The American political landscape has shifted. Democrats have secured control of both chambers of Congress, Muslim and Arab American candidates have made electoral gains, and a new generation of progressive lawmakers is preparing to challenge some of Washington’s most contentious policies.
But can these election victories actually stop American weapons shipments to Israel, restrict Donald Trump’s military campaign against Iran, or redirect billions of dollars towards healthcare and struggling American households?
For voters who supported candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed, the Egyptian-American physician and politician who has secured a seat in the US Senate, these are no longer abstract campaign questions. They are the expectations against which the newly elected lawmakers will be judged.
The answer, however, is more complicated than simply winning an election.
Although Democrats now control the House of Representatives and the Senate, Trump remains in the White House, retaining extensive authority over foreign policy and the US military.
Congress can restrict funding, challenge weapons sales, investigate military operations and block certain presidential appointments. But passing legislation over Trump’s objections could require majorities far larger than those needed to win control of Congress.
Understanding what these politicians can actually accomplish requires examining where power sits within the American political system, and where elected lawmakers encounter limits that campaign promises cannot overcome.
Winning Congress Does Not Mean Controlling Washington
The United States operates under a federal system that divides authority between the national government in Washington and the governments of its 50 states.
At the federal level, Congress is responsible for passing national legislation, authorising government expenditure and overseeing the executive branch.
It consists of two chambers.
The House of Representatives has 435 voting members, elected every two years. The Senate has 100 members, with each state electing two senators to serve six-year terms. Approximately one-third of Senate seats are contested every two years.
Both chambers participate in federal lawmaking, but neither can ordinarily pass legislation independently.
For a bill to become law, both chambers must approve the same text before it is presented to the president for signature.
If Trump rejects the legislation through a presidential veto, Congress can override him, but only with a two-thirds majority in both chambers.
That distinction matters enormously for the incoming Democratic majority.
Controlling Congress allows Democrats to determine which legislation advances, influence spending priorities and conduct investigations. It does not automatically give them the votes needed to impose their preferred policies on an unwilling president.
Why the House and Senate Have Different Powers
Although both chambers participate in passing federal legislation and approving government expenditure, their constitutional responsibilities differ.
The Senate has the authority to confirm cabinet members, ambassadors and federal judges nominated by the president.
It also has the power to approve international treaties, which generally require the support of two-thirds of senators present.
The House, meanwhile, has the exclusive authority to initiate impeachment proceedings against federal officials and must originate legislation concerning tax revenue.
If the House impeaches an official, the Senate conducts the subsequent trial.
These differences mean that a Democratic majority can exercise significant control over some presidential decisions without necessarily securing Trump’s approval.
A Democratic-controlled Senate, for example, can reject presidential nominees whose appointments require confirmation.
But changing national laws, altering military expenditure or imposing new restrictions on the administration generally involves a more complicated legislative process.
What About the Thousands of Politicians Elected to State Legislatures?
Not every politician elected during the November 2026 midterms will serve in Washington.
American states maintain their own legislatures, which exercise authority over substantial areas of domestic policy.
Forty-nine states have two legislative chambers, typically a state House and Senate, while Nebraska operates a single-chamber legislature.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the United States has 7,386 state legislative seats, with 6,139 contested during the November 2026 elections.
These lawmakers can make decisions with immediate consequences for their constituents.
State legislatures can regulate public education, housing, local taxation, minimum wages, employment conditions, insurance and healthcare.
In New York, for example, state lawmakers can introduce changes to rental regulations and tenant protections.
In Michigan, legislators can expand certain health insurance programmes, increase school funding or amend employment regulations.
States can also expand access to Medicaid, the healthcare programme jointly funded by federal and state governments, within the legal framework established by Congress.
But these powers have limits.
A state legislator cannot independently stop US military assistance to Israel, determine American foreign policy or issue binding orders to the federal armed forces.
Those decisions fall under the authority of the federal government.
For Arab American, Muslim and progressive candidates, the office they have won therefore matters almost as much as the election victory itself.
A state legislator can influence healthcare and housing policy. A member of Congress has considerably greater opportunities to challenge federal military spending and foreign policy.
Can Muslim and Progressive Lawmakers Actually Cut US Military Aid to Israel?
This is one area where the new congressional balance of power could have direct consequences.
Despite the longstanding military relationship between Washington and Israel, American financial assistance is not entirely beyond congressional control.
The United States and Israel operate under a memorandum of understanding covering 2019 to 2028, which provides for $38 billion in military assistance and defence cooperation over ten years.
The arrangement establishes a baseline of approximately $3.8 billion annually.
Of that amount, $3.3 billion is allocated to Foreign Military Financing, while approximately $500 million supports joint missile defence programmes.
Congress can also approve additional assistance beyond those annual commitments.
However, the memorandum does not automatically compel Congress to appropriate the money.
A June 2026 report by the Congressional Research Service confirmed that the agreement does not legally bind lawmakers to approve the proposed funding.
This distinction creates an opportunity for members of Congress who oppose unconditional American military support for Israel.
They can propose reductions in military assistance, challenge requests for additional funding or introduce conditions governing how American-supplied weapons may be used.
They can also seek to connect military assistance to compliance with American law and human rights requirements.
For legislators who have criticised Israel’s military operations and Washington’s continued support, these mechanisms provide more than a platform for political statements.
They offer a way to translate opposition into legislative proposals.
But there is a substantial difference between proposing restrictions and securing the votes required to implement them.
Why 2028 Could Become a Critical Year
The current US-Israel memorandum of understanding is scheduled to expire in 2028.
Negotiations over subsequent defence cooperation arrangements could therefore create an important political opening for lawmakers seeking to reconsider the scale and conditions of American assistance.
A larger progressive bloc in Congress could use the negotiations to demand greater scrutiny of weapons transfers, military expenditure and the conditions attached to future support.
Whether those demands succeed will depend on the balance of power within Congress, including the positions taken by Democrats who continue to support the US-Israel military alliance.
The significance of the new majority lies in its ability to force these questions into the legislative process, rather than simply raise them during election campaigns.
Can Congress Block American Weapons Shipments to Israel?
Beyond annual military funding, Congress has another mechanism available to lawmakers seeking to challenge weapons transfers.
Under the Arms Export Control Act, Congress can review major weapons sales announced by the executive branch.
For certain sales involving Israel that meet statutory notification thresholds, the normal congressional review period is 15 days.
During that period, lawmakers can introduce joint resolutions seeking to block the transactions.
Independent Senator Bernie Sanders has previously attempted to use this mechanism to challenge American arms shipments to Israel.
In March 2026, Sanders joined Democratic senators in introducing resolutions aimed at preventing several ammunition sales, including a proposed transfer involving 12,000 bombs weighing 1,000 pounds each.
The resolutions were ultimately blocked or defeated.
Nevertheless, the effort demonstrated that congressional opposition to weapons transfers can take the form of specific legislative action rather than public criticism alone.
Why Blocking a Weapons Sale Is So Difficult
The Senate has special procedures allowing resolutions opposing certain arms sales to advance to a vote without being subject to the usual parliamentary obstruction mechanisms.
However, passing such a resolution in the Senate is not sufficient.
To become legally binding, it must also receive approval in the House and be signed by the president.
If Trump vetoes it, lawmakers must secure two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override his decision.
According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress has never successfully blocked a weapons sale through this particular mechanism.
Congressional objections have nevertheless influenced the timing and components of certain arms transactions.
There are also other forms of pressure available.
Members serving on foreign affairs, armed services and appropriations committees can request information about weapons exports and their use.
They can organise oversight hearings, question administration officials and seek investigations into potential violations of American law.
These powers may not immediately halt a shipment, but they can compel greater scrutiny of decisions that might otherwise encounter limited congressional resistance.
The Democratic Party Is Divided Over Israel
The election of more progressive lawmakers does not necessarily mean that the Democratic Party will collectively support ending American military assistance to Israel.
The party contains competing positions on the relationship.
One progressive faction, represented by politicians such as Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, advocates ending or substantially restricting military support.
Another progressive current favours maintaining assistance under stricter conditions, particularly those related to human rights.
More traditional and centrist Democrats remain committed to the US-Israel military alliance and oppose a comprehensive termination of assistance, even when they criticise particular policies pursued by Israeli governments.
A September 2026 analysis published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies identified these divisions within the Democratic Party.
It distinguished between progressives advocating an end to assistance, lawmakers seeking to impose conditions and traditional supporters of the bilateral alliance.
These disagreements could become decisive whenever legislation affecting Israel reaches a vote.
Even with Democrats controlling both chambers, progressive proposals cannot succeed automatically if substantial numbers of their own party’s lawmakers oppose them.
For Arab American and Muslim representatives, the immediate political opportunity may therefore involve building a larger congressional coalition capable of challenging existing funding arrangements.
That coalition could influence budget negotiations, demand stricter oversight and increase support for restrictions on weapons transfers.
But an election victory does not guarantee that the entire Democratic majority will adopt the same position on Israel.
Can Democrats Stop Trump’s War Against Iran?
The debate over American military operations against Iran raises an even more consequential constitutional question.
Who has the authority to decide when the United States goes to war?
Under the American constitutional system, Congress holds the power to declare war and authorise military expenditure.
The president, however, serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and possesses substantial authority over the conduct of military operations.
This division has long generated disputes over the extent to which presidents can initiate or continue military action without congressional authorisation.
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 provides Congress with mechanisms for reviewing presidential decisions to deploy American forces into hostilities.
These include consideration of resolutions directing the withdrawal of US forces from military operations that Congress has not authorised.
During 2026, the House of Representatives approved measures intended to restrict military operations against Iran.
Those efforts did not succeed in ending the war, as approval by one chamber alone was insufficient to impose binding restrictions on the president.
With Democrats now holding majorities in both chambers, the legislative situation has changed.
They can introduce new measures to restrict military operations, impose conditions on future military campaigns or prohibit the use of particular funds to expand the war.
However, significant constitutional and political obstacles remain.
Trump can veto legislation intended to restrict his administration’s military activities.
Overcoming that veto requires two-thirds support in both chambers, a much higher threshold than a simple majority.
What Democrats Can Do Even Without Ending the War
While passing binding legislation may prove difficult, congressional oversight offers another avenue for challenging the administration.
Democratic majorities can organise hearings involving senior officials from the Pentagon, State Department and intelligence agencies.
They can demand explanations of the legal justification for military operations, question the administration’s strategy and examine the financial cost of the war.
Lawmakers can also seek information about operational planning, military expenditure and the administration’s broader objectives.
Such investigations would not automatically end military operations.
They could, however, increase political pressure on the White House and expose decisions to scrutiny that a Congress controlled by the president’s party might have been less willing to pursue.
For politicians who campaigned against the war on Iran, the distinction is important.
They may not possess the votes needed to force an immediate withdrawal, but they can challenge the legal and financial foundations of continued military action.
Congress Controls the Money. Could That Become Trump’s Biggest Problem?
One of Congress’s most consequential powers is its authority over federal expenditure.
The White House can propose how much the government should spend, but Congress determines the legal appropriations available to federal departments and programmes.
That gives Democratic lawmakers considerable influence over military funding, healthcare expenditure and other national priorities.
The issue is especially relevant to Iran.
In June 2026, the Trump administration requested additional military funding, including $21 billion for munitions and $17.3 billion for operational costs, according to a Congressional Research Service report.
With Democrats controlling both chambers, future requests for additional military expenditure could encounter greater resistance.
Lawmakers can reject proposed funding increases, introduce restrictions governing how appropriated money may be used or require detailed reporting on military expenditure.
They can also negotiate changes to the balance between defence spending and domestic programmes.
However, restricting operations already funded through previously approved appropriations is more complicated.
Doing so may require new legislation, which could again encounter a presidential veto.
There is another risk.
If congressional Democrats and Trump fail to agree on government spending, the resulting dispute could prevent appropriations legislation from passing.
That could lead to a temporary federal government shutdown rather than the policy outcome Democrats originally sought.
Congress also has powers to review taxation, federal debt and the annual budget deficit, although meaningful changes generally require legislation supported by both chambers and the president.
The incoming majority therefore possesses substantial financial leverage, but exercising it effectively will depend on legislative negotiations and political calculations.
Where Democrats Can Challenge Trump Without His Approval
Not every congressional decision requires presidential consent.
The Senate’s authority over certain appointments offers one example.
With Democrats holding the majority, senators can reject Trump nominees for cabinet positions, federal judgeships and other offices requiring Senate confirmation.
They do not need the House’s approval or the president’s agreement to reject those nominations.
Similarly, a Democratic majority in the House can prevent legislation it opposes from advancing.
Control of congressional committees also provides opportunities to investigate the administration, summon officials and demand information within established legal procedures.
These powers could make governing more difficult for Trump, even when Democrats cannot force their preferred policies into law.
However, Congress does not assume control of the armed forces or executive foreign policy simply because the president’s party loses its legislative majority.
Those responsibilities remain with Trump for the remainder of his presidential term.
The midterm elections have therefore changed the distribution of political power in Washington without transferring control of the executive branch.
What Can Abdul El-Sayed Actually Deliver on Healthcare?
For Abdul El-Sayed, the practical consequences of entering the Senate extend beyond debates about Israel and Iran.
His election campaign placed healthcare reform and the cost of living at the centre of his political programme.
El-Sayed is scheduled to begin his Senate term on 3 January 2027.
Once sworn in, he will be able to introduce legislation, vote on federal spending and presidential appointments, and participate in congressional committees according to his assignments.
But turning his campaign proposals into law will require cooperation from other lawmakers.
Medicare for All: Can El-Sayed Deliver Universal Healthcare?
One of El-Sayed’s central campaign commitments was Medicare for All.
The proposal seeks to expand Medicare, the government health insurance programme primarily serving older Americans and certain other eligible groups, into a universal system covering the entire population.
Under his proposed approach, the expanded programme would cover necessary medical services, including dental, vision and hearing care.
Patients would not face insurance premiums, co-payments or deductibles when obtaining covered treatment.
El-Sayed has also pledged to pursue the cancellation of medical debt and expand government-backed coverage for prescription medications.
His programme includes reversing reductions in Medicaid funding and health insurance assistance introduced under the Trump administration.
For Americans struggling with medical expenses, the proposals represent a substantial departure from the existing healthcare financing system.
But delivering them would require extensive changes to federal law and public expenditure.
Congress would need to approve the legislation, establish funding arrangements and navigate procedural barriers in the Senate.
Among those obstacles is the filibuster, which generally requires the support of 60 senators to end debate on most ordinary legislation.
As a result, holding a simple Democratic majority does not necessarily provide enough votes to enact Medicare for All.
El-Sayed can introduce the proposal, advocate for it and negotiate with other senators.
He cannot implement a nationwide healthcare system through his own authority.
Taking on Drug Prices and the Pharmaceutical Industry
El-Sayed’s healthcare proposals also extend to the pharmaceutical market.
He has criticised the business model of pharmacy benefit managers, intermediaries involved in negotiating medicine prices and coverage arrangements among pharmaceutical companies, insurers, pharmacies and healthcare providers.
El-Sayed argues that the existing system introduces unnecessary costs that ultimately affect patients.
His proposed reforms would replace aspects of that system with more direct and transparent mechanisms.
He has also advocated public-sector manufacturing of certain essential medicines.
The objective is to reduce the financial burden of prescription drugs while increasing public oversight of how medicines are priced and supplied.
However, changing the industry’s regulatory and financial structure would require federal legislation.
Like Medicare for All, these proposals would depend on securing sufficient congressional support and overcoming procedural obstacles.
Can El-Sayed Lower Prices for Ordinary Americans?
The cost-of-living crisis presents another challenge for the incoming senator.
El-Sayed can support legislation aimed at increasing market competition, expanding the federal government’s capacity to negotiate drug prices and improving financial assistance for housing and healthcare.
Such measures could affect household expenses if enacted and successfully implemented.
But a senator cannot simply order businesses to reduce prices.
Nor can Congress immediately eliminate inflation or reduce the cost of living through a single legislative decision.
The practical impact of El-Sayed’s programme will depend on whether his proposals can attract enough support to become law.
His domestic economic agenda is also closely connected to his criticism of American foreign expenditure.
El-Sayed has repeatedly challenged the allocation of US taxpayer funds to support the Israeli military, arguing that greater resources should instead be directed towards public services within the United States.
That position connects two issues often discussed separately in Washington: the scale of American military assistance overseas and the financial pressure experienced by households at home.
For voters who supported him, the question will be whether his presence in the Senate can translate those priorities into concrete changes in federal spending.
The Election Has Changed Washington’s Balance of Power, Not Its Entire Political Direction
The victories of Abdul El-Sayed and other Arab American, Muslim and progressive candidates provide them with new opportunities to influence national policy.
Their positions allow them to introduce legislation, challenge military assistance to Israel, scrutinise the war against Iran and advocate expanded healthcare and economic support.
For the Democratic Party more broadly, control of both chambers provides greater influence over federal spending, legislative priorities, presidential appointments and congressional investigations.
But the constitutional limits remain substantial.
Lawmakers cannot independently implement their entire election programmes, and the Democratic Party’s internal divisions may prevent it from reaching agreement on some of the most contentious issues, particularly military assistance to Israel.
Meanwhile, Trump retains the presidency, command of the armed forces and the authority to veto legislation.
The immediate question is no longer whether Muslim and progressive politicians can win seats in Washington. They have. The question is whether they can build the congressional majorities needed to turn those victories into binding restrictions on military policy and meaningful changes in Americans’ daily lives.
For El-Sayed, that test begins when he takes his seat in January 2027.
His influence will ultimately be measured not simply by the positions he advocates, but by how effectively he uses the Senate’s legislative, financial and oversight powers to advance them.
