The region is approaching a decisive political and security moment, as anticipation builds around an expected meeting between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. This meeting is no longer read as an ordinary diplomatic protocol, but rather as a gathering that could shape the boundaries of the next military round in the Middle East. The current escalation is no longer about whether confrontation is possible, but about its form, timing, limits, and who will hold the decision to ignite it or restrain it.
The meeting is expected to take place in Florida, outside the formal framework of the White House, a step that reflects Trump’s desire to manage the discussion in a political space less constrained by declared commitments and more open to flexible or even ambiguous decisions. The choice of Florida carries both political and security dimensions. It allows Trump to hear the Israeli position without appearing to have granted a green light in advance, and it enables Netanyahu to present his security file away from the pressure of traditional American institutions, at an exceptionally sensitive regional moment.
At the core of this anticipated meeting, the Iranian nuclear issue no longer occupies the forefront as it did in previous years. In current Israeli calculations, the nuclear programme is no longer viewed as the most urgent danger. Instead, Iran’s ballistic missile programme has become the immediate and direct threat. This shift reflects a security assessment that missiles, not the bomb, are the weapon capable of disrupting the Israeli interior, undermining the concept of rapid decisive victory, and imposing a practical deterrence equation even in the absence of nuclear arms.
From here, the question of Israeli defensive readiness becomes a central component of the equation. Throughout 2025, Western warnings have escalated that any prolonged confrontation would place severe pressure on stocks of interceptor missiles, and that sustaining a high interception rate could impose forced rationing if the exchange of strikes drags on. Israel therefore appears to be buying time through overlapping defensive layers. This includes expanding the Arrow 3 system to intercept long range ballistic missiles at the upper tier, and boosting the production of Iron Dome interceptors through manufacturing lines linked to the United States to ensure endurance should the war turn into one of attrition. In the background, a factor emerges that could alter the economics of air defence, namely the Iron Beam defensive laser, designed to reduce interception costs when the sky turns into a contest of density and numbers.
On the other side, the Iranian air defence file stands out as one of the most opaque and complex elements of the confrontation. During the previous round, S 300 systems displayed mixed performance. Despite their deployment around strategic sites, Israeli strikes succeeded in penetrating airspace and reaching their targets, exposing operational and tactical gaps more than an absolute technical failure. The problem was not the system alone, but how it was integrated into a multi layer early warning network and its limited ability to handle composite attacks combining electronic warfare, precision missiles, and long range munitions.
As for the S 400 system, around which much debate has circulated, there have been no confirmed indications of its actual deployment during the previous confrontation. Its absence was not a minor detail, but a reflection of careful calculations. Activating a system of this level would have meant raising the ceiling of confrontation to a strategic level and exposing it to testing or even direct targeting, a politically and militarily costly option. Today, in the event of a new confrontation, the Iranian bet will not be on fully preventing penetration, but on complicating and slowing the attack, absorbing the first strike, dispersing assault waves, and imposing a higher time and munitions cost on the attacker, rather than completely denying access.
Yet Israeli preparedness alone does not determine the shape or duration of war, because the most decisive factor remains the nature of the Iranian response. In recent years, Iran has focused on developing solid fuel missiles to reduce launch time, improve accuracy, and enhance manoeuvrability within the atmosphere to bypass interception systems. These developments do not render Israeli defences ineffective, but they raise the cost of each interception and make any leakage, even if limited, carry significant psychological and political impact.
Within this landscape, a highly sensitive question surfaces. Could Israel move toward targeting Iran’s top leadership, including the Supreme Leader. From a strategic standpoint, this scenario represents a breach of the ultimate red lines. Targeting the head of the system would not be read as a conventional military operation, but as a declaration of an open existential war, potentially pushing Iran toward a comprehensive and unrestrained response and opening the door to broad regional and international involvement. For this reason, most assessments view this option as a political and psychological pressure card rather than a practical, executable choice.
As for the role of allies, any confrontation will not remain purely bilateral. Iran possesses a network of regional relationships capable of influencing the course of the conflict, whether through indirect pressure or by expanding arenas of engagement. At the same time, Iranian decision makers understand that full scale involvement by allies could transform the confrontation into an open regional war, a scenario carrying grave risks even for Tehran itself. Accordingly, this role remains flexible and gradual, tied to the intensity of the first strike and the level of American involvement.
Here, a realistic estimate of the potential duration of war can be offered. If the confrontation remains confined to an exchange of concentrated missile and air strikes without broad regional involvement, it is likely to last from days to a few weeks. Launch tempo, limited stockpiles, and pressure on defences all push the parties toward a rapid ceiling followed by a search for an exit. If it turns into a broader campaign targeting missile production infrastructure, air defence systems, and command centres, it could extend for several weeks, but would most likely end with attempts to impose new rules of engagement rather than sliding into an open ended war.
The worst case scenario is the breakdown of confrontation into a multi track regional war extending to maritime corridors and American bases, placing the Strait of Hormuz at the heart of the storm. In this path, the danger is not limited to rising energy prices, but includes the shaking of global stability and the difficulty for any party to step back without internal political losses, turning the war from a limited operation into a series of successive rounds.
In sum, what is unfolding is no longer a theoretical debate about the possibility of war, but an open race between deterrence and explosion. Each side seeks to convince the other that the next strike will be the last or that its cost will be unbearable. Yet recent experience in the region shows that major wars do not always begin with a declared decision, but with a calculated step that slips out of control.
The Florida meeting may not announce war, but it could lift the ambiguity that prevents it. After it, the question will no longer be whether missiles will be launched, but when, how many, and how far the chain will roll. The sky will be the first testing ground, defences will operate under unprecedented pressure, and regional capitals will watch the countdown aware that any miscalculation could turn a limited round into a regional war with no clear keys to its end.
Thus the region enters truly dangerous days. What comes after the Florida meeting will not resemble what came before, because the missile clock does not operate by the logic of statements, but by the logic of seconds.
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