After nearly 40 public statements by US President Donald Trump predicting an imminent agreement with Iran, he announced that Washington and Tehran would sign a memorandum of understanding in Switzerland next Friday. Yet the broad framework of the deal is expected to require a relatively lengthy negotiating process with no guarantee of success.
As a result, the conflict is unlikely to end completely. Instead, the coming period may be defined by a grey zone between war and peace, where tensions remain unresolved and the possibility of renewed confrontation persists.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reaction to the latest developments reflected this uncertainty. While expressing an understanding of American interests in reaching an agreement with Iran, he stressed that Israel must not become its victim.
His remarks revealed Israel’s concerns that a US-Iran agreement could bypass its primary objectives and leave it emerging from the conflict empty handed, possessing tactical achievements but suffering a strategic defeat.
A Fragile Agreement Is Better Than Another War
The reality recognised by all parties is that a return to full scale war would leave everyone with more to lose than to gain.
A fragile agreement that preserves the possibility of intermittent confrontation is now viewed as the least damaging outcome, provided tensions remain under control and a broader regional war is avoided.
Israel, however, stands out as the only party that remains interested in escalating the situation.
Netanyahu is unlikely to accept such an agreement easily because the new rules of engagement that Iran established during the recent confrontation have weakened Israeli deterrence while strengthening Iran’s position.
Most importantly, Iran succeeded in securing the Lebanese front within the broader ceasefire arrangement and halting hostilities across multiple fronts.
This development could expose Netanyahu to fierce criticism ahead of Israel’s elections scheduled for late October.
The Politics of Permanent Conflict
Netanyahu appears to believe that maintaining a state of neither war nor peace between Iran and the United States is preferable to accepting what Israel considers a bad agreement.
Such a deal would be impossible to market domestically as an absolute victory.
On the contrary, his political opponents would use it as evidence that he lost the war against Iran.
Keeping the conflict alive, even without a decisive outcome, allows Netanyahu to preserve the narrative that the struggle will continue until the Iranian government is ultimately defeated.
Trump Wanted a Symbolic Victory
The gap between what Trump wanted and what Netanyahu sought lies at the heart of Israeli anxiety.
Trump pursued a symbolic victory that could reduce domestic criticism and ease mounting public and economic pressures ahead of the US midterm elections.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, focused on one of two objectives.
The first was convincing Trump that Israel could inflict a decisive defeat on Iran if the war resumed through attacks on energy infrastructure, economic targets, and key facilities.
This would potentially include ground operations to seize Kharg Island, through which roughly 90 per cent of Iranian oil exports pass, as well as special operations aimed at capturing approximately 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.
The second objective was preventing what Netanyahu considers a bad agreement and prolonging the confrontation in the hope that economic pressure would turn Iranian public opinion against the government or create opportunities for foreign intervention.
The Battle Over Enriched Uranium
After failing to force Iran’s surrender, topple its government, or dismantle its nuclear programme entirely, Trump searched for a more limited but tangible achievement.
That achievement centred on Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
For this reason, the issue of the approximately 450 kilograms of enriched uranium became the focal point of negotiations.
This explains Trump’s repeated statements linking sanctions relief to Iran giving up its enriched uranium reserves.
However, Iran did not grant Trump this concession.
The issue now appears likely to be postponed to later phases of negotiations.
Netanyahu’s Long Campaign Against Iran
For nearly three decades, Netanyahu has built his political identity around Iran.
He portrayed Tehran as Israel’s only existential threat and as a danger to the entire world.
He consistently argued that war was the only solution to eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions and presented himself as the only leader capable of persuading Washington to confront Tehran militarily.
Over the years, he used every available avenue to pressure successive American administrations into war with Iran.
After repeated failures, he finally found an ally in Trump.
Netanyahu convinced him that the Iranian government could collapse in a manner similar to Venezuela’s political crisis.
Instead, he now finds himself facing an agreement that differs little in substance from the 2015 nuclear deal negotiated by Barack Obama, the very agreement Netanyahu successfully encouraged Trump to abandon in 2018.
If implemented, the current agreement may prove even more damaging to Netanyahu than the 2015 deal.
Israel’s Core Objectives Have Fallen Away
According to this assessment, several of Israel’s principal war objectives have disappeared.
Instead of overthrowing the Iranian government, Tehran could emerge with greater legitimacy as sanctions are gradually eased and frozen assets released.
Iran’s ballistic missile programme would continue without major restrictions.
There is also no indication that Iran will be required to abandon its regional alliances.
On the contrary, the concept of unified fronts appears to have become more deeply entrenched, particularly on the Lebanese front.
It remains unclear whether Gaza will be included within the agreement.
If it is, the integration of Gaza into this framework would represent one of Iran’s most significant strategic achievements, since Gaza remains the central arena from which the broader confrontation has unfolded.
Iran’s Negotiating Advantage
Israeli concerns are also driven by the possibility that Iran could regain access to some or all of its frozen assets while postponing discussions over enriched uranium.
Such an outcome could strengthen Tehran’s negotiating position in later phases and enable it to secure further concessions.
There is a widespread belief that Trump and most members of his administration pushed strongly for an agreement.
Islamic countries close to Washington, financial markets, and domestic political pressures in the United States also appear to have influenced Trump’s calculations.
Trump needs to show that he did not abandon the nuclear issue.
Iran, meanwhile, needs to demonstrate that it did not surrender.
Both sides are now attempting to craft narratives of victory that resonate domestically and internationally.
This is often the outcome of wars that fail to produce decisive military victories.
In such conflicts, the militarily weaker side can gain the advantage through resilience, increasing the cost of war for its opponent, and internationalising the crisis.
According to this view, Iran achieved all three even before an agreement was signed.
Trump’s Vision and Netanyahu’s Fear
For Trump, appearances are often as important as substance, if not more so.
The current memorandum of understanding may be enough for him to claim that he prevented a major war.
At the same time, Trump appears eager to shift the narrative away from prolonged conflict and unfulfilled threats.
Instead, he speaks increasingly about regional peace and expanding the so called Abraham Accords, presenting them as the foundation of a broader settlement in the Middle East.
This is where another Israeli concern emerges.
Trump’s vision of a regional settlement could expose Netanyahu as an obstacle rather than a partner.
Apart from the United Arab Emirates, there appears to be little appetite in the region to advance such a project while Netanyahu and Israel’s far right government remain in power.
This context gives greater significance to Trump’s recent comment that he does not expect Netanyahu to run in Israel’s next election.
For Netanyahu, the remark was more than a source of concern.
It was a warning.
A Difficult Reality for Netanyahu
Once an agreement between Iran and the United States is finalised, Netanyahu will find it extremely difficult to oppose it.
He is unlikely to attack Iran alone.
He will not want to provoke an open confrontation with Trump.
Nor would he wish to obstruct an international demand to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and ease pressure on the global economy.
For years, Netanyahu cultivated the image of a leader uniquely capable of influencing Republican administrations, shaping White House policy, understanding Iran, and maintaining a special relationship with Trump.
An agreement between Washington and Tehran could dismantle that image entirely.
When the war began, Netanyahu did not promise limited tactical gains.
He promised the collapse of the Iranian government, the destruction of its nuclear and missile capabilities, and the severing of its regional alliances.
At the very least, this is how much of the Israeli public understood his rhetoric.
His speeches repeatedly invoked ideas such as decisive victory, absolute triumph, and reshaping the Middle East.
Instead, Iran’s missile production capacity was damaged but not destroyed.
A number of military leaders were assassinated but quickly replaced.
Some of the new figures are widely viewed as more hardline than their predecessors.
At the same time, the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within Iran’s political system has grown.
An Agreement That Cannot Be Sold
Netanyahu understands that the Israeli public has spent recent months hearing promises that this war would end differently.
In such an environment, selling a temporary agreement as a victory will be extraordinarily difficult.
His opponents are likely to expose the gap between his promises and the outcome before an Israeli society that is exhausted, frustrated, and searching for answers.
Many will ask why they were promised a historic ending only to arrive at yet another transitional phase.
Even if Netanyahu attempts to regain political momentum through escalation in Lebanon, Gaza, or Syria, there are growing signs that the Israeli public is becoming weary of war.
A new confrontation, involving more military casualties, further mobilisation of reservists, and additional economic damage, may do little to improve his electoral prospects.
For this reason, Netanyahu finds himself trapped.
He faces an agreement he considers harmful, yet cannot easily sell to the public or sabotage outright.
And trying to compensate through another battlefield may no longer be politically viable.
