The year 2025 witnessed the twelve-day war between Iran and the occupying state, a negotiation track between the latter and Syria that did not reach an outcome, and the announcement of a ceasefire in Gaza. At its conclusion, Trump meets with Netanyahu to discuss the second phase of the American president’s plan regarding the Gaza Strip.
Based on these facts and starting points, it would be assumed that 2026 would be a year of calm and relative stability and the end of the war in its previous form. However, a number of indicators point to the exact opposite. That is, it may be a year of renewed war, perhaps more violent, especially at the regional level.
First, it should not be overlooked that the Israeli security doctrine has changed after Al Aqsa Flood. It is now based on striking any potential threat before it emerges, and not allowing any infrastructure or readiness that could make the scenario of 7 October 2023 repeatable by any party. This has driven and continues to drive offensive military adventures in the region, without regard for the Sykes-Picot borders, as stated by the American envoy to Syria and Lebanon and ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack.
Based on this new vision, Israel views several wars it has fought and attacks it has launched as unfinished missions that must be completed, particularly in Lebanon and Iran. Hezbollah suffered a severe blow but was not eliminated, while the Iranian system did not fall, and its nuclear and missile projects were not destroyed.
The occupying state also believes that it has already been subjected to the maximum level of blame, condemnation, and pressure, including legal proceedings against it and its leaders before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. This means that additional wars will not cost it further pressure, especially given the unprecedented support of the Trump administration. Trump may at times differ with Netanyahu on details related to timing, method, and rhetoric, but they agree on the goals of war, their view of the region, and the necessity of Israel’s victory.
In addition, the proposed defence budget submitted to the Knesset, amounting to 34.5 billion US dollars, with a significant increase over the 2023 budget and a slight increase of around 5% even over 2025, which was a year of halted war, should be viewed as a war budget rather than one of stability.
In this context, it is important to point to repeated Israeli reports about Hezbollah’s efforts to repair its losses and enhance its capabilities. These reports sometimes include deliberate exaggerations to justify continued violations of the current ceasefire and to serve as a pretext for exhausting the group or launching a future war against it. The Israeli tone toward Iran also continues to signal a second war. Attention was drawn to a video prepared using artificial intelligence that Netanyahu’s account posted days ago on Instagram, showing him with Trump aboard the American B-2 stealth bomber that was used to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities months ago.
On the other hand, the wars launched by Israel in the region remain largely open fronts that were not properly closed. They remain like mines waiting to explode or fuses ready to ignite. This is reinforced by the fact that what Trump presents to the region is closer to imposing conditions of surrender, submission, and compliance, which provokes anger and reaction rather than silence or acceptance, even in the long term.
From this perspective, the summit that will bring Netanyahu and Trump together must be viewed with great seriousness, apprehension, and caution. They previously met before the announcement of the ceasefire in Gaza, where they jointly shaped the provisions of Trump’s plan that he later announced. Now they meet again before the announcement of the contours of the second phase of the plan or agreement. In addition, the summit will certainly include discussion of regional conditions in general, specifically those related to Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Syria.
In another context, tension between Turkey and Israel has been increasing over time. Israel classified Turkey for the first time as a threat in 2020. Earlier this year, the Nagel Committee, linked to the Israeli government, recommended preparing for a military confrontation with Turkey within years, against the backdrop of tensions between the two sides following the flood and developments in Syria.
For its part, Ankara has come to view the expanding Israeli aggression in the region as a direct threat. Erdogan expressed this in his well-known statement that its forces are two and a half hours from our borders. This was followed by a closed session of the Turkish parliament to discuss ways to confront the Israeli threat. In addition, the lessons Ankara drew from the Iranian Israeli confrontation focused on how to strengthen its own power in the face of any potential Israeli aggression, concentrating on Iranian weaknesses rather than Israeli ones.
When Erdogan stated months ago the need to strengthen his country so that Israel cannot do to it what it does to the Palestinians, recalling Turkey’s interventions in Libya and Karabakh, Katz threatened him with the fate of Saddam Hussein. While Israel does not want Turkey to participate in an international stabilisation force in Gaza so that it does not encircle it from the north and south, it seeks to encircle and target Turkey by offering support to the Syrian Democratic Forces and deepening cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. The three parties announced at their recent summit in occupied Jerusalem the formation of a rapid military intervention force in the eastern Mediterranean, clearly directed against Ankara.
As competition between the two sides has taken on an escalatory character in Syria, Israeli forces bombed a military base that Ankara was studying the possibility of deploying forces to in agreement with Damascus. Israel also announced the retrieval of Turkish surveillance systems from Syria. Turkey, meanwhile, views Israel’s recognition of the independence of the Somaliland region as a direct threat to its presence in Somalia and its interests in the Horn of Africa more broadly.
The conclusion of all this is that despite Turkey’s keenness to avoid or delay confrontation with Israel, and despite the unlikelihood of a direct military confrontation between them in the near term, an indirect but more intense and heated confrontation in Syria has become a likely possibility recently. This is regardless of whether its trigger is related to the SDF file, targeting Syrian leadership, or other factors.
In summary, Trump’s talk of a stable Middle East is no more than an unworkable slogan detached from an understanding of the region’s dynamics and realities. What the American president means by stability is closer to submission and surrender to full Israeli influence in the region, something several parties will not accept.
Contrary to Trump’s claims and calls, it is more likely that the region will return to the logic of war, aggression, and confrontation rather than calm, stability, and investment. This time, confrontations will be more violent and with higher ceilings, as they seek to achieve objectives that previous confrontations failed to realise, such as eliminating Hezbollah or toppling the Iranian system.
From this specific angle, the Trump-Netanyahu summit with the war criminal Netanyahu should be monitored, followed, and scrutinised closely, particularly the idea of trading any steps in Gaza for a green light to military adventures in the region.
