Since the nineteenth century, Lebanon has been one of the most prominent arenas of European pressure on the Ottoman state. European intervention was not confined to humanitarian or religious considerations. It was also connected to efforts to reshape the balance of power within the empire.
Following the events of 1860, which led to the establishment of the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate under international supervision, Lebanon became a space where Ottoman administration and European influence overlapped. That legacy remains present in Turkish political memory whenever foreign intervention in the Levant is discussed.
That period also produced population movements between Anatolia and Greater Syria, although not all of them were political in nature. Families from Mardin and its surroundings migrated to Lebanon in search of employment, benefiting from the growth of Beirut’s port and its transformation into a major commercial centre in the eastern Mediterranean.
Large numbers settled in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. Over time, they formed communities that preserved family and cultural connections with their place of origin. Recent Turkish studies estimate that tens of thousands of people in Lebanon are of Mardin origin. Some still hold Turkish citizenship or retain legal ties to Turkey.
The migration included Muslims, Christians, Syriacs, Armenians and Arabs. Among them was the family of the singer Fairuz, who left the region to escape the unrest that accompanied the final years of the Ottoman Empire.
At the beginning of the new millennium, as Turkey expanded its engagement with the Arab world, it revived this cultural heritage and these social links. During that period, however, its activity in Lebanon remained largely cultural and developmental, often preceding a more substantial diplomatic presence.
Ankara Redefines Lebanon’s Position After Assad’s Fall
For many years, Turkey treated Lebanon as part of Syria’s sphere of influence rather than as an independent file within its foreign policy.
Until the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Damascus remained the most influential external actor in Lebanese decision-making. In the years that followed, Ankara’s priorities shifted towards the consequences of the Syrian uprising, the Kurdish issue, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean and terrorist threats.
Lebanon remained present largely as an arena in which the roles of Iran, France and Syria intersected. It did not become an independent pillar of Turkish strategy.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Lebanon became part of the security and political environment upon which the success of Syria’s post-Assad transition depends.
The security and demarcation of the Syrian border, weapons smuggling, the return of refugees and the regulation of relations between Beirut and Damascus all became central to Ankara’s understanding of regional stability, in which the stability of Syria remains the principal concern.
Turkey believes that the security of its southern borders begins with rebuilding Syrian state institutions and restoring control over Syrian territory and borders.
Researcher Sohaib Jawhar told Noon Post that Turkey’s current position is based on the belief that the new Syria has a direct interest in Lebanon’s stability because any security disturbance would immediately affect the Syrian border, reconstruction projects and the regional economy.
He added that Ankara encourages Damascus to play a political and diplomatic role that reduces tensions among Lebanese forces. However, it does not support the return of Syrian security or military influence in Lebanon or the reproduction of the previous model.
The SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research has argued that Turkey’s security environment extends beyond its formal borders through an interconnected network stretching from Iraq and Syria to the eastern Mediterranean, where security, energy and trade corridors overlap.
Within this framework, Lebanon’s stability becomes part of the wider regional stability surrounding Turkey. In one of his speeches, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that his country’s security does not begin in Hatay, but in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.
This approach reflects a shift in Turkish strategic thinking.
Ankara is seeking to consolidate its position within the new regional arrangements emerging after the American-Iranian war. Any security or political vacuum in Lebanon would affect Syria’s stability, while Turkey is working to prevent the emergence of a geopolitical void that could reproduce cycles of instability or allow other powers to reshape the balance of power in the Levant without regard for Turkish interests.
Turkish interests also extend to economic and geopolitical issues, foremost among them maritime border demarcation, energy projects and transport corridors in the eastern Mediterranean.
Jawhar said that the recent talks held in Ankara by Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri reflected this approach.
The discussions focused on four principal issues: consolidating Lebanon’s stability, the future of security arrangements in the south, Lebanese-Syrian relations following the change in Damascus and the restoration of economic cooperation linked to Syria’s reconstruction and regional transport and energy projects.
How Is Turkey Building Its Presence in Lebanon?
Since the middle of the first decade of the millennium, Turkey has relied more heavily on soft-power instruments than on direct political involvement in Lebanon.
While political and security issues remained largely governed by complex domestic and regional balances, Ankara expanded its presence through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, which began implementing projects in Lebanon in 2006 before opening its Beirut office in 2012.
Its early projects were concentrated in northern Lebanon, before expanding into education, health, agriculture, the restoration of historical sites and vocational training.
Turkey’s presence has also included government university scholarships, activities run by the Yunus Emre Institute and programs administered by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities.
In addition, Turkey has granted citizenship to Lebanese people of Turkish or Ottoman origin after they provided evidence of family links.
Ankara formally reaffirmed this policy in 2020, when then Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that Turkey was prepared to grant citizenship to Lebanese citizens of Turkish or Turkmen origin who wished to apply.
The evacuation operations carried out by Turkey from Lebanon in 2024 also revealed the presence of Lebanese nationals who held Turkish citizenship.
Following the regional changes that came after Assad’s fall, Turkey’s role began to move towards economic and logistical infrastructure.
In February 2025, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency opened a project to develop facilities at the Port of Tripoli, stressing the port’s importance to trade between Turkey and Lebanon.
Lebanese officials said during the opening that the maritime freight route between Mersin and Tripoli handled more than 100 trucks each week, strengthening the port’s position as a regional logistics corridor.
Ankara’s interest in reopening René Moawad Airport reflected the same direction.
On 27 June 2026, Turkish Ambassador to Beirut Murat Lütem visited the airport and reviewed plans for its operation. He highlighted its strategic and economic importance because of its proximity to the Port of Tripoli and the Syrian border, while noting that Turkish airlines were closely monitoring the project.
How Does Ankara Define a Solution for Lebanon?
Ankara rejects approaches based on military force or the restoration of external tutelage.
Instead, it advances a vision that links Lebanon’s stability to the existence of a state capable of managing internal balances without allowing its institutions to collapse.
Turkey also regards Israeli escalation as the greatest obstacle to any political settlement.
Alongside its repeated condemnation of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted a stronger position in June 2026.
It accused Israel of seeking to expand its occupation in southern Lebanon and impose new realities on the ground by making border areas uninhabitable and forcing residents to flee.
Turkey said this policy aimed to reshape the regional balance of power through military force, undermining any opportunity to rebuild regional stability.
Jawhar said the Turkish approach seeks to balance security and politics.
He explained that Ankara regards the Israeli threat as the most urgent external danger to Lebanon’s stability. At the same time, it believes that the continued presence of weapons outside state authority weakens Lebanon’s institutions and leaves the country vulnerable to recurring crises.
He added that Turkey rejects forced disarmament and externally imposed solutions, while also viewing the continuation of the current situation as unsustainable.
Ankara therefore supports a gradual process based on internal dialogue, strengthening the capabilities of the Lebanese army and providing mutual security guarantees that would allow an orderly transition towards placing all weapons under state control.
Turkey avoids public discussion of how Hezbollah’s weapons should be addressed.
Its official statements instead emphasise support for Lebanese state institutions and sovereignty, while rejecting any steps that could widen the war or undermine stability.
This position reflects Turkey’s desire to avoid becoming involved in Lebanon’s internal polarisation while maintaining its focus on halting Israeli escalation and strengthening the Lebanese state as the only framework capable of addressing disputed issues.
Turkey is not seeking to inherit Iran’s influence in Lebanon as much as it is seeking to prevent the balance of power from shifting decisively towards Israel.
It also wants to ensure that it is not excluded from the new security arrangements taking shape across the Levant.
Ankara now regards Lebanon as one of the central components of a regional balance that has been under reconstruction since 7 October, the fall of Assad’s government and the subsequent acceleration of change following the war on Iran.
These developments weakened Iran’s network of influence across the Levant and opened the way for a redistribution of roles among regional powers.
At the same time, Israel is attempting to convert its military superiority into political and security realities extending from Gaza and Syria to Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s current approach also carries a historical dimension.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish republic withdrew from the affairs of the Levant for decades, focusing on building the new state and consolidating its borders before turning towards the West during the Cold War.
Today, Ankara is acting on the belief that absence during periods of regional reconstruction allows other powers to draw the maps of influence.
It also leaves Turkey facing arrangements in the future that it played no role in creating.
Turkey is therefore seeking to consolidate its presence in the Levant and prevent Israel from unilaterally determining its emerging security and political balance, without attempting to restore the older models of regional domination.
From this perspective, Turkey’s interest in border issues, energy, Lebanese-Syrian relations and support for Lebanese state institutions forms part of a broader vision.
Within that vision, Lebanon has become part of a new geopolitical map that regional powers are competing to shape.
