Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently addressed concerns over the possibility of a direct Israeli attack on Turkey, stating bluntly that “those leading Israel are crazy”, while stressing that such a scenario remains possible, at least under Israel’s current leadership.
Despite Ankara’s concerns, a direct military confrontation remains unlikely in the foreseeable future. Turkey possesses significant sources of power that Israel cannot ignore, including its military capabilities, advanced defence industries, strong ties with Western powers, and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO.
Ironically, this assessment is shared by both government and opposition figures in Israel. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently warned that “Turkey is the new Iran. Turkey is more dangerous”, referring to Ankara as a greater long term challenge for Israel.
Among these factors, NATO membership is often viewed as Turkey’s ultimate security guarantee against Israeli threats. Since Israel is not a NATO member, many assume the alliance itself would automatically deter or counter any aggression against Turkey.
This assumption, however, is exaggerated and largely theoretical.
Turkish leaders themselves do not regard NATO as an absolute shield. Instead, Ankara has been working intensively to strengthen its security through multiple other channels.
The Difficulty of Activating NATO’s Article 5
The first reason is the complexity surrounding Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty.
The collective defence clause has only been activated once in the alliance’s history, following the attacks of 11 September 2001.
That case involved an unambiguous attack on the United States by an organisation designated as a terrorist group. The circumstances were clear, the United States was the alliance’s leading power, and the anticipated costs of intervention appeared manageable.
A confrontation between Turkey and Israel would be very different.
Even if Israel launched an attack against Turkey, it does not necessarily follow that Article 5 would be activated.
The political and strategic complexities surrounding such a scenario are obvious and would likely prevent NATO from reaching a unified position.
Turkey Has Experienced NATO’s Hesitation Before
Ankara has already experienced what it views as NATO’s reluctance to support it.
In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Su 24 fighter jet, bringing it dangerously close to a military confrontation with Moscow.
At the time, NATO did not provide the level of support Ankara had expected.
On the contrary, the alliance withdrew Patriot missile systems from Turkish territory despite Ankara’s objections.
Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg effectively signalled that the situation did not fall under Article 5.
This episode reinforced Turkish doubts about relying entirely on NATO in times of crisis.
Greece Could Complicate NATO’s Position
Another factor is Greece.
Any future confrontation between Israel and Turkey could potentially involve Athens, making NATO’s calculations even more complicated given that Greece is also a member of the alliance.
In this context, it is worth recalling a report published by Turkey’s National Intelligence Academy on the twelve day war between Iran and Israel.
The report urged Turkey to prepare for the possibility of fighting “an air war on two simultaneous fronts”, referring to Greece in the west and Israel in the south.
Conflict May Take Non Traditional Forms
An Israeli campaign against Turkey would not necessarily resemble the direct military confrontation seen with Iran.
It could take more indirect or unconventional forms.
These might include economic pressure, support for separatist organisations, targeted assassinations, or proxy confrontations in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Such scenarios would make NATO intervention far less likely.
The alliance was not designed to address every form of hybrid or indirect conflict.
Political Friction Inside NATO
Turkey’s position within NATO is not without controversy.
Some members hold negative views towards Ankara, either because of cultural differences or due to Turkey’s pursuit of a relatively independent foreign policy.
This became particularly visible during the Russia-Ukraine war, where Turkey attempted to maintain a more balanced position.
As a result, voices periodically emerge both inside and outside the alliance questioning Turkey’s place in NATO or arguing that the alliance no longer needs Ankara.
Similar debates surfaced after the end of the Cold War and continue to resurface today.
NATO Itself Faces Uncertainty
All of these arguments assume a strong and cohesive NATO.
Yet the alliance itself is facing increasingly serious challenges.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has revived old disputes over burden sharing and strategic priorities.
At the same time, mistrust between the United States and its European allies has deepened.
As a result, analysts have offered increasingly pessimistic forecasts regarding NATO’s future, ranging from dysfunction and paralysis to broader questions about its long term viability.
Turkey’s Real Strategy
Ultimately, Turkey does not believe that NATO membership alone is enough to deter Israel or guarantee protection in the event of a confrontation.
This has been Ankara’s view for years, and it is unlikely to change anytime soon.
Instead, Turkey relies on a broader strategy.
Its priorities include strengthening its domestic economy, expanding its defence industries, reinforcing internal cohesion, maintaining strong relations with major powers, especially the United States, and avoiding direct confrontation whenever possible.
At the regional level, Ankara is seeking deeper cooperation and coordination with countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
It also continues to cultivate close bilateral relations with partners including Qatar and Azerbaijan.
For Turkey, these overlapping layers of power and alliances, rather than NATO membership alone, are what ultimately provide security in an increasingly uncertain region.
