Removing Benjamin Netanyahu from power might improve Israel’s international image. But would it end the occupation, halt settlement expansion or fundamentally change Israeli policy towards Palestinians? A closer examination of the politicians seeking to replace him suggests otherwise.
The possibility of Netanyahu losing power to an opposition coalition led by Gadi Eisenkot raises a question that deserves serious consideration: would such an outcome actually serve the interests of the Palestinian people?
I believe the answer is no, and for several reasons.
Perhaps the most important is the political transformation of Israeli society itself. A substantial majority has moved towards increasingly extreme and racist positions, leaving little reason to assume that replacing Netanyahu with Eisenkot would produce meaningful improvements for Palestinians.
The opposition coalition is united around two primary objectives: removing Netanyahu from office and implementing US President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza.
Beyond those objectives, however, the differences between Eisenkot’s political partners and Netanyahu’s camp are far less substantial than their electoral rivalry might suggest.
A closer examination of their positions on Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iran reveals a remarkable degree of continuity.
Lieberman: Annex the West Bank, Confront Hezbollah and Overthrow Iran’s Government
Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party offers little indication of a more moderate Israeli policy towards Palestinians or neighbouring countries.
Lieberman rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state and advocates the annexation of Area C of the occupied West Bank, which constitutes the majority of the territory.
His proposed alternative for the remaining parts of the West Bank is to transfer their administration to Jordan.
In other words, his political programme does not envisage an independent Palestinian state, but rather a reorganisation of territorial control that preserves Israeli dominance over strategically important areas.
His regional positions are equally confrontational.
In Lebanon, Lieberman advocates pre-emptive military operations against Hezbollah.
In Syria, he regards the country’s new government as a security threat requiring an aggressive deterrence strategy.
His approach to Iran goes further.
Lieberman openly supports overthrowing the Iranian government and does not rule out targeting strategic facilities and civilian economic infrastructure to achieve that objective.
These are not policies that suggest a significant departure from the confrontational regional approach associated with Netanyahu.
Bennett: No Palestinian State and Continued Israeli Military Control
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett represents another influential figure within the anti-Netanyahu political camp.
His security doctrine firmly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state and opposes Israeli withdrawal from territories he considers essential to Israel’s security.
Bennett supports continued settlement activity in the occupied West Bank while maintaining Israeli security control over the territory.
His position on Lebanon centres on preserving Israel’s occupation of the area it describes as a security zone.
He also advocates holding Iran directly responsible for Hezbollah’s attacks and responding to such operations inside Iranian territory.
In Syria, Bennett supports maintaining Israel’s occupied buffer zone until security arrangements acceptable to Israel can be guaranteed.
Regarding Iran, he favours continued military and economic pressure to prevent Tehran from developing capabilities that could threaten Israel.
Taken together, Bennett’s positions offer little prospect of an end to Israeli territorial control or a significant reduction in military pressure across the region.
Lapid: More Diplomacy, but the Same Fundamental Red Lines
Yair Lapid presents himself through a somewhat different political approach, placing greater emphasis on diplomacy and international alliances alongside Israel’s military superiority.
But when his positions are examined more closely, the fundamental similarities become difficult to ignore.
Lapid opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state or international recognition of Palestinian statehood “under the current circumstances”.
He has criticised settler violence and settlement expansion that undermines the prospects of a negotiated settlement.
Yet he does not advocate a complete halt to settlement activity.
That distinction matters.
Opposing certain settlement practices is not equivalent to opposing the settlement enterprise itself, particularly when Israeli control over occupied territory remains central to the political programme.
In Lebanon, Lapid supports military operations against Hezbollah, while seeking to translate their outcomes into security and diplomatic arrangements, including normalisation with Lebanon.
In Syria, he prioritises security understandings with the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa but does not commit to withdrawing Israeli forces from occupied Syrian territory.
His approach to Iran also preserves the military option.
Lapid supports military action to prevent what he describes as an Iranian nuclear threat, although he emphasises the importance of coordinating such action with the United States.
His differences with other opposition figures therefore concern the methods used to pursue Israeli objectives more than the objectives themselves.
Eisenkot: Opposition to Netanyahu, Not to the Occupation
At the centre of this political coalition stands Gadi Eisenkot, whose approach combines military force with political and diplomatic arrangements.
Eisenkot rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Although he opposes certain settlement expansion projects, including the controversial E1 project in the occupied West Bank, he supports settlement activity more broadly.
He also opposes placing the West Bank under the direct administration of the Israeli military.
However, his preferred alternative is not Palestinian sovereignty.
Instead, he supports maintaining the territory under Israel’s Civil Administration.
That position would alter the administrative framework without necessarily ending Israeli control.
His regional policies follow a similar pattern.
In Lebanon, Eisenkot supports maintaining Israel’s occupation of what it calls the security zone.
He also advocates involving the United States and France in efforts to bring Lebanon into a process of normalisation with Israel.
Regarding Syria, Eisenkot supports negotiating new security arrangements based on the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
But negotiations, in his approach, do not necessarily mean withdrawing Israeli forces from territory occupied in Syria.
On Iran, he advocates combining military and intelligence pressure with a verifiable agreement designed to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.
Eisenkot may differ from Netanyahu in his preferred diplomatic instruments and political presentation, but his positions offer little evidence of a fundamental shift towards ending Israeli occupation or recognising Palestinian statehood.
Even the Coalition’s Left-Wing Party Stops Short of Palestinian Statehood
The most notable differences within Eisenkot’s coalition come from the Democrats, led by Yair Golan.
As the coalition’s only left-wing party, the Democrats hold positions that genuinely differ from those of their right-wing partners.
Yet even these differences offer limited grounds for Palestinian optimism.
Unlike several coalition allies, Golan’s party opposes annexing the occupied West Bank.
However, it does not support establishing a Palestinian state, instead advocating separation from the Palestinians.
The party also opposes the establishment of new settlement outposts that were previously considered illegal under Israeli law.
But it stops short of demanding an end to settlement activity altogether.
Furthermore, it supports continued Israeli security control over the Jordan Valley and other strategically important areas of the occupied West Bank.
On Lebanon, the Democrats advocate a security agreement that would move Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border and deploy the Lebanese army alongside international forces.
At the same time, they support retaining Israeli military positions on elevated terrain and preserving Israel’s freedom to conduct military operations.
In Syria, the party favours a security agreement that would stabilise the border and reduce the need for continued direct military occupation.
Regarding Iran, Golan supports preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons through a new agreement subject to strict international monitoring.
He nevertheless insists that the military option remain available, provided it is coordinated with Washington.
The Democrats therefore represent a more restrained approach on certain issues, particularly annexation and diplomatic engagement.
But even within this supposedly more moderate political framework, the prospect of Palestinian statehood remains absent.
The Real Difference May Be How Israel Presents Its Policies to the World
Looking across the coalition, a broader political reality emerges.
Lieberman, Bennett, Lapid, Eisenkot and Golan differ in their rhetoric, political priorities and preferred methods.
Some favour greater military confrontation, while others emphasise diplomatic agreements and international coordination.
Some support annexation, while others oppose it.
Yet none of these differences provides a convincing basis for Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians or Iranians to celebrate the prospect of Eisenkot replacing Netanyahu.
The central policies would largely continue, even if the political language and instruments used to implement them changed.
This raises a more uncomfortable question.
Could Netanyahu remaining in power actually serve Palestinian interests better than an opposition victory?
It may seem counterintuitive, particularly given the policies pursued by Netanyahu and his far-right allies.
But there is a strategic argument for considering that possibility.
Why Netanyahu’s Removal Could Help Israel Escape International Pressure
An Eisenkot victory could make it more difficult for Palestinians to mobilise international support against Israeli policies.
Western governments have already shown considerable reluctance to impose meaningful sanctions on Israel despite the crimes committed against Palestinians.
Replacing Netanyahu with a politician perceived as more moderate could provide those governments with a convenient justification for avoiding stronger action.
Much of the international criticism directed at Israel has focused on Netanyahu and his far-right allies, particularly Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
An Eisenkot-led government would allow Western capitals to distinguish between the Israeli state and the politicians currently governing it.
They could argue that Netanyahu’s departure represents a return to political moderation, even if the new government’s positions on occupation, settlements and Palestinian statehood remained fundamentally unchanged.
In effect, Israel could receive a diplomatic opportunity to rehabilitate its international image without being required to undertake a corresponding transformation of its policies.
That outcome would be especially consequential for Palestinians seeking to build international pressure against occupation and apartheid.
Netanyahu Has Become a Liability for Israel’s International Image
Netanyahu and his political allies have increasingly become a burden on Israel’s reputation abroad.
The Israeli prime minister is wanted by the International Criminal Court on allegations of war crimes.
Meanwhile, his far-right allies Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have faced sanctions from several countries, including European states, restricting their ability to travel to those jurisdictions.
Their continued presence in government complicates efforts to present Israeli policies as the actions of a moderate democratic state.
An Eisenkot victory, by contrast, could help Western governments argue that Israel has corrected its political direction.
The problem with that argument is that changing the government would not necessarily change the policies responsible for the international criticism.
The occupation of Palestinian territory would remain central to the political agenda.
Settlement activity would continue to enjoy support across much of the political spectrum.
And Israel’s regional military posture towards Lebanon, Syria and Iran would remain largely intact.
The political presentation might change, but the underlying structures would survive.
The Strategic Case Against Celebrating an Eisenkot Victory
For Palestinians, the objective should not simply be to replace Netanyahu with a more internationally acceptable Israeli leader.
The objective must be to end the occupation, dismantle the system of apartheid and secure meaningful political rights.
That requires sustained international pressure directed at Israeli state policies rather than criticism restricted to individual politicians.
Netanyahu’s continued leadership could, paradoxically, create more favourable conditions for strengthening Israel’s international isolation.
His government’s conduct and the political positions of his allies have made it increasingly difficult for foreign governments to overlook the nature of Israeli policies.
That situation could provide an opportunity to expand demands for economic, political and cultural sanctions aimed at ending occupation and apartheid.
An Eisenkot government might weaken that momentum by offering Israel an opportunity to improve its diplomatic standing while preserving the policies at the centre of the dispute.
The question, therefore, is not whether Eisenkot would govern more diplomatically than Netanyahu. It is whether his government would end the policies Palestinians are fighting against.
Judging by the positions of the parties in his coalition, there is little reason to expect that outcome.
And if replacing Netanyahu merely changes the international perception of Israel without changing its conduct, Palestinians may find themselves confronting the same occupation under a government that faces considerably less international pressure.
