Despite optimistic statements suggesting that Washington and Tehran are close to reaching a temporary memorandum of understanding to halt the conflict for 60 days, the timing of any formal announcement remains unclear.
The proposed arrangement reportedly includes reopening the Strait of Hormuz, allowing Iran to resume oil exports, and launching a negotiating track over Tehran’s nuclear programme.
The uncertainty surrounding the announcement intensified after US President Donald Trump stated on his Truth Social platform that the American blockade on Iranian ports and vessels in the Strait of Hormuz “will remain fully in force until an agreement is reached, formally approved and signed”.
Political analysts and academics told Al Jazeera Net that deep mistrust between Washington and Tehran, inflated expectations on both sides, disputes over frozen Iranian assets and Iranian sovereignty in the Strait of Hormuz, along with Israeli attempts to obstruct the agreement, are all contributing to the delay.
Analysts Reza Ghibishawi and Osama Abu Irshaid said Iran continues to insist on a formula granting it authority to regulate navigation through the Strait of Hormuz without imposing transit fees, a position rejected by Washington.
The United States is also reportedly linking sanctions relief to progress in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, which analysts Qamar Cheema and Abdul Hamid Siam described as the central unresolved obstacle from the American perspective.
Deep Distrust and Conflicting Expectations
Political analyst Reza Ghibishawi said the delay stems primarily from deep and accumulated mistrust between the two sides, a view echoed by analyst Osama Abu Irshaid, who pointed to sharply different expectations regarding the agreement.
According to Abu Irshaid, the main disputes revolve around the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, lifting the blockade on Iranian ports, and Tehran’s demand for compensation or the release of part of its frozen overseas assets.
Iran insists on maintaining sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and managing maritime traffic there, while Washington rejects any arrangement granting Tehran such authority.
Abu Irshaid added that Washington also refuses to lift sanctions, remove the blockade, or unfreeze Iranian assets independently of progress on the nuclear file.
Ghibishawi explained that Tehran believes any advancement in nuclear negotiations must be accompanied by binding political, economic and legal guarantees preventing future American administrations from withdrawing from the deal, as happened in 2018. Washington reportedly considers such guarantees difficult to provide.
Qamar Cheema argued that the main unresolved issue remains the nuclear file itself, while Rutgers University professor Abdul Hamid Siam said several matters remain unsettled, including the final framework expected after the proposed 60 day period.
Cheema suggested that Iran may already have offered significant concessions, citing Trump’s remarks that discussions were moving in a positive direction.
Nuclear Programme Remains the Core Obstacle
According to Abu Irshaid, Iran’s concessions may include reopening the Strait of Hormuz without conditions and accepting the lifting of restrictions on Iranian ports in exchange.
He added that Tehran could also pledge not only to refrain from developing nuclear weapons but potentially accept dismantling parts of its nuclear programme and surrendering enriched uranium stockpiles.
However, Washington reportedly insists on receiving Iran’s uranium enriched to 60 percent. Some reports suggest Tehran may agree to transfer the material to a third party rather than directly to the United States, provided it would be returned if negotiations collapse.
Ghibishawi said the United States wants enriched uranium reserves removed entirely from Iran, while Tehran continues to reject direct surrender to Washington. Abu Irshaid added that the United States seeks direct control and destruction of the material.
Disagreements also remain over whether Iran would retain any uranium enrichment capability, even at the civilian level of 3.67 percent.
Ghibishawi said disputes also extend to the nature and scope of sanctions relief, including whether only nuclear related sanctions would be removed or if measures linked to terrorism and human rights accusations would also be addressed.
Frozen Assets and Arab Normalisation
Ghibishawi stated that another major obstacle concerns the amount of Iranian funds to be released and the mechanism for transferring them back to Tehran.
He noted that Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Nasser Hemmati travelled to Doha as part of mediation efforts aimed at resolving the issue.
Siam pointed to opposition voices within the Republican Party and pro Israel circles in Washington as another factor complicating the process.
He referenced Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who criticised the proposed arrangement as a major concession to Iran and accused Trump of retreating from previous positions.
According to Siam, Trump attempted to offset criticism by linking support for the agreement to expanded Arab and Muslim normalisation with Israel, an approach publicly rejected by Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh reaffirmed in an official statement that normalisation with Israel would only be possible after a clear and genuine path towards a two state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Cheema suggested that some figures close to Trump may be pushing for further concessions from Tehran before approving any announcement.
He also argued that a broader regional arrangement benefiting Israel appears to remain one of Trump’s conditions for moving forward, although Siam noted that such a clause does not appear to be present at this stage.
Israeli Pressure and Escalation
Ghibishawi said Israeli influence is strongly present behind delays to the agreement, arguing that Israel sees any nuclear deal with Iran as an existential threat unless it guarantees the complete dismantling of Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.
He added that Israel is pressuring Washington through pro Israel lobbying networks in an effort to prevent concessions.
Cheema and Siam agreed that Israeli influence over American decision making is undeniable, arguing that Trump continues listening closely to Israeli leadership and its allies in Washington.
According to Siam, Israel does not want the conflict to end under the current framework and instead seeks the continuation of pressure until the Iranian system itself is fundamentally weakened or transformed into one more aligned with Israeli interests.
Abu Irshaid, however, argued that Israeli opposition alone is unlikely to determine Trump’s position. He said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu still possesses the ability to manoeuvre politically or exploit failures to reignite tensions between Washington and Tehran.
He added that Trump remains highly motivated to secure a diplomatic victory after failing to achieve a decisive military outcome, particularly as midterm elections approach and criticism within Republican circles intensifies.
According to Abu Irshaid, Trump is seeking a “respectable victory formula” while attempting to avoid portraying the agreement as a repeat of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Possible Compromises
Abu Irshaid said several creative options remain available to overcome the obstacles, including transferring enriched uranium to a third country such as Russia, similar to arrangements under the 2015 agreement, provided the material would be returned if the United States violated its commitments.
Regarding nuclear facilities, he suggested a compromise could involve suspending enrichment activities for a fixed period rather than dismantling infrastructure entirely.
Iran reportedly proposed a 15 year suspension period, while Washington seeks 20 years.
Abu Irshaid added that Iran’s ballistic missile programme and regional alliance network are currently not included in negotiations, something he said continues to anger Israel.
Ghibishawi stressed that overcoming the obstacles requires understanding Iran’s strategic mindset regarding nuclear activities, the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.
He argued that success depends on strong political will from both sides and a gradual “step for step” approach instead of attempting a sudden comprehensive agreement.
He also called for separating regional disputes from the nuclear file in order to reach technical understandings first.
Cheema said progress remains possible if all sides lower their expectations and provide broader guarantees and confidence building measures.
Siam argued that both countries now share an interest in overcoming the current deadlock and predicted that Trump may soon offer reassurances to Republican figures that he will not abandon Israel while simultaneously offering incentives linked to wider normalisation efforts.
When Could the Agreement Be Announced?
Although the timing remains uncertain, Ghibishawi said signs of a breakthrough could emerge by the end of the current week, though all scenarios remain possible depending on developments on the ground.
Abu Irshaid agreed, suggesting that both sides may ultimately prefer informal understandings or temporary de escalation arrangements over a fully formalised agreement in the near term.
He added that both Washington and Tehran have reasons to end the confrontation. Trump needs a politically acceptable exit strategy, while Iran faces severe economic pressure and urgently requires oil exports and access to frozen assets to ease domestic tensions.
Siam and Cheema were more cautious, arguing that no one can confidently predict when an announcement may come.
Siam noted that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said from New Delhi that an agreement could potentially be signed on Monday, though nothing had been confirmed.
He also cited Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei, who stated that an agreement had been reached in principle but warned that anyone claiming the signing would happen on schedule “would be mistaken”.
Despite widespread optimism from Iranian, American and even Pakistani officials suggesting that a temporary agreement is nearly ready, analysts cautioned that renewed Israeli escalation in Lebanon could negatively affect the atmosphere surrounding negotiations.
According to Axios, the proposed temporary agreement would include keeping the Strait of Hormuz open without transit fees, easing restrictions on Iranian ports, granting exemptions for oil exports, ending confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and securing Iranian commitments not to develop nuclear weapons while engaging in talks over suspending uranium enrichment.
Political analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera Net concluded that excessive expectations from both Washington and Tehran, combined with disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, frozen assets, Israeli interference and unresolved disagreements surrounding the nuclear file, have all contributed to delaying the signing of the agreement, despite growing expectations that an announcement could come by the end of the week.
