Following escalating Israeli threats to strike Beirut’s southern suburbs, and Iranian threats to target Israel in response to the massacres carried out by the occupation army in Lebanon, alongside Tehran’s announcement that it was suspending negotiations with Washington, US President Donald Trump unveiled a ceasefire initiative aimed at halting the confrontation.
The Israeli side, however, opposed a comprehensive ceasefire and instead proposed a new formula for a limited truce based on the equation of “Dahiyeh for the northern settlements”. Under this proposal, attacks targeting northern occupied Palestine would be met with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Although Hezbollah rejected the proposal and continued to insist on a nationwide ceasefire covering all of Lebanon, Israel’s willingness to present such an equation reflects a significant shift from the realities that characterised the period between 2024 and 2026.
The Evolution of Deterrence Equations
Since 1996, the conflict between Lebanon and Israel has largely operated within rules of engagement shaped by developments on the ground.
These equations began to take form through the April Understanding, which established the principle of “civilian for civilian”, effectively seeking to spare civilians in Lebanon in exchange for sparing civilians in Israel.
The July War of 2006 later produced a broader framework of mutual deterrence. Hezbollah established a deterrence model based on strategic pain, whereby each side possessed the capability to inflict significant damage on the other. This contributed to a prolonged period of relative calm and stability along the border and helped prevent major wars or large-scale confrontations.
As Hezbollah’s capabilities expanded and circumstances evolved, these deterrence equations became more sophisticated. They served to regulate the conflict within defined boundaries and helped prevent escalation into a full-scale war through a balance of deterrence that remained largely intact until 7 October 2023.
Nasrallah’s Deterrence Doctrine
Amid ongoing Israeli threats against Lebanon, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah personally articulated the core principles of deterrence.
He warned:
“If you strike Rafic Hariri International Airport, we will strike Ben Gurion Airport. If you target our ports, we will target yours. Our capital for your capital.”
Through his speeches, Nasrallah developed a comprehensive framework for mutual deterrence based on undermining Israel’s ability to exploit its military superiority by threatening its strategic depth and imposing costs significant enough to discourage military adventures in Lebanon.
From that point until 2024, an unwritten but widely understood equation prevailed: any comprehensive war would result in devastation on both sides, not on one side alone.
The Collapse of Previous Equations
Between 2024 and 2026, Israel effectively shattered all previous deterrence arrangements.
It launched a large-scale war against Lebanon and assassinated senior Hezbollah leaders, including Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, crossing lines that had previously been considered untouchable.
When the war concluded, it became evident that deterrence had largely disappeared.
Israel no longer limited itself to responding to attacks or waiting for escalation before retaliating. Instead, it sought to impose a new framework based on unrestricted operational freedom inside Lebanon, preventive strikes, and attacks justified by alleged intentions or planning.
Under the broad banner of eliminating potential threats, these concepts institutionalised Israeli military superiority and created a situation in which Lebanon was subjected to repeated violations while Hezbollah remained focused on rebuilding its capabilities.
The New Equation: Dahiyeh for the North
Today, Israeli officials are advancing a new formula: “Dahiyeh for the northern settlements”.
Under this framework, any attack on northern Israel would trigger strikes against Hezbollah’s primary stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Although Hezbollah has rejected the proposal, the mere fact that Israel is presenting such an equation marks a relative shift in behaviour compared with the period between 2024 and 2026.
The reintroduction of a deterrence equation effectively means reconnecting military action with consequences. It signals a move away from the logic of unrestricted military freedom and towards an attempt to regulate confrontation through defined rules.
This development appears linked to the resistance’s ability to impose costs on Israeli forces on the battlefield, as well as Israel’s continued difficulties in countering the new generation of drones reportedly possessed by Hezbollah.
A Partial Shift, Not a Full Restoration
This development should not be interpreted as a complete restoration of the deterrence balance that existed before 2023.
However, it does suggest a partial Israeli retreat from the posture that prevailed before 2 March 2026.
The simple fact that Israel now feels compelled to propose a deterrence equation, even one rejected by Lebanon, points to a notable change that favours Lebanon’s strategic position.
Lebanon cannot enjoy long-term stability unless Israel is effectively deterred, and the return of discussions centred on deterrence formulas indicates that battlefield realities are once again influencing political and military calculations.
Conclusion
Despite this shift, the change remains limited and fragile.
It has not yet developed into the kind of comprehensive and balanced deterrence equation that emerged after the 2006 war. Lebanon has not succeeded in fully re-establishing the red lines that previously governed the conflict.
Nevertheless, developments on the ground have imposed costs on Israel significant enough to force a return to the language of deterrence equations, something that Israeli decision-makers would not have accepted only three months ago.
