Israeli media continues to focus on Iran’s situation following the recent attacks, which lasted 12 days and included airstrikes on major nuclear facilities directly targeted by American aircraft.
Major General Tamir Hayman, former head of Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman), outlined what he called an “inventory of the campaign’s outcomes on Iran,” presenting five offensive efforts. The first, he said, was the series of assassinations that targeted military commanders as an opening move in the war. The second was establishing air superiority by creating a safe corridor for Israeli aircraft, enabling them to conduct attacks while refuelling mid-flight, which allowed a series of long-range strikes.
In an article published by Channel 12 and translated by our platform, Hayman wrote: “Drones hovered over Iran to hunt for ground-to-ground missile launch sites, neutralise air defence systems, and eliminate commanders. Their constant presence in Iran’s skies became a source of fear — arguably even more impactful than fighter jets.”
He noted that Israeli intelligence tracked missile launch platforms and pinpointed air defence systems. “Iran is a vast, distant country — without precise intelligence guidance, locating these targets would have been impossible. Over the years, new intelligence capabilities were developed for this mission. Air superiority has exposed a systematic failure of Iran’s military, which had prepared for a war requiring centralised, efficient command and control. The anti-tank guided missiles no longer needed to evade jets in the skies once the air defences were neutralised.”
Hayman added, “It will take more time to fully understand how this campaign has changed things. We need to assess the extent of the command system’s disruption, the level of destruction inflicted on the nuclear programme, and how far the missile system and command structure have been dismantled. Iran recovered swiftly and effectively from the initial devastating strike. All newly appointed commanders are experienced, so there may be no long-term damage.”
He stressed that “the friction between Tehran and Tel Aviv has forced both to learn more about each other. Israel now knows far more about Iran than it did before, both in terms of capabilities and strategic culture. Equally, the Iranians will benefit from this campaign, improving their ability to counter Israeli intelligence breaches and the air superiority Israel achieved.”
He suggested that “Iranian leaders will argue extensively about whether to return to negotiations or pursue a different path. If they return to negotiations, it will be different: they will be careful not to make the new nuclear deal look like a surrender. But Israel’s working assumption must be that Iran will want to maintain a nuclear deterrence project — albeit in a way different from its previous threshold nuclear state status.”
Hayman added, “One significant achievement in confronting the nuclear programme is eliminating Iran’s uranium enrichment capability. If Iran wants to enrich again, it will have to build a new enrichment facility. Before the war, once a decision was made, Iran needed just one week to reach weapons-grade enrichment. Today, after the war, it could take several months because Iran cannot currently reconvert enriched uranium into metal — though the technology for this is relatively simple compared to the rest of the process.”
The writer outlined five scenarios resulting from the war — from worst to best, in Israel’s view. The first is a rapid dash towards the bomb: Iran possesses 60% enriched material and the know-how, and reconstruction could take months. But in this scenario, Iran would bear heavy risks and become a pariah state, provoking the US and the international community to act against it.
The second scenario is signing an agreement while secretly building nuclear capability. Having suffered humiliation at the start of the war, Iran in this scenario might agree to a new nuclear deal — but in practice, it would be a deception. Here, the intelligence and operational challenge for Israel and the West would be immense.
The third scenario is the absence of both an agreement and further attacks, with Iran slowly rehabilitating itself as a reckless nuclear state. This would mean no nuclear deal, leading to massive additional sanctions, including from the UN Security Council.
The fourth scenario is Iran abandoning nuclear weapons altogether through a genuine, comprehensive nuclear agreement, driven by fears of regime stability. This would be an excellent scenario but is very unlikely, as it contradicts Iran’s core principles.
The fifth scenario is regime collapse — although predicting this is extremely difficult. This could take years or happen very quickly, but for Israel it remains a dream scenario.
Hayman concluded that “Iran after the war is a weaker state, but not less dangerous. This calls for a new Israeli policy that balances readiness to repeat the offensive to maintain the gains, with a binding, regulated framework that keeps Iran away from its nuclear programme.”
