding Iran from the region’s political equation was geographically unrealistic.
She said a significant part of the problem also stemmed from the failure of Arab states to develop a shared national security project capable of confronting Iran’s expanding influence.
Possible Scenarios
Al-Silawi believes the Iranian government is relying on time, based on its assumption that the international community cannot endure prolonged escalation and may eventually offer concessions to Tehran rather than enter an open confrontation.
She said the Iranian leadership understands that the United States and its allies do not want to launch a ground operation inside Iran because of the country’s vast size and complex geography.
She pointed to the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, which demonstrated the difficulty of managing such wars.
Air strikes, regardless of their intensity, do not necessarily lead to the collapse of a government, she added, citing Syria, where the government remained in place for years despite war, economic collapse and the division of territorial control.
Al-Silawi said some analysts had raised scenarios in which parts of Iran, including Kurdish or Arab regions, could fall outside central government control, creating a practical division of authority on the ground.
However, she stressed that this would not necessarily mean the collapse of the government.
She said the world may have been able to tolerate a prolonged crisis in Syria, but would not be able to absorb a similar crisis in Iran because of its strategic location and control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of global energy trade passes.
According to al-Silawi, Tehran is building its calculations around this reality.
It is seeking to use its geographical position and remaining sources of leverage to push the international community towards concessions, while also betting on time, the possible end of Trump’s presidency and the return of a Democratic US administration more willing to negotiate.
