In the face of military and political defeats of the Arab regimes, the Arab peoples created their instruments of resistance. Since the 1930s, the Palestinian cause began shifting from the fragility of governments to the resilience of organised movements.
It wasn’t just ideologies and leaders that collapsed during confrontations—conventional Arab armies also failed, and with them, the illusion of state-led liberation. Behind the failures of governments stood the fervour of the people. Behind the weakness of formal militaries rose the courage of emerging resistance forces.
Islamic and nationalist movements filled the vacuum. The Nakba of 1948 revived the concept of jihad. The 1967 defeat unleashed popular initiative and reawakened the spirit of liberation. The 1978 Camp David Accords triggered the rise of armed resistance movements in the early 1980s. Throughout the history of Palestine, two approaches have coexisted: resistance and reconciliation.
The Nakba: A Turning Point of Abandonment
Only a few years after its founding, the Arab League was tested by the Palestinian crisis. Yet it had not been established to liberate Palestine, but rather to paper over the British betrayal of Sharif Hussein. The league’s creation was a substitute for the failed dreams of Arab and Islamic unity—and Palestine was never its true priority.
From its earliest stages, the League’s impotence pushed the cause toward internationalisation. The UN’s Partition Plan of November 1947 laid the groundwork for the Zionist entity and triggered one of the fiercest confrontations in Arab history.
In response, the Arab League formed a volunteer military force known as the Arab Liberation Army, led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. But British pressure swiftly dismantled the project—just as it did to the League’s military committee led by Taha al-Hashimi and General Ismail Safwat Pasha.
Even early military gains were undone by Western maneuvers, such as the first and second truces. The 1948 Nakba became the gateway to Arab defeats—exposing the incompetence and dependence of Arab regimes.
Between internal weakness, subservience to Britain, and outright betrayal, Arab governments refused to seriously confront the Zionist threat. Instead, they begged for solutions from the very imperial powers responsible for the crisis.
Palestine was not the driving force behind Arab policy. The real goal of post-colonial Arab regimes was securing their own rule, not liberating Palestine. These priorities explain the persistent neglect of the Palestinian call for jihad.
Popular Movements and Rejection of State Failure
As Arab regimes faltered, grassroots movements stepped in, before and after the Nakba. In 1946, Michel Aflaq declared:
“Arabs must not wait for a miracle—governments won’t liberate Palestine, only the people can.”
Hassan al-Banna similarly believed the Arab regimes lacked seriousness in resisting Zionism. Kamal al-Sharif plainly stated:
“Nothing good can be expected from these governments.”
Corruption, political repression, and inter-Arab rivalry created the perfect storm for catastrophic defeat.
This growing critique of official Arab positions laid the foundation for transferring the cause from state institutions to popular civil and military actors. In Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee, led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, formed the Holy Jihad Army under Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini.
During the first five months of war, these fighters inflicted significant losses on Zionist militias. But with the intervention of Arab armies on 15 May 1948, came policies aimed at excluding Palestinian fighters from the battlefield, and cutting off their weapons and funding.
In his April 1948 report to the Arab League—just two days before his martyrdom at al-Qastal—Husseini blamed the League for the fall of Palestine, lamenting the delays and negligence of its military committee.
Meanwhile, Arab volunteers flocked to join the struggle, especially the Muslim Brotherhood brigades. Despite crackdowns, Brotherhood units infiltrated into Palestine and fought valiantly in Gaza, Khan Younis, and other key areas. Leaders such as Ahmed Abdelaziz, Abdel Latif Abu Qura, and Mustafa al-Sibai led battles on multiple fronts. Egyptian commander Abd al-Jawad Tabala deployed in Gaza. These groups proved more committed than the official armies. As journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal noted:
“Some of them proved their worth under fire.”
The 1967 Defeat: Resistance is Reborn
On 5 June 1967, Israeli airstrikes obliterated Egypt’s air force in hours, grounding its entire aerial capability. The withdrawal from Sinai was chaotic, leaving Egyptian troops defenceless and exposing the Arab heartland to invasion.
Israel rapidly advanced into Sinai, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, without facing proportional resistance. These dark days became known as “Black June.”
The defeat transformed Palestinian political consciousness. It led to the emergence and rise of armed Palestinian resistance, alongside the realisation that Arab states were incapable of liberation. The myth of Arab “progressive” regimes was shattered.
As Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) stated, reliance on Arab governments was a mistake. The Palestinian national movement stepped into the void, asserting itself as the true representative of the Palestinian people.
Fatah redefined the strategic slogan from “Unity is the road to Palestine” to “Palestine is the road to unity.” The resistance moved toward political and organisational independence from Arab regimes and the Arab League.
By the early 1960s, armed struggle became the new doctrine. The Palestinian National Charter adopted this as its central principle. Theories of revolutionary liberation were debated, inspired by the struggles of other colonised peoples.
Resistance bases were built in surrounding countries. The Battle of Karameh (1968) served as a watershed moment, proving the credibility of the new path. From that point on, armed struggle became the foundation of Palestinian identity and legitimacy.
The October War and the Mirage of Peace
After Nasser’s death, Egypt drifted from radicalism toward “moderation” under Anwar Sadat, who believed that destroying Israel was impossible. The 1973 October War was launched to regain Egyptian initiative.
On 6 October 1973, Egypt crossed the Suez Canal in a surprise attack, deploying five infantry divisions and hundreds of tanks. Palestinians rejoiced, and the PLO declared it a golden opportunity to escalate their operations.
Yet, the attack stalled. Israel regained momentum through the “breach” in Egyptian lines, leading to strategic setbacks. Internal mismanagement and Sadat’s interference derailed the military command.
Instead of leveraging the symbolic victory, Sadat pursued negotiations. The Bar Lev Line was replaced by the Camp David Accords, as Egypt shifted from confrontation to normalisation.
Henry Kissinger famously predicted that Egypt’s military actions would eventually lead to political negotiations. And so it was: unlike the Nakba and Naksa, the 1973 war did not birth revolutionary forces but opened the gates of Arab retreat.
Camp David marked the beginning of an Arab race toward recognition and compromise, culminating in Oslo 1993 via the Algiers Declaration (1989). The Palestinian Authority’s formation under Arafat reflected this trajectory. His pursuit of “peace” mirrored Sadat’s.
From the Regimes’ Decline, Resistance Rises
Every time Arab regimes weakened, the people rose—through Islamic and nationalist resistance:
- From the Nakba of 1948 emerged grassroots movements.
- From the Naksa of 1967 rose the PLO and Fatah.
- From the disillusionment with state-led military campaigns, came armed factions with ideological independence.
The October War marked a pivot not toward victory, but toward negotiated surrender.
Yet in response to this path of settlements, a new form of resistance was quietly maturing—one grounded in faith, identity, and endurance. It continues to grow today.
