Iran may be preparing to assassinate American officials, according to US intelligence assessments. But the more consequential question is whether Tehran actually intends to carry out such operations, or whether the threat itself has become a weapon in its confrontation with Washington.
The distinction could determine whether the United States and Iran move towards another military confrontation or find a way to avoid one.
On 24 October, Axios published details of an intelligence memorandum dated 23 October and addressed to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The document reportedly warned of Iranian efforts to target American personnel, claiming that US intelligence agencies had detected suspicious activity and assessed that some assassination preparations had reached advanced stages.
According to the memorandum, the potential targets extended beyond individuals currently receiving security protection, raising concerns about the ability of American authorities to identify and safeguard everyone potentially at risk.
The document reportedly recommended declassifying sensitive intelligence to enable security agencies to warn those believed to be under threat.
Rubio responded by reducing the American diplomatic presence in West Asia and ordering the return of less essential diplomatic personnel and their families, a precaution intended to protect American lives.
Yet the memorandum contained a significant omission: it did not identify the intended targets or specify the countries where the alleged assassinations might take place.
That absence leaves a crucial question unanswered. Is Iran preparing to carry out attacks, or is Washington responding to intelligence about contingency plans that Tehran may never intend to activate?
Planning an Assassination Is Not the Same as Ordering One
Three separate questions must be considered when assessing the reported Iranian plots.
First, has Iran developed operational plans to target American officials?
Second, has the Iranian leadership actually authorised their execution?
Third, is Tehran prepared to accept responsibility for the political and military consequences if such operations take place?
These distinctions are particularly important given the current military environment.
American aircraft carriers remain positioned near Iran, maintaining a visible military threat while Washington and Israel continue to signal the possibility of renewed strikes against Tehran.
The prospect of military action following elections in the United States and Israel has added another layer of uncertainty.
Under such circumstances, Iran has reasons to prepare for retaliation, but also powerful incentives to avoid actions that could provide Washington with justification for another military campaign.
An assassination plot could therefore serve several purposes without ever being executed.
It could demonstrate that Tehran possesses unconventional means of retaliation, complicate American security calculations or increase pressure on Washington to reconsider further military action.
However, the existence of such possibilities does not establish that Iran has adopted assassination as an operational policy.
That distinction matters because the consequences of an attempted assassination could extend far beyond the immediate target.
Washington Has Accused Iran of Similar Plots Before
The latest intelligence warnings have emerged against a background of previous American accusations involving individuals allegedly connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In November 2024, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Farhad Shakeri, accusing him of involvement in a plot to assassinate Donald Trump.
The allegations linked the suspected operation to individuals acting on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
In another case, American authorities accused Shahram Poursafi, whom they described as working for the IRGC, of attempting to arrange the assassination of former US National Security Adviser John Bolton in 2022.
According to the Department of Justice, the alleged plot was intended as retaliation for the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani.
US authorities have also alleged Iranian involvement in other assassination-related activities.
These cases demonstrate that Washington has previously investigated and prosecuted alleged plots associated with Iranian operatives.
But previous accusations, even when supported by criminal investigations, cannot independently establish the accuracy of the latest intelligence memorandum.
The current allegations must be evaluated on their own evidence.
What makes the latest warning particularly consequential is not simply the history of alleged Iranian activity, but the timing of its publication and the possibility of a renewed American-Israeli military campaign.
Why the Timing of the Intelligence Leak Matters
The memorandum appeared as Washington and Tel Aviv were discussing the possibility of renewed military strikes against Iran.
At the same time, the dispute over Tehran’s nuclear programme was returning to the centre of diplomatic confrontation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Tehran, described as an effort to persuade Iranian leaders to abandon their nuclear and missile programmes, formed another part of the diplomatic activity surrounding the crisis.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the alleged assassination threats emerged during a period of mounting pressure rather than in isolation.
Iran has also been signalling that another American attack would provoke a substantially broader military response.
On 1 October, Reuters reported that Tehran was preparing for a more extensive and forceful retaliation should Washington resume military operations.
The warning reflected growing Iranian frustration with diplomatic efforts that had produced little progress.
Since the announcement of a ceasefire, Trump’s approach has remained caught between maintaining military pressure and pursuing negotiations, without achieving a decisive diplomatic breakthrough.
The Wall Street Journal returned to the subject on 23 October, reporting Iranian threats to broaden the scope of retaliation.
According to the newspaper, Tehran was considering strikes against economic facilities, infrastructure and American interests.
The report also indicated that Iran retained missile and drone capabilities sufficient to carry out such threats, despite damage sustained by its military infrastructure.
These developments form the wider context in which the assassination allegations must be understood.
Iran is confronting the possibility of another round of American and Israeli strikes while attempting to demonstrate that renewed military action would carry substantial costs.
The reported assassination preparations could be another element of that deterrence effort.
But whether they represent an operational decision or a calculated warning remains unresolved.
Could Assassination Become Iran’s Alternative to Conventional War?
The military and economic pressure imposed on Iran has created a difficult strategic calculation for Tehran.
American policy has combined military deployments with economic sanctions, seeking to weaken Iran’s position and compel concessions.
Yet American assessments have also raised the possibility that this combination could produce further escalation rather than force Tehran into compliance.
In that environment, Iranian leaders may consider unconventional methods of retaliation that do not require a direct military confrontation with the United States.
Assassination operations, if authorised, could represent one such option.
Their potential value from Tehran’s perspective would lie in increasing the perceived costs of continued confrontation and demonstrating that American officials could remain vulnerable beyond conventional battlefields.
Such threats could also be intended to strengthen Iran’s bargaining position by introducing additional uncertainty into Washington’s military calculations.
Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between recognising the possible deterrent value of an assassination threat and concluding that Iran is prepared to carry it out.
The risks associated with actual implementation are considerable.
The Risks Tehran Cannot Ignore
The United States possesses overwhelming conventional firepower and could respond to an assassination attempt with a far more extensive military campaign.
Iran, meanwhile, has already sustained military and economic damage that could limit its capacity to endure another prolonged war.
A successful or attempted assassination of an American official could also destroy what remains of the diplomatic process.
Instead of strengthening Tehran’s negotiating position, such an operation might transform an already dangerous confrontation into a zero-sum struggle in which neither side could easily retreat.
The consequences could therefore undermine the very objective an assassination threat was intended to achieve.
If Iran’s priority is to deter renewed American attacks, carrying out an operation that provides Washington with a justification for escalation could prove strategically counterproductive.
That contradiction is central to understanding Tehran’s possible calculations.
What If Iran Wanted Washington to Discover the Plots?
One interpretation deserves particular attention: the possibility that Iranian intelligence deliberately allowed information about advanced assassination plans to reach American authorities.
Under this scenario, the reported plots would function primarily as instruments of pressure rather than as operations awaiting immediate execution.
Tehran could maintain detailed contingency plans while ensuring that Washington understood the potential consequences of another military confrontation.
The resulting uncertainty might complicate American decision-making and strengthen Iran’s position in future negotiations.
It could also influence calculations surrounding the possibility of new strikes after November’s US congressional midterm elections.
From this perspective, the warning itself could serve Iran’s interests without requiring any assassination to occur.
The author considers this the most likely explanation, suggesting that Iranian intelligence may have deliberately leaked information about the plans while retaining the option of activating them if circumstances changed.
However, there is no publicly established evidence in the material presented that Iranian intelligence orchestrated the disclosure.
The hypothesis remains an interpretation of the memorandum’s timing, the surrounding military threats and Tehran’s broader deterrence objectives.
There is another complication.
Iran’s political and security institutions do not necessarily operate according to a single, unified calculation.
Recent developments have demonstrated the difficulties of treating Iranian decision-making as a completely centralised process in which every institution shares identical priorities.
Different agencies and centres of power may assess the advantages and consequences of escalation differently.
This leaves open the possibility that assassination operations could be pursued even if other elements of the Iranian leadership considered them politically damaging.
Nevertheless, no published evidence or official Iranian statement cited in the available account establishes that Tehran has decided to accept the consequences of a major assassination operation against American officials.
Four Scenarios That Could Determine What Happens Next
The confrontation now presents four possible outcomes, each carrying different consequences for Iran, the United States and the wider region.
1. The Threats Continue, but Neither Side Acts
The first possibility is that Washington and Tehran remain engaged in a confrontation dominated by threats, military deployments and mutual deterrence.
Iran would continue signalling its ability to retaliate beyond conventional military targets, while the United States would maintain pressure through sanctions and the threat of additional strikes.
Under this scenario, the assassination allegations would remain part of the psychological and political confrontation without developing into actual attacks.
This would allow both governments to preserve their deterrent positions while avoiding the immediate consequences of another military escalation.
2. Iran Carries Out Limited Assassination Operations
The second possibility involves Iran authorising limited assassination attempts against American targets, either directly or through allied groups in the region.
Such operations could be intended to demonstrate Tehran’s willingness to impose costs on Washington.
However, their consequences would be highly unpredictable.
An American response could range from limited retaliation to a broader campaign against Iranian military and security infrastructure.
The uncertainty surrounding Washington’s reaction makes this scenario particularly dangerous for Tehran.
Even an operation intended to remain limited could provoke a confrontation far beyond its original scope.
3. Washington and Israel Strike First
A third scenario involves the United States and Israel launching renewed attacks against Iran after the American midterm elections.
Such a development could fundamentally alter Tehran’s calculations.
If Iranian leaders concluded that Washington and Tel Aviv had already resumed military action, previously prepared assassination plans might acquire a different strategic justification in their eyes.
Operations considered too risky during a period of diplomatic uncertainty could become part of a wider retaliatory response.
Under these circumstances, the boundary between deterrence planning and operational retaliation could become increasingly difficult to maintain.
The danger would be a cycle in which each side interprets its own actions as defensive while viewing the other’s response as grounds for further escalation.
4. Mediation Prevents Another War
The fourth possibility is that diplomatic mediation succeeds in preventing another round of military confrontation.
This is the outcome the author considers most desirable.
A negotiated arrangement could reduce the immediate pressure on Iran, provide Washington with a way to avoid another costly conflict and prevent the assassination allegations from becoming part of a broader military escalation.
Such a settlement, however, would not necessarily satisfy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose position towards Iran has consistently favoured stronger pressure.
The author argues that diplomacy could nevertheless offer Trump an opportunity to escape the political predicament created by the figure he refers to as the “Polish fox”, although the original account does not identify that individual.
More importantly, successful mediation could spare the wider region from another confrontation at a time when instability is already spreading.
The war in Yemen has added another dimension to the regional crisis, creating an additional conflict that the author believes requires even more urgent diplomatic attention than the dispute over Iran.
The Question Is Whether Tehran Wants to Kill or Deter
The central uncertainty surrounding the alleged Iranian assassination plots remains unresolved.
American intelligence assessments reportedly suggest that preparations have reached advanced stages. Previous US criminal investigations have also produced allegations of assassination activities involving individuals linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
Yet neither development establishes that Tehran has made a final decision to carry out attacks against American officials.
Iran has reasons to demonstrate that renewed American military action would carry consequences beyond the battlefield.
It also has powerful reasons to avoid an operation that could trigger overwhelming retaliation, further weaken its military and economic position, and eliminate remaining diplomatic opportunities.
The reported plots may therefore represent a deterrent message intended to influence Washington’s calculations rather than a decision to initiate another confrontation.
But the possibility of execution cannot be excluded, particularly given the complexities of Iranian decision-making and the prospect of renewed American-Israeli strikes.
For now, the most important distinction is between possessing an assassination plan, threatening to use it and actually authorising its execution.
Whether Washington and Tehran recognise that distinction could determine if the current crisis remains a contest of threats or develops into another dangerous phase of regional warfare.
