As the United States and the occupation fail to decisively end the war against Iran or bring down its leadership, new proposals have emerged within the US administration centred on seizing Iran’s enriched uranium and transferring it abroad.
This idea has surfaced through official statements and media leaks, framed as part of potential conditions to end the war. However, it raises a critical question: is this merely a pressure tactic to force Iran into negotiations, or a genuine military option targeting the nuclear material itself?
Key Leaks on Seizing Enriched Uranium
A series of US media reports have outlined the evolving proposal:
- The Wall Street Journal reported in late March that Donald Trump is considering a military operation to extract approximately 1,000 pounds, around 454 kilograms, of enriched uranium from Iran, though no final decision has been made. Officials noted that while risks to US forces remain a concern, the plan is still under consideration due to its alignment with Washington’s goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Bloomberg reported earlier that the Trump administration is evaluating the deployment of special forces on the ground to confiscate Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, particularly given that airstrikes alone cannot eliminate the nuclear material itself.
- The Washington Post revealed details of a leaked 15-point plan to end the war. The proposal includes large-scale sanctions relief in exchange for the complete removal of enriched uranium, dismantling enrichment capabilities, restricting Iran’s ballistic missile program, and halting support for armed groups in the region.
- Reuters cited sources within the Israeli cabinet indicating that the proposal was relayed to Iran through Pakistan, and similarly includes the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.
Despite these discussions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed after 20 days of war that Iran could no longer enrich uranium or produce missiles, though he provided no evidence.
In contrast, Rafael Grossi stated that many of Iran’s nuclear capabilities have survived the attacks, emphasising that the country still retains both the knowledge and industrial capacity to continue enrichment.
What Do We Know About Iran’s Uranium Stockpile?
Understanding the current complexity of Iran’s stockpile requires revisiting the last verified assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency before the major strikes on nuclear facilities in June 2025.
Before the 12-day confrontation, the agency estimated that Iran possessed 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium across various levels. This included 440.9 kilograms enriched to 60%, a level approaching weapons-grade material. Most of this stockpile was stored as uranium hexafluoride, known as UF₆, inside large steel cylinders.
According to the report, uranium enriched to 20% and 60% was stored in an underground tunnel complex in Isfahan. The agency had observed consistent vehicle movement near the tunnel entrance but was denied access. Following the attacks, inspectors withdrew and have since been unable to verify the condition of the stockpile.
A March 2026 report by the agency’s director confirmed that while Iran still allows access to unaffected facilities, it has refused inspections of sites that were bombed or the materials within them. As a result, the agency has not had access to declared uranium stockpiles for over eight months and cannot confirm whether enrichment activities have ceased or whether the stockpile remains intact.
Despite this uncertainty, Grossi indicated on 9 March 2026 that most of the uranium enriched to 60%, slightly over 200 kilograms, was not destroyed. He noted that these quantities remain in the Isfahan complex, which did not suffer major damage, while additional material is believed to be stored at Natanz, where some destruction may have occurred.
Another Reuters report, citing intelligence sources, suggested that the Isfahan stockpile was stored in tunnels beneath a mountain. Airstrikes may have collapsed tunnel entrances, but the steel cylinders themselves likely remained intact. This explains Washington’s focus on removing the material rather than attempting to destroy it, as eliminating infrastructure does not necessarily eliminate the nuclear material.
Some US military officials also believe that Iran may have relocated part of the stockpile to undisclosed locations before the attacks.
Why This Would Be One of the Most Dangerous Military Operations
Seizing enriched uranium differs fundamentally from bombing a nuclear facility. The former targets hazardous chemical material stored in sealed cylinders deep within fortified tunnels, while the latter targets infrastructure.
According to a report by CBS News, UF₆ cylinders contain material that transforms into toxic gas upon exposure to air. This means that any direct strike could result in widespread contamination.
If a foreign force were to attempt seizure instead of destruction, the operation would involve multiple complex stages:
1. Accessing the Site
The Isfahan complex is located in a fortified mountainous area under heavy security. Military experts indicated that special forces would need to infiltrate or breach the site after neutralising surface defences, potentially requiring heavy engineering equipment to clear debris and reinforced structures.
2. Securing the Material
Once inside, forces would need to prevent Iranian attempts to recover or destroy the stockpile. This would require a large-scale military perimeter and aerial support to defend against missile and drone attacks. Experts estimate that more than 1,000 troops may be required to secure the area and manage operations.
3. Handling and Transport
UF₆ cylinders weigh hundreds of kilograms and require specialised equipment for safe handling and transport. By comparison, during Project Sapphire in 1994, the United States removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan in a peacetime operation that required weeks of planning, heavy transport aircraft, and international coordination.
4. Extraction from Iran
Even if the material is successfully loaded, the extraction phase presents the highest risk. Once the element of surprise is lost, the operation becomes highly vulnerable to attack. Aircraft or ground convoys would need to travel long distances under threat from Iranian missiles and drones.
A separate analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies outlines additional requirements for success, including precise intelligence on stockpile locations, complete air superiority, prior coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and potentially hundreds or thousands of personnel. It also stresses the need for full control over Iranian airspace and air defence systems.
The chemical risks remain significant. UF₆ can decompose into toxic hydrogen fluoride gas if exposed to air, raising the possibility of a severe environmental and public health disaster in the event of accidental release.
Pressure Tactic or Real Military Option?
Given the extreme risks, some analysts believe that the threat of seizing enriched uranium is primarily a strategic pressure tool aimed at forcing Iran into an agreement. Such a deal could involve transferring its stockpile under international supervision or reducing enrichment levels to a lower threshold.
However, the continued discussion of this option within US policy circles suggests that it remains on the table not only as leverage, but as a potential operational plan in the event diplomacy fails.
