As the war between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other enters its third week, the contours of the confrontation and its strategic trajectories are becoming clearer. Military operations continue to escalate while the conflict expands across multiple areas of the Middle East, amid analyses suggesting a gradual shift in the war aims of the parties involved.
According to data presented in an analysis broadcast by Al Jazeera, the war recorded more than 41,000 American and Israeli attacks over two weeks targeting around 6,000 sites inside Iran. In response, Tehran launched successive waves of missiles and drones toward Israel and targets linked to the United States in the region, carrying out approximately 51 attack waves.
The data indicates that American and Israeli strikes concentrated primarily on western Iran, a region that hosts a large number of military and economic installations, as well as sites linked to Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.
In contrast, Iranian strikes targeted the Israeli interior, with a particular focus on central Israel, especially the greater Tel Aviv area, which represents Israel’s main economic and political centre. Targets were also struck further south reaching the city of Eilat.
Military operations also extended to Lebanon, where Israel intensified its strikes on the south, the Bekaa Valley, and areas north of the Litani River, reaching the southern suburbs of Beirut. At the same time, Hezbollah continued launching rockets and drones toward northern Israel.
These confrontations have created severe humanitarian consequences inside Lebanon, where estimates indicate that more than 1.2 million people have been displaced from their homes as a result of the continuous bombardment.
Strategy of Raising the Cost
Mahjoob Zweiri, an academic and expert in Middle East policy, argues that the war began with what he described as a “surplus of force” by the United States and Israel, represented in the targeting of the highest levels of Iran’s political and military leadership at the beginning of the confrontation.
However, Tehran quickly responded, according to Zweiri, with a strategy aimed at expanding the scope of the conflict and increasing its cost, not only for Iran but also for the region and the wider world. This was pursued by opening multiple fronts and triggering concerns related to global energy security.
He explained that Iran expanded its operations across several regional fronts, while the United States and Israel broadened their strikes to cover most of Iran’s geography, targeting military capabilities, missile infrastructure, and facilities linked to the nuclear program.
Zweiri notes that battlefield developments gradually pushed Washington to adjust its objectives, shifting from the goal of toppling the Iranian system to focusing instead on weakening it.
He attributes this shift to the speed and geographical scale of the Iranian response, in addition to fears of global economic repercussions related to energy markets, as well as increasing international pressure on the American administration to halt the war.
Reshaping the Middle East
Regarding Israel, Zweiri believes that it entered the war within a broader vision of what it calls “reshaping the Middle East”, an attempt to reduce Iran’s regional influence and reorganise the balance of power in the region.
However, over time Tel Aviv realised the difficulty of achieving the goal of toppling the Iranian system, particularly after Tehran managed to quickly reorganise its leadership structure following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in addition to the continued cohesion of its political and military institutions.
Zweiri emphasises that the Iranian strategy relied on three primary elements:
The country’s vast geography.
Control over vital energy routes such as the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s role as an influential oil power in global markets.
At the same time, the Iranian leadership sought to demonstrate political cohesion, which according to the analysis was reflected in the public appearance of senior officials during Quds Day events in Tehran.
Zweiri suggests that the war may continue until the three parties involved, the United States, Israel, and Iran, recognise that none of them can achieve all of their objectives. This realisation could ultimately lead them to redefine the meaning of “victory” and “defeat” in this confrontation.
According to his assessment, such recognition could open the door to ending the fighting, though it may take additional time, as each side still believes it possesses a surplus of power that can be used to secure battlefield or political gains.
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