The US-Israeli war against Iran and its far-reaching consequences for energy markets and the global economy have prompted regional and international powers to rethink trade routes and supply chains.
The transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a political pressure point at the centre of the conflict has exposed the vulnerabilities of relying heavily on traditional maritime routes. As a result, governments are increasingly searching for alternative corridors that offer greater resilience and strategic flexibility.
One proposal gaining attention is a land corridor linking the Gulf to Europe through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. More than just a new trade route, the project could reshape regional geopolitics by redefining transit networks, shifting economic influence and elevating the strategic importance of the countries through which it passes.
The proposal has generated visible concern in Israel, where Hebrew media outlets have warned about a project partially based on reviving sections of the historic Hejaz Railway. Israeli newspapers describe it as a route that “bypasses Israel” and competes directly with the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, which Tel Aviv sees as central to its ambitions of becoming a major trade and logistics hub between the Gulf and Europe.
If translated into practical steps, despite the political, security and financial challenges it faces, the project would not simply become another commercial corridor. It could alter the regional balance of influence by placing new actors at the heart of trade, logistics and energy networks.
So what do we know about this corridor? Can it move from concept to reality? What obstacles stand in its way? And why does Israel see it as a threat to its role in shaping the region’s future trade routes?
What Is the Proposed Corridor?
At its core, the project envisions a two way land connection between the Gulf and Europe.
In the westbound direction, goods would move through Saudi transport networks before crossing into Jordan via Aqaba. From there, shipments would pass through Syria, likely including Damascus and Aleppo, over a distance of approximately 350 kilometres, before entering Turkey’s transport networks and ultimately reaching southern Europe and broader European markets.
The eastbound route would follow the same path in reverse, with the possibility of future expansion from Saudi Arabia to other Gulf countries and Oman on the Indian Ocean.
The project consists of two main components.
The first, and strategically more significant, is a railway system capable of moving larger volumes of cargo at lower cost and with greater efficiency than conventional road transport.
However, this option faces a major challenge: deteriorating railway infrastructure, particularly inside Syria, where large sections would require rehabilitation.
The second component is road transport using trucks.
This option could be implemented more quickly if border crossings are secured and customs and security procedures are coordinated among the participating countries.
For that reason, the corridor could begin as a limited road transport route before gradually evolving into a more stable and competitive rail network.
Several reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have already signed memorandums of understanding covering railways and logistics.
This suggests the project has moved beyond a purely political idea or theoretical proposal and entered the realm of preliminary agreements and technical studies that may pave the way for more serious planning.
Its significance lies in offering a land route between Asia and Europe without passing through Israel or relying on Haifa Port.
It also reduces, at least partially, dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
More broadly, the corridor is not limited to Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Future expansion could include the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, transforming it into a wider Gulf-Europe corridor capable of reshaping trade and transport across the region.
Major Logistics and Economic Potential
The corridor’s first major advantage is logistical.
If fully operational, it would provide an alternative route for trade between Asia and Europe, reducing reliance on traditional corridors that have increasingly become exposed to political pressure and security risks.
Some maritime routes have become geopolitical bargaining chips, while others face recurring military tensions.
Relying solely on them is increasingly seen as a strategic vulnerability.
Beyond that, the project offers significant benefits to the countries located along its path.
Turkey’s Strategic Opportunity
Turkey is expected to be one of the main beneficiaries.
As the final gateway to Europe, Ankara could generate revenues from transit fees, railway operations and logistics services, while linking its ports and industrial zones to regional transport networks.
The benefits are not merely financial.
The corridor would expand Turkey’s economic influence across Syria, Jordan and the Gulf, reinforcing its ambition to become a major logistics platform connecting East and West.
It could also deepen Turkish economic involvement in Syria and integrate future reconstruction efforts with Turkish transport infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia’s Diversification Strategy
Saudi Arabia also stands to gain significantly.
The corridor would support Riyadh’s ambitions to transform itself from a major energy producer into a logistics hub connecting Asia and Europe.
This aligns with broader efforts to diversify the economy and strengthen Saudi Arabia’s role in global supply chains.
The route would also provide an alternative to maritime shipping in the event of disruptions or rising insurance and transport costs caused by tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab or the Red Sea.
Syria’s Return as a Transit State
For Syria, the project could restore part of its historic role as a land bridge between Turkey and the Gulf.
Its geographic position naturally lends itself to such a role.
However, Syria’s ability to benefit depends heavily on securing roads and border crossings, rebuilding damaged transport and railway infrastructure, and overcoming political and economic obstacles linked to sanctions and the investment climate.
Jordan as the Connecting Link
Jordan occupies a critical position in the proposed network.
As the link between Saudi Arabia and Syria, it is essential to any overland connection between the Gulf, Turkey and Europe.
Participation in the project could strengthen Jordan’s role in transit trade and create new opportunities in transport, logistics and storage services, particularly if the corridor connects with Amman and Aqaba.
Why Is Israel Concerned?
Israel is watching the political, economic and security changes unfolding across the region with growing unease.
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, alternative projects and regional corridors emerging outside traditional frameworks have attracted particular attention in Tel Aviv.
For Israel, this is not merely about a new trade route.
It concerns its place within the regional order and its ability to remain a central player in transport, trade and energy networks.
The Turkish-Saudi corridor through Syria and Jordan challenges one of the key assumptions underlying Israel’s major economic normalisation projects.
That assumption is the transformation of Israel into the main bridge connecting the Gulf with Europe.
The most prominent example is IMEC, announced in 2023 with American and Western backing.
The project envisages linking India to the Gulf and then through Jordan and Israel to Europe, with Haifa Port serving as a major logistics hub.
The Turkish-Saudi corridor offers an almost opposite vision.
If realised, Gulf-European trade could move through Jordan, Syria and Turkey rather than a route centred on Israel.
The implications go beyond economics.
Israel would not only lose potential revenues from ports and logistics services, but could also see a reduction in the geopolitical influence it has sought to build through infrastructure and economic integration.
A Changing Regional Order
The sensitivity surrounding this project becomes even greater when viewed alongside wider regional developments.
Alternative corridors and new networks of cooperation are emerging beyond the frameworks traditionally shaped by Washington and Tel Aviv.
Israel, which benefited for decades from a relatively fixed regional landscape and traditional arrangements that limited alternative options, now faces a more fluid environment.
Economics, geography and energy are increasingly intertwined with shifting alliances and new centres of influence.
For that reason, Israel’s concern is not solely about the corridor itself.
It is about the broader possibility of a regional order in which Israel is no longer at the centre and where major routes do not necessarily pass through its territory.
From Tel Aviv’s perspective, this could represent a strategic shift that limits its ability to use economic integration and infrastructure as tools for consolidating regional influence.
The Challenges Ahead
Despite the growing discussion surrounding it, the corridor remains far from becoming a fully operational project.
At present, it exists mainly as a series of preliminary agreements, technical discussions and memorandums of understanding.
Although Saudi Arabia and Turkey have signed cooperation agreements in railways and logistics, and transport understandings were reached between Turkey, Jordan and Syria in April, the corridor has yet to become a physical reality.
A long list of obstacles remains.
The first is infrastructure.
Large sections of the route, particularly in Syria, require major rehabilitation of roads, border crossings and rail networks.
Such efforts demand substantial investment, long term political commitment and close coordination among participating countries.
Security is another critical factor.
A stable commercial corridor cannot function without secure routes and reliable border management.
Legal and diplomatic challenges are equally significant.
A project of this scale requires more than infrastructure.
It needs harmonised customs procedures, security coordination, international recognition, transit regulations and insurance frameworks capable of giving businesses and investors confidence.
There is also a political challenge.
Israel does not view the corridor as an ordinary transport route.
It sees it as a potential challenge to its logistics ambitions and to the role it has sought to establish within Gulf-Europe connectivity projects.
As a result, the corridor could face political pressure or attempts at obstruction, directly or indirectly, from Israel or other actors whose interests overlap with it.
This means that advancing the project will require sophisticated diplomacy and regional understandings capable of shielding it from becoming another arena of geopolitical rivalry.
More Than a Trade Route
Regardless of the obstacles ahead, the corridor reflects a deeper shift in how regional powers view their future.
After decades of operating within pre-existing geopolitical maps that limited their options and influence, several countries are seeking more independent paths.
They are exploring alternative corridors, building regional partnerships and using geography as a strategic asset rather than merely a fixed reality.
These developments cannot be separated from the wider geopolitical uncertainty affecting both the regional and international order.
Old frameworks no longer provide the same guarantees.
Remaining dependent on traditional systems is increasingly viewed as risky.
From this perspective, the significance of the corridor lies not only in its potential as a trade route between Asia and Europe.
It represents a regional desire to break away from old constraints and move from being subjects of existing maps to active participants in drawing new ones.
Countries that recognise the value of their geography early and successfully transform it into economic and political influence will be better positioned in the emerging order.
Perhaps this is why the remarks made by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the recent Davos forum resonate so strongly.
As he spoke about the decline of the traditional order and the rise of regional alliances, he captured a central reality of this transition:
Countries that fail to secure a seat at the table may eventually find themselves on the menu.
