Warnings are growing that the confrontation in the Middle East may expand further, as the Israeli occupation shifts its rhetoric from focusing on Iran to portraying Turkey as its next strategic threat. This comes as Tel Aviv continues to entrench its military presence in Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip under what it calls “security belts”.
Experts see this shift as part of Israel’s attempt to redraw the regional balance of power and reshape borders, taking advantage of divisions inside the US administration over how the region’s files should be managed.
In this context, David Hearst, editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye, examined what he described as a contradiction in US policy. In an article published last Tuesday, he pointed to one agreement with Iran that pledges respect for its sovereignty and a halt to military operations across different fronts, and another agreement that gives Israel cover to continue its military presence in southern Lebanon.
Two Contradictory Agreements
The US administration has signed two contradictory agreements at the same time to end its war on Iran. The influence Israel lost in dictating the terms of peace with Iran is now something it is working hard to gain in Lebanon.
It has been greatly helped by the Lebanese government, which has surrendered part of its sovereignty over its own land, along with its duty to seek compensation for the war crimes committed by Israel.
Under the agreement signed by US President Donald Trump with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Washington accepted an explicit link between Iran and Lebanon by agreeing to the “direct and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon”.
If this commitment is implemented, it would invalidate the second agreement signed in Washington on 26 June by representatives of the Lebanese, Israeli and US governments. This “framework” allows Israeli forces, which occupy wide areas of southern Lebanon, to remain where they are indefinitely.
Under the first agreement, the United States promised to respect Iranian sovereignty, including Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Under the second, its ally Israel is not required to respect Lebanese sovereignty, which is further weakened by the creation of a “military coordination group” run from Washington.
The agreement obliges the Lebanese army, which is deliberately kept weak through the veto exercised by Washington and Israel over what weapons it may possess, to disarm a battle-hardened armed group that many in Lebanon see as the only means of deterring Israeli aggression and settlement expansion.
The framework agreement also obliges the Lebanese government to grant Israeli forces and Israeli military commanders immunity from accountability for war crimes committed during the invasion. Article 13, according to legal experts, strips the Lebanese government of its right to file legal complaints against Israel before international courts.
The Risk of a Lebanese Civil War
Since October 2023, more than one million people have been displaced from their homes in Lebanon, while at least 8,000 people have been killed. Israeli strikes have also targeted many civilians, including journalists and healthcare workers.
According to Halima Kaakour, a member of the Lebanese parliament and an expert in international law, “The clause reflects a political decision by the Lebanese authorities not to resort to international institutions in exchange for Israeli withdrawal, although that step is a right in itself and should not have been traded for anything else.”
Anger spread through the streets of Beirut to the point that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reportedly had no choice but to express gratitude to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for intervening to calm the situation. Berri pledged to obstruct the deal in order to avoid the outbreak of civil war. Given Lebanon’s history, such a warning should not be underestimated.
Berri said: “Those who prepared this agreement want to ignite internal strife, but I do not want it, and I will exert pressure to prevent an explosion. Even Hezbollah is working towards internal calm. Yet they insist on proceeding with an agreement that is far worse than the 17 May Agreement. They want strife.”
Berri added that the entire region could pay the price for what he described as a tug-of-war inside the US administration.
As the main aggressor against Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his satisfaction with the Washington agreement, dismissing the areas surrounding the Litani River, from which Israeli forces had pledged to withdraw, as insignificant.
Netanyahu described the agreement as a “major blow” to Iran, saying: “Iran is trying to force us to withdraw from southern Lebanon by force. But in practice, Israel, Lebanon and the United States are saying to them: this is none of your business.”
The difference between the two agreements is stark because each was drafted by a different and competing team within the US administration, which is engaged in the same tug-of-war referred to by Berri.
Trump’s agreement with Iran reflects the thinking of Vice President JD Vance, who must have felt vindicated by the failure of the US-Israeli air strikes to achieve regime change.
Vance did not hide his opposition to the joint strikes. His absence from the operations room was noticeable in February, when Trump decided to launch war on Iran after a briefing from Netanyahu and David Barnea, who was then the director of Mossad.
Talk of a “Sunni Axis”
The framework agreement reached in Washington between Israel and Lebanon was the work of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who remains committed to the goal of regime change in Iran, as he was with Venezuela and still is with Cuba.
Rubio believes that disarming Hezbollah should be a condition for peace, rather than the outcome of a negotiated political settlement. He also believes that Israel should remain the uncontested dominant power in the region.
Vance clearly sees many negatives in continuing the bombing campaign against Iran, not least the fact that 20 US military sites in the region were struck by Iranian missiles and drones, including a major naval base in Bahrain. This comes in addition to the time the United States will need to replenish its stockpile of Tomahawk missiles.
Rubio, however, continues to cling to the myth that Hezbollah is alien to Lebanon and merely an Iranian tool.
The Iran war was a clear setback for Israel’s regional plans. Yet, in a clear sign that the war would have continued even if the United States and Israel had succeeded in changing the regime in Tehran, the political establishment in Tel Aviv has now turned its attention towards Turkey.
As predictably as day follows night, Turkey has become Israel’s latest existential enemy. In near-perfect harmony, a group of Israeli politicians has sounded the alarm over the emergence of a new “Sunni axis” made up of Turkey, Syria and Qatar.
Trump did not accept this framing. He was quick to mock the idea that his best friend in the region, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was an “antisemitic dictator” and was “committing genocide against the Kurds”, as Netanyahu now claims.
Trump said: “Erdogan is a great leader, and a very strong person. Whatever I asked of him, he did.”
When Netanyahu said Israel’s “new” security doctrine was “kill them first”, Vance responded bluntly. Addressing two right-wing ministers in Netanyahu’s government, while in effect speaking to the prime minister himself, he said: “You are a country of nine million people. You simply cannot kill your way out of every national security problem you have.”
Laying the Groundwork
Israel is serious about moving against Turkey, just as it did against Iran. To begin with, the anti-Turkey rhetoric is bipartisan. It dominates the thinking of the man expected to replace Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett, who said that a new Turkish threat is taking shape.
Bennett added: “I want to be very clear. Turkey and Qatar have gained influence inside Syria and are seeking influence elsewhere, everywhere across the region. That is why I warn that Turkey is the new Iran.”
The same theme was taken up by Amichai Chikli, the minister for diaspora affairs, who said the era of the “Shiite empire in Iran” had ended. He added that a new axis was following in its footsteps: “It is the Muslim Brotherhood axis represented by Turkey, Syria and Qatar under Erdogan. You had better open your eyes now.”
Second, the groundwork for Israel’s latest campaign was laid in November 2024, when Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said, one month before the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, that Israel should reach out to its natural allies, the Kurds and the Druze.
Once Assad fell, Israel completely wiped out Syria’s naval and air forces, invaded southern Syria by land across an area larger than Gaza, and aggressively and openly sought to shape a federal Syria divided into sectarian cantons.
Netanyahu now calls the areas occupied by his forces in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza “security belts”, and he has no intention of withdrawing from them.
Through these means, Israel has sought to limit the authority of the national government in Damascus formed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and to challenge Turkey’s relationship with post-Assad Syria.
Israel has also deliberately attempted to revive tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean, including by supplying Cyprus with Barak MX air defence missiles. Meanwhile, Israel enjoys a privileged position at an airbase in Paphos, while Cyprus is reportedly considering the purchase of Indian supersonic missiles and drones.
All these moves have one common objective: to challenge Turkey’s rising naval power.
A recent article in Maariv stated that Turkey is increasingly being viewed in Israeli strategic circles as a greater long-term challenge than Iran. This is not only because of the aircraft carrier it is building, or because of the strength of its drones, radar capabilities and advanced electronic warfare systems, as the analysis noted, but also because of Ankara’s growing diplomatic and military footprint across the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East.
Another Israeli minister, Gila Gamliel, said Israel is preparing to confront the “Ottoman Empire”.
A Changing Mood in Ankara
Turkey’s response to Israeli moves has been cautious. Some may say excessively so. Leaving Erdogan’s rhetoric aside, it is worth considering what Turkey actually did when Israel invaded Syria and bombed its air force and navy.
Turkey and Israel held talks over a deconfliction line after Israel attacked military sites in Syria, including Hama and Tiyas airbases, where Turkey had been planning to deploy.
Throughout the assault on Gaza, Turkey kept Azerbaijani oil flowing to Israel through the port of Ceyhan, most likely one of the things Trump asked Erdogan to do. Activists from the Stop Fuelling Genocide campaign published evidence showing that the tanker Seavigour transported crude oil from Turkey’s Ceyhan port to a pipeline near Ashkelon in Israel at least eight times during 2024, after Turkey had announced a trade ban.
Turkish officials also downplayed Netanyahu’s rhetoric as being purely for domestic consumption. They stressed the importance of the hotlines established between the Turkish and Israeli militaries, the fact that Turkish military commanders opposed entering any confrontation with Israel in Syria, and the contacts taking place between Turkish and Israeli security agencies.
In 2022, the year before Hakan Fidan was promoted from intelligence chief to foreign minister, Turkish intelligence intercepted and thwarted ten different assassination attempts by three branches of Iranian intelligence against Jewish targets inside Turkey and in the Caucasus, according to sources familiar with the matter who spoke to Middle East Eye.
This lenient policy shifted after the 2024 local elections, which saw Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party suffer losses because of Turkey’s failure to take action over Gaza. Yet the series of steps Turkey later took were largely diplomatic, based on winning Trump and his ambassador Tom Barrack over to Turkey’s side regarding Syria.
Today, the mood in Ankara has changed, and there is growing acceptance of the idea that Israel means what it says about the next confrontation. Turkey is now focused on building its deterrent power, whether at sea, in the air, or through drones.
Trump is now giving Turkey the support it needs to build its next-generation stealth fighter, the Kaan, while Ankara is accelerating the construction of a 60,000-tonne aircraft carrier and building 30 other warships. It also recently held a joint exercise with the Egyptian navy.
Even so, Turkey is seeking to buy time. Turkish military analysts believe the country’s air defence systems need between three and five years to reach the operational capability required to confront the Israeli air force.
Turkey’s main response to what happened in Gaza has been to focus on building a defence alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the same regional powers that helped mediate the deal between the United States and Iran. This is what Israel fears and is now fighting to dismantle.
Whatever happens next in the Gulf, the main battle line between Israel and the region will be drawn in Lebanon and Syria.
The lesson from all this is that Israel means what it says when its prime minister pledges to change the borders of the Middle East. Military power is unavoidable if this is to be prevented.
The longer Arab states in the region delay their response or remain dependent on their weak relationships with Washington, the greater the shock they will receive when Israel kills first.
