This Is How Iran’s Spies Operate in “Israel”

At a time when security and military tensions continue between the occupation state and Iran, the latter persists in recruiting more spies within the former. This has become a recurring phenomenon, as Iranian intelligence services recruit Israelis to spy on their behalf, the most recent case involving a soldier serving in compulsory military service.

Arieh Egozi, the security correspondent for the Zman Israel website, revealed that “the Israeli security services do not uncover all of these spies, and therefore the punishment must be extremely severe, otherwise the damage will be immense”. He added that this demonstrates that Iran is preparing for another round of fighting, including a barrage of ballistic missiles, noting that Iranians primarily recruit their spies through mass remote recruitment via social media platforms, messaging applications, and so-called work-from-home websites.

In an article translated by Arabi21, Egozi said that “Iran’s spies in Israel operate using money and ideology, and sometimes through blackmail, then gradually escalate the level of tasks, reaching sabotage and assassination attempts”. He explained that this network is run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Quds Force, and Iranian intelligence, which also operate through criminal networks and intermediaries abroad.

Egozi pointed out that “this network uses applications such as Telegram and WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, as well as high-paying job advertisement sites, attracting Israelis from various segments of society, including Arabs, Jews, foreign workers, and new immigrants”.

He clarified that “some Iranian intelligence referrals come from business figures, human rights organisations, or journalists, and at times referrals pass through Jewish communities and Israelis abroad. The main promise is easy money, ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars, in exchange for tasks such as photographing facilities, checking alertness, or distributing propaganda materials, with payments increasing as the level of risk rises”.

The writer confirmed that “those running this network sometimes exploit feelings of deprivation or internal political hatred among those they attempt to recruit. After the recruit is exposed and carries out security tasks, incriminating material is collected and used for blackmail. If you stop cooperating, we will report you to the General Security Service (Shin Bet). Initially, the tasks are innocent, such as photographing parks, intersections, government offices from the outside, parking lots, or checking a bag or object supposedly left in the field, and immediately sending a video or a selfie for verification”.

He added that “after proving the person’s discipline, the level of tasks is raised to tracking individuals, photographing the homes of security personnel, scientists, or other targets, placing cameras or GPS tracking devices on vehicles, and setting up caches, often money and equipment, in the field. Even a person with basic intelligence must understand what they are getting involved in; therefore, claims of ‘I did not know what I was doing’ are pure nonsense”.

He noted that “in some cases, after several tasks, the handler tests the person’s willingness to move into sabotage and assassination, such as throwing a Molotov cocktail, attempting to harm an Israeli nuclear scientist, or searching for ‘local soldiers’ to carry out a contract killing”.

Egozi stressed that “those targeted by Iran as potential spies are mostly people with no intelligence background: the unemployed, those in debt, youth seeking excitement, local criminals, and sometimes dual nationals, residents of areas under surveillance with entry permits, and so on. The Iranians also exploit internal divisions within Israeli society, between Jews and Arabs, Haredim and secularists, right and left, to create the impression that these operations are ‘political’ or linked to protests, when in reality they are part of an Iranian intelligence system”.

This Israeli monitoring reveals the dangerous state of the escalating phenomenon of spy recruitment. While Israeli security agencies attempt to apprehend those involved, it is doubtful they will succeed 100% of the time. This drives demands for imposing the maximum punishment on those who are exposed and convicted, under the claim that this alone is capable of deterring and curbing the phenomenon. The seriousness of this issue becomes particularly evident when it is claimed that Iran is preparing for another round of attacks on the occupation, using a ballistic missile arsenal it is currently working to build.