Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to make another war devastatingly expensive. By turning the Strait of Hormuz into a pressure point for global oil shipments, Tehran is pursuing a strategy that could force Washington to calculate the economic consequences of confrontation alongside its military objectives.
With the prospect of renewed American military action against Iran growing, oil tankers, shipping routes and energy infrastructure have become central to the confrontation between the two countries.
Military analyst Brigadier General Elias Hanna believes the two sides are approaching the crisis with fundamentally different calculations. Iran is attempting to make war increasingly costly, while US President Donald Trump appears to be betting on a short, intense military campaign capable of weakening Tehran’s position before the confrontation becomes prolonged.
The latest developments in the Strait of Hormuz suggest that Iran intends to make that calculation considerably more difficult.
A Burning Tanker and a Warning to International Shipping
On Saturday, the Iranian navy announced that a tanker had caught fire after striking mines while passing through a prohibited area east of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian authorities described the vessel as having violated maritime restrictions.
Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that several ships had been struck by projectiles, including a tanker hit near Iran’s Lavan Island.
The Iranian navy subsequently warned commercial vessels against entering unsafe areas of the strait and instructed them not to switch off their onboard systems.
The incidents come as control over shipping through Hormuz becomes an increasingly contentious issue between Tehran and Washington.
The United States maintains that it has assisted approximately 3,000 tankers in navigating the strait over the past six months, despite the Iranian closure.
Tehran, however, is attempting to establish new conditions governing maritime movement.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said his country requires recognition of a new shipping route established in coordination with Oman, alongside the closure of all other routes.
The demand suggests that Tehran is seeking more than a temporary disruption of shipping. It wants its authority over the movement of vessels through the strategic waterway to be recognised.
At the same time, a channel affiliated with Iran’s Supreme Leader reported strategic instructions to the country’s military commanders, including the identification of potential targets, improvements to military intelligence capabilities and enhanced readiness for precision combat operations.
The message from Iran’s military leadership has been equally uncompromising.
Ali Abdollahiabadi, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, warned that the United States and Israel would face a response beyond anything they could imagine.
He also declared that Iran, rather than Washington or Tel Aviv, would determine when any new war ends.
Other Iranian officials have warned that a renewed confrontation could expand geographically, suggesting that military escalation would not necessarily remain confined to Iranian territory.
Why Iran Is Expanding Its Attacks Beyond Hormuz
For Hanna, the latest escalation reflects an Iranian effort to regain the strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument of deterrence.
He described the waterway as the most important deterrence asset for the region and the wider world.
According to his assessment, 38 attacks have occurred in the strait during the current month alone.
But the number of incidents is only part of the story.
What distinguishes the latest operations, Hanna explained, is their geographical reach.
Attacks have extended to locations approximately 55 kilometres from Iraq’s al-Faw area and as far as the Saudi industrial city of Jubail.
That expansion matters because Iran is no longer concentrating exclusively on the movement of oil tankers through Hormuz.
Instead, the attacks are reaching areas associated with oil production and export infrastructure.
In Hanna’s assessment, Tehran is attempting to pressure both ends of the energy supply chain: the facilities from which oil originates and the routes through which it reaches international markets.
The implications extend well beyond the immediate military confrontation.
Disrupting the movement of oil is one form of pressure. Threatening the infrastructure and maritime facilities supporting its production and export introduces another level of economic vulnerability.
And Iran appears to be pursuing that strategy without relying exclusively on expensive or sophisticated weapons.
A Speedboat, an RPG and the Economics of War
One of the most revealing aspects of Iran’s approach, according to Hanna, is the relatively simple equipment involved in some of the reported attacks.
He pointed to an incident in Jubail that reportedly involved a speedboat and a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).
Other operations involved limpet mines, which can be attached directly to vessels.
The military significance lies in the imbalance between the resources required to conduct such attacks and the potentially enormous costs imposed on the opposing side.
A relatively inexpensive weapon can threaten a commercial vessel, disrupt shipping operations and force additional protective measures across a much larger maritime area.
That imbalance is becoming increasingly visible in the cost of transporting oil.
While Washington maintains that it is securing the movement of millions of barrels through the strait despite Iran’s closure, Hanna highlighted a substantial increase in insurance costs.
Before the war, insuring a barrel of oil cost approximately $6. That figure has now risen to $33, according to Hanna.
The increase illustrates the financial pressure associated with protecting maritime traffic through a contested waterway.
Even when vessels manage to complete their journeys, the economic consequences of the confrontation continue to accumulate.
For Tehran, this creates an opportunity to impose substantial costs without necessarily matching American military capabilities.
Iran can threaten shipping with relatively modest resources, while the United States must maintain expensive naval deployments and security arrangements to protect maritime traffic.
This is the calculation Hanna believes lies at the centre of Iran’s strategy: making the cost of sustaining military pressure increasingly difficult for Washington to justify.
Iran’s Strategy: Survive the War and Make the Enemy Pay
Hanna also interpreted the reported instructions from Iran’s Supreme Leader as a deliberate message about the country’s internal military cohesion.
The directives, he argued, indicate that Iran’s leadership remains united and is preparing for the possibility of another confrontation.
Equally important is Tehran’s apparent willingness to expand the geographical scope of any military response.
Hanna described this horizontal expansion as particularly significant because it increases the pressure experienced by the opposing side.
Rather than limiting retaliation to a narrow battlefield, Iran could seek to impose consequences across a wider geographical area.
The approach reflects a different understanding of what constitutes success in a confrontation with a militarily superior opponent.
Iran may not need a conventional military victory. Its objective could be to survive the confrontation while making the consequences so costly that its adversaries struggle to sustain them.
As Hanna characterised the Iranian calculation, Tehran appears to believe it can win simply by avoiding defeat.
That approach also helps explain why shipping routes, oil infrastructure and the wider regional economy have assumed such importance in Iran’s military calculations.
Trump’s Three Options and the Risk of a Short War
Against this backdrop, Hanna believes Trump faces three principal choices: escalate militarily, negotiate with Tehran or wait.
Each carries its own implications, but the military option appears to be taking shape around a specific objective.
Trump’s references to striking Iranian energy facilities and command-and-control infrastructure suggest, according to Hanna, that Washington is considering an intense campaign designed to weaken Iran rapidly.
The aim would be to apply overwhelming military pressure within a limited period, undermine Iran’s internal position and then withdraw a substantial portion of the American forces currently maintaining the naval pressure around the country.
Hanna noted that sustaining such a large military presence is itself extremely expensive.
A short campaign could therefore offer Washington a way to pursue its objectives without bearing the financial burden of an extended military confrontation.
But this is precisely where the American and Iranian calculations diverge.
Washington appears to be considering how to maximise military pressure within a compressed timeframe.
Tehran, meanwhile, is attempting to ensure that the economic and geographical consequences of military escalation cannot be contained so easily.
The struggle over Hormuz has therefore become more than a contest over who controls a maritime passage.
It is a confrontation between an American strategy built around the possibility of a rapid military outcome and an Iranian strategy designed to make the consequences of war increasingly expensive, geographically dispersed and difficult to control.
Whether Trump chooses escalation, negotiation or continued pressure, the Strait of Hormuz is already demonstrating how Iran intends to influence that decision.