Losing at the ballot box may not be enough to stop Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu from launching another war against Iran. It could, in fact, give both leaders another reason to escalate.
That is the warning from Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman, who argues that electoral setbacks could tempt the American president and Israeli prime minister to seek a military victory they have so far failed to achieve, even as the risks of another confrontation threaten to destabilise the Middle East and the global economy.
The possibility is already unsettling international energy markets.
Oil prices surged to $117 a barrel last week, reflecting growing fears that Washington and Israel could resume their military campaign against Tehran. While Trump attributed the increase to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Rachman argued that the markets were responding to a more immediate concern: reports that American and Israeli forces were preparing another attack on Iran after the US midterm elections.
The central question, however, is whether another round of bombardment would accomplish anything that previous military operations failed to achieve.
More Bombs, but No Clear Path to Victory
The joint American-Israeli offensive against Iran in February failed to achieve one of its most ambitious objectives: bringing down the Islamic Republic.
According to Rachman, expanding the list of targets or deploying more destructive weapons would not necessarily change that outcome.
There is no guarantee that a larger military campaign would overthrow Iran’s government or force Tehran to make the substantial concessions Washington and Israel have sought.
What appears considerably more predictable is the likelihood of Iranian retaliation.
Rachman warned that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain vulnerable to attacks on critical infrastructure, while American military bases across the region and commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz could also be targeted by Iran or its regional allies.
Such attacks could have consequences extending well beyond the battlefield, particularly if they disrupted energy production, shipping routes or the infrastructure upon which Gulf economies depend.
Tehran also retains potential escalation options it has not yet exercised.
These include strikes against desalination plants, which provide essential freshwater supplies across much of the Gulf, and undersea communications cables that support regional and international connectivity.
Some analysts have even raised the possibility of Iranian ground attacks against American military installations in Bahrain or Kuwait.
These scenarios are not established Iranian plans, but they illustrate the range of vulnerabilities that could be exposed if another military campaign develops into a wider regional confrontation.
With oil prices already reflecting fears of escalation, the economic consequences could be immediate and global.
Why Would Trump and Netanyahu Risk Another War?
Rachman questioned why either leader would contemplate another military offensive when neither appears to possess a coherent strategy for achieving victory.
One explanation, he suggested, is their unwillingness to accept the failure of the previous campaign.
Both leaders may remain convinced that additional military pressure could finally force Iran to retreat, reopen the Strait of Hormuz without conditions and surrender its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
Yet this calculation rests on an assumption that previous military operations have not substantiated: that Tehran will eventually capitulate if subjected to sufficient force.
For Trump and Netanyahu, however, the decision is not exclusively military. Domestic political considerations may prove equally influential.
Both face elections expected to produce unfavourable results, while their campaign against Iran has failed to deliver the decisive outcome they had sought.
Nevertheless, the political consequences of the war have developed very differently in Washington and Israel.
An Unpopular War in America, but a Different Political Reality in Israel
In the United States, the war has attracted limited public support.
Rising prices, American military casualties and the perceived deterioration of America’s international standing have contributed to domestic dissatisfaction.
For Trump, another offensive against Iran would therefore carry substantial political risks, particularly if it triggered further economic disruption or additional American losses.
In Israel, the political calculation is different.
According to Rachman, the decision to attack Iran remains broadly popular among Israelis. Opposition criticism of Netanyahu has focused less on the decision to launch the campaign and more on his failure to complete its military objectives.
That distinction gives Netanyahu a potential political incentive to continue the confrontation.
Despite his government’s failure to prevent the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, Netanyahu has continued to place national security at the centre of his election campaign.
During the final days of campaigning, he published an artificial intelligence-generated image depicting a nuclear explosion over Tel Aviv.
The image accompanied a warning about what he described as a “real and tangible existential threat” facing Israel.
By emphasising the Iranian threat, Netanyahu has sought to keep national security at the forefront of an election in which his political future remains uncertain.
Netanyahu Reportedly Wanted an Earlier Attack, but Trump Had Other Plans
According to Rachman, Netanyahu is believed to have pushed for renewed military strikes against Iran before the Israeli election.
The calculation was political as well as military.
With opinion polls suggesting that his political bloc could narrowly lose, another confrontation with Tehran might have strengthened his electoral position by shifting attention towards national security.
Trump, however, reportedly preferred postponing any renewed offensive until after the American midterm elections.
As the more powerful partner in the US-Israeli relationship, the American president was able to make his preferred timetable prevail.
The disagreement illustrates how the timing of a possible military campaign has become entangled with the domestic political calculations of both governments.
It also raises the possibility that the removal of electoral constraints could make another offensive more attractive.
Losing an Election Would Not Remove Either Leader’s Military Powers
Rachman argued that the conclusion of the elections would not necessarily eliminate the incentives for escalation.
Even if Netanyahu loses, he would not immediately relinquish power.
Israel’s parliamentary system could require weeks or months of coalition negotiations before a new government takes office.
During that period, Netanyahu would remain prime minister, retaining the authority to order military operations if he considered them necessary for Israeli national security.
Some analysts believe renewed hostilities could also offer Netanyahu an opportunity to reshape the domestic political landscape.
Dani Citrinowicz, an analyst at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, is among those who have suggested that restarting the war could allow Netanyahu to press for the formation of a national unity government under his leadership.
Such an arrangement could potentially offer him a route to retaining power despite an unfavourable election result.
Trump faces a different constitutional reality, but one that also leaves considerable room for military action.
Even if Republicans lose control of both chambers of Congress, the president would remain commander-in-chief of the US armed forces.
An electoral defeat would therefore not automatically prevent him from authorising another attack on Iran.
Rachman suggested that a political setback could instead encourage Trump to respond with a renewed demonstration of American military power.
In both countries, therefore, electoral defeat might weaken the leaders politically without immediately restricting their ability to escalate militarily.
The Military Risks That Could Still Restrain Washington
Despite these political incentives, Rachman cautioned that another war is far from inevitable.
Trump has repeatedly threatened Iran with further military escalation in recent months, only to retreat from carrying out those threats.
There are also significant practical constraints.
American military installations and regional allies remain exposed to Iranian retaliation, making any renewed offensive potentially costly for Washington and its partners.
The previous campaign has also depleted stocks of critical military equipment, particularly interceptor missiles used to defend against incoming attacks.
These shortages could complicate preparations for another confrontation, especially one involving sustained Iranian missile attacks against American bases, Gulf infrastructure or regional shipping.
The danger is that another offensive could trigger a cycle of retaliation that neither Washington nor Israel can easily control, while imposing further pressure on already unsettled international energy markets.
For Rachman, the absence of a clear strategy for victory is one of the strongest arguments against restarting the war.
But strategic logic may not ultimately determine the decision.
The prospect of further economic damage, military casualties and regional instability has to be weighed against the political instincts of two leaders who have invested heavily in their confrontation with Iran.
And therein lies the danger identified by Rachman: Trump and Netanyahu may be tempted to respond to defeat at the ballot box by pursuing the victory they failed to secure on the battlefield.
